

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(Commercial List)

B E T W E E N:

DBDC SPADINA LTD.,
and THOSE CORPORATIONS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A" HERETO

Applicants

- and -

NORMA WALTON, RONAULD WALTON, THE ROSE & THISTLE GROUP
LTD. and EGLINTON CASTLE INC.

Respondents

- and -

THOSE CORPORATIONS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "B" HERETO, TO BE
BOUND BY THE RESULT

Book of Authorities of Schonfeld Inc.

*("Counter-Application" of the Respondents returnable March 15, 2016 re: various
procedural relief and Manager's Motion returnable March 15, 2016 for an Order Striking
Certain Portions of the Respondents' "Notice of Counter-Application")*

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TO: SERVICE LIST

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A

2003 SCC 63
Supreme Court of Canada

Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79

2003 CarswellOnt 4328, 2003 CarswellOnt 4329, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, [2003] S.C.J. No. 64, 120 L.A.C. (4th) 225, 179 O.A.C. 291, 17 C.R. (6th) 276, 2003 C.L.L.C. 220-071, 232 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 311 N.R. 201, 31 C.C.E.L. (3d) 216, 59 W.C.B. (2d) 334, 9 Admin. L.R. (4th) 161, J.E. 2003-2108, REJB 2003-49439

Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79, Appellant v. City of Toronto and Douglas C. Stanley, Respondents and Attorney General of Ontario, Intervener

McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel, Deschamps JJ.

Heard: February 13, 2003
Judgment: November 6, 2003 *
Docket: 28840

Proceedings: affirming (2001), 45 C.R. (5th) 354, 37 Admin. L.R. (3d) 40 (Ont. C.A.); affirming (2000), 23 Admin. L.R. (3d) 72 (Ont. Div. Ct.)

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Subject: Labour; Criminal; Civil Practice and Procedure; Public; Evidence

APPEAL by union from judgment reported at 2001 CarswellOnt 2760, 45 C.R. (5th) 354, (sub nom. *Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79*) 55 O.R. (3d) 541, 149 O.A.C. 213, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 280, (sub nom. *City of Toronto v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79*) 2002 C.L.L.C. 220-014, 37 Admin. L.R. (3d) 40 (Ont. C.A.), dismissing union's appeal from judgment granting employer's application for judicial review of decision of labour arbitrator, reported at 2000 CarswellOnt 1477, [2000] O.J. No. 1570, 2000 C.L.L.C. 220-038, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 323, 23 Admin. L.R. (3d) 72, 134 O.A.C. 48 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

POURVOI du syndicat à l'encontre de l'arrêt publié à 2001 CarswellOnt 2760, 45 C.R. (5th) 354, (sub nom. *Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79*) 55 O.R. (3d) 541, 149 O.A.C. 213, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 280, (sub nom. *City of Toronto v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79*) 2002 C.L.L.C. 220-014, 37 Admin. L.R. (3d) 40 (Ont. C.A.), qui a rejeté son pourvoi à l'encontre du jugement ayant accueilli la demande de contrôle judiciaire présentée par l'employeur contre la décision rendue par l'arbitre de grief, publié à 2000 CarswellOnt 1477, [2000] O.J. No. 1570, 2000 C.L.L.C. 220-038, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 323, 23 Admin. L.R. (3d) 72, 134 O.A.C. 48 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

Arbour J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie JJ. concurring):

I. Introduction

1 Can a person convicted of sexual assault, and dismissed from his employment as a result, be reinstated by a labour arbitrator who concludes, on the evidence before him, that the sexual assault did not take place? This is essentially the issue raised in this appeal.

2 Like the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Divisional Court, I have come to the conclusion that the arbitrator may not revisit the criminal conviction. Although my reasons differ somewhat from those of the courts below, I would dismiss the appeal.

II. Facts

3 Glenn Oliver worked as a recreation instructor for the respondent City of Toronto. He was charged with sexually assaulting a boy under his supervision. He pleaded not guilty. At trial before a judge alone, he testified and was cross-examined. He called several defence witnesses, including character witnesses. The trial judge found that the complainant was credible and that Oliver was not. He entered a conviction, which was later affirmed on appeal. He sentenced Oliver to 15 months in jail, followed by one year of probation.

4 The respondent City of Toronto fired Oliver a few days after his conviction, and Oliver grieved his dismissal. At the hearing, the City of Toronto submitted the boy's testimony from the criminal trial and the notes of Oliver's supervisor, who had spoken to the boy at the time. The City did not call the boy to testify. Oliver again testified on his own behalf and claimed that he had never sexually assaulted the boy.

5 The arbitrator ruled that the criminal conviction was admissible as *prima facie*, but not conclusive, evidence that Oliver had sexually assaulted the boy. No evidence of fraud nor any fresh evidence unavailable at trial was introduced in the arbitration. The arbitrator held that the presumption raised by the criminal conviction had been rebutted and that Oliver had been dismissed without just cause.

III. Procedural History

A. Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court) (2000), 187 D.L.R. (4th) 323

6 At Divisional Court the application for judicial review was granted and the decision of the arbitrator was quashed. The Divisional Court heard this case and *Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79* at the same time. (*Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79*, 2003 SCC 64 (S.C.C.), is being released concurrently by this Court.) O'Driscoll J. found that while s. 22.1 of the *Evidence Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, applied to all the arbitrations, relitigation of the cases was barred by the doctrines of collateral attack, issue estoppel and abuse of process. The court noted that criminal convictions are valid judgments that cannot be collaterally attacked at a later arbitration (paras. 74-79). With respect to issue estoppel, under which an issue decided against a party is protected from collateral attack barring decisive new evidence or a showing of fraud, the court found that relitigation was also prevented, rejecting the appellants' argument that there had been no privity because the union, and not the grievor, had filed the grievance. The court also held that the doctrine of abuse of process, which denies a collateral attack upon a final decision of another court where the party had "a full opportunity of contesting the decision," applied (paras. 81 and 90). Finally, O'Driscoll J. found that whether the standard of review was correctness or patent unreasonableness in each case, the standard for judicial review had been met (para. 86).

B. Court of Appeal for Ontario (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 541

7 Doherty J.A., for the court, held that because the crux of the issue was whether the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE or the union) was permitted to relitigate the issue decided in the criminal trial, and because this analysis "turned on [the arbitrator's] understanding of the common law rules and principles governing relitigation of issues finally decided in a previous judicial proceeding," the appropriate standard of review was correctness (paras. 22 and 38).

8 Doherty J.A. concluded that issue estoppel did not apply. Even if the union was the employee's privity, the respondent City of Toronto had played no role in the criminal proceeding and had no relationship to the Crown. He also found that describing the appellant union's attempt to relitigate the employee's culpability as a collateral attack on the order of the court did not assist in determining whether relitigation could be permitted. Commenting that the phrase "abuse of process" was perhaps best limited to describe those cases where the plaintiff has instigated litigation for some improper purpose, Doherty J.A. went on to consider what he called "the finality principle" in considerable depth.

9 Doherty J.A. dismissed the appeal on the basis of this principle. He held that the *res judicata* jurisprudence required a court to balance the importance of finality, which reduces uncertainty and inconsistency in results and which serves to conserve the resources of both the parties and the judiciary, with the "search for justice in each individual case" (para. 94). Doherty J.A. held that the following approach should be taken when weighing finality claims against an individual litigant's claim to access to justice:

- Does the *res judicata* doctrine apply?
- If the doctrine applies, can the party against whom it applies demonstrate that the justice of the individual case should trump finality concerns?
- If the doctrine does not apply, can the party seeking to preclude relitigation demonstrate that finality concerns should be given paramouncy over the claim that justice requires relitigation?

10 Ultimately, Doherty J.A. dismissed the appeal, concluding that "finality concerns must be given paramouncy over CUPE's claim to an entitlement to relitigate Oliver's culpability" (para. 102). He so concluded because there was no suggestion of fraud at the criminal trial, because the underlying charges were serious enough that the employee was likely to have litigated them to the fullest and because there was no new evidence presented at arbitration (paras. 103-108).

IV. Relevant Statutory Provisions

11 *Evidence Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23

22.1(1) Proof that a person has been convicted or discharged anywhere in Canada of a crime is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the crime was committed by the person, if,

- (a) no appeal of the conviction or discharge was taken and the time for an appeal has expired; or
- (b) an appeal of the conviction or discharge was taken but was dismissed or abandoned and no further appeal is available.

(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the convicted or discharged person is a party to the proceeding.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), a certificate containing the substance and effect only, omitting the formal part, of the charge and of the conviction or discharge, purporting to be signed by the officer having the custody of the records of the court at which the offender was convicted or discharged, or by the deputy of the officer, is, on proof of the identity of the person named as convicted or discharged person in the certificate, sufficient evidence of the conviction or discharge of that person, without proof of the signature or of the official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate.

Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A

48.(1) Every collective agreement shall provide for the final and binding settlement by arbitration, without stoppage of work, of all differences between the parties arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged violation of the agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable.

V. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

12 My colleague LeBel J. discusses at length our jurisprudence on standards of review. He reviews concerns and criticisms about the three standard system of judicial review. Given that these issues were not argued before us in this case, and without the benefit of a full adversarial debate, I would not wish to comment on the desirability of a departure from our recently affirmed framework for standards of review analysis. (See this Court's unanimous decisions of *Q. v. College of Physicians & Surgeons*

(*British Columbia*), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19 (S.C.C.), and *Ryan v. Law Society (New Brunswick)*, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20 (S.C.C.).

13 The Court of Appeal properly applied the functional and pragmatic approach as delineated in *Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration)*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.) (see also *Q.*, *supra*), to determine the extent to which the legislature intended that courts should review the tribunals' decisions.

14 Doherty J.A. was correct to acknowledge patent unreasonableness as the general standard of review of an arbitrator's decision as to whether just cause has been established in the discharge of an employee. However, and as he noted, the same standard of review does not necessarily apply to every ruling made by the arbitrator in the course of the arbitration. This follows the distinction drawn by Cory J. for the majority in *Toronto (City) Board of Education v. O.S.S.T.F., District 15*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487 (S.C.C.), where he said, at para. 39:

It has been held on several occasions that the expert skill and knowledge which an arbitration board exercises in interpreting a collective agreement does not usually extend to the interpretation of "outside" legislation. *The findings of a board pertaining to the interpretation of a statute or the common law are generally reviewable on a correctness standard* An exception to this rule may occur where the external statute is intimately connected with the mandate of the tribunal and is encountered frequently as a result. [Emphasis added.]

15 In this case, the reasonableness of the arbitrator's decision to reinstate the grievor is predicated on the correctness of his assumption that he was not bound by the criminal conviction. That assumption rested on his analysis of complex common law rules and of conflicting jurisprudence. The body of law dealing with the relitigation of issues finally decided in previous judicial proceedings is not only complex, it is also at the heart of the administration of justice. Properly understood and applied, the doctrines of *res judicata* and abuse of process govern the interplay between different judicial decision makers. These rules and principles call for a judicial balance between finality, fairness, efficiency and authority of judicial decisions. The application of these rules, doctrines and principles is clearly outside the sphere of expertise of a labour arbitrator who may be called to have recourse to them. In such a case, he or she must correctly answer the question of law raised. An incorrect approach may be sufficient to lead to a patently unreasonable outcome. This was reiterated recently by Iacobucci J. in *Parry Sound (District) Welfare Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324*, 2003 SCC 42 (S.C.C.), at para. 21.

16 Therefore, I agree with the Court of Appeal that the arbitrator had to decide correctly whether CUPE was entitled, either at common law or under a statute, to relitigate the issue decided against the grievor in the criminal proceedings.

B. Section 22.1 of Ontario's Evidence Act

17 Section 22.1 of the Ontario *Evidence Act* is of limited assistance to the disposition of this appeal. It provides that proof that a person has been convicted of a crime is proof, "in the absence of evidence to the contrary," that the crime was committed by that person.

18 As Doherty J.A. correctly pointed out, at para. 42, s. 22.1 contemplates that the validity of a conviction may be challenged in a subsequent proceeding, but the section says nothing about the circumstances in which such challenge is or is not permissible. That issue is determined by the application of such common law doctrines as *res judicata*, issue estoppel, collateral attack and abuse of process. Section 22.1 speaks of the admissibility of the fact of the conviction as proof of the truth of its content and speaks of its conclusive effect if unchallenged. As a rule of evidence, the section addresses in part the hearsay rule, by making the conviction - the finding of another court - admissible for the truth of its content, as an exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay (David M. Paciocco and Lee Stuesser, *The Law of Evidence*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), at p. 120; M.N. Howard, Peter Crane and Daniel A. Hochberg, *Phipson on Evidence*, 14th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), at pp. 33-94 to 33-95).

19 Here, however, the admissibility of the conviction is not in issue. Section 22.1 renders the proof of the conviction admissible. The question is whether it can be rebutted by "evidence to the contrary." There are circumstances in which evidence will be admissible to rebut the presumption that the person convicted committed the crime, in particular, where the conviction in issue is that of a non-party. There are also circumstances in which no such evidence may be tendered. If either issue estoppel or

abuse of process bars the relitigation of the facts essential to the conviction, then no "evidence to the contrary" may be tendered to displace the effect of the conviction. In such a case, the conviction is conclusive that the person convicted committed the crime.

20 This interpretation is consistent with the rule of interpretation that legislation is presumed not to depart from general principles of law without an express indication to that effect. This presumption was reviewed and applied by Iacobucci J. in *Parry Sound*, *supra*, at para. 39. Section 22.1 reflected the law established in the leading Canadian case of *Demeter v. British Pacific Life Insurance Co.* (1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d) 249 (Ont. H.C.), at p. 264, affirmed (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 266 (Ont. C.A.), wherein after a thorough review of Canadian and English jurisprudence, Osler J. held that a criminal conviction is admissible in subsequent civil litigation as *prima facie* proof that the convicted individual committed the alleged act, "subject to rebuttal by the plaintiff on the merits." However, the common law also recognized that the presumption of guilt established by a conviction is rebuttable only where the rebuttal does not constitute an abuse of the process of the court (*Demeter* (H.C.), *supra*, at p. 265; *McIlkenny v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands* (1981), [1982] A.C. 529 (U.K. H.L.), at p. 541; see also *Del Core v. College of Pharmacists (Ontario)* (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 22, *per Blair J.A.*). Section 22.1 does not change this; the legislature has not explicitly displaced the common law doctrines and the rebuttal is consequently subject to them.

21 The question, therefore, is whether any doctrine precludes in this case the relitigation of the facts upon which the conviction rests.

C. The Common Law Doctrines

22 Much consideration was given in the decisions below to the three related common law doctrines of issue estoppel, abuse of process and collateral attack. Each of these doctrines was considered as a possible means of preventing the union from relitigating the criminal conviction of the grievor before the arbitrator. Although both the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal concluded that the union could not relitigate the guilt of the grievor as reflected in his criminal conviction, they took different views of the applicability of the different doctrines advanced in support of that conclusion. While the Divisional Court concluded that relitigation was barred by the collateral attack rule, issue estoppel and abuse of process, the Court of Appeal was of the view that none of these doctrines as they presently stand applied to bar the rebuttal. Rather, it relied on a self-standing "finality principle." I think it is useful to disentangle these various rules and doctrines before turning to the applicable one here. I stress at the outset that these common law doctrines are interrelated and in many cases more than one doctrine may support a particular outcome. Even though both issue estoppel and collateral attacks may properly be viewed as particular applications of a broader doctrine of abuse of process, the three are not always entirely interchangeable.

(1) Issue Estoppel

23 Issue estoppel is a branch of *res judicata* (the other branch being *cause of action* estoppel) which precludes the relitigation of issues previously decided in court in another proceeding. For issue estoppel to be successfully invoked, three preconditions must be met: (1) the issue must be the same as the one decided in the prior decision, (2) the prior judicial decision must have been final, and (3) the parties to both proceedings must be the same, or their privies (*Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc.*, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, 2001 SCC 44 (S.C.C.), at para. 25, *per Binnie J.*). The final requirement, known as "mutuality," has been largely abandoned in the United States and has been the subject of much academic and judicial debate there, as well as in the United Kingdom and, to some extent, in this country (See Garry D. Watson, "Duplicative Litigation: Issue Estoppel, Abuse of Process and the Death of Mutuality" (1990), 69 *Can. Bar Rev.* 623, at pp. 648-651). In light of the different conclusions reached by the courts below on the applicability of issue estoppel, I think it is useful to examine that debate more closely.

24 The first two requirements of issue estoppel are met in this case. The final requirement of mutuality of parties has not been met. In the original criminal case, the *lis* was between Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada and Glenn Oliver. In the arbitration, the parties were CUPE and the City of Toronto, Oliver's employer. It is unnecessary to decide whether Oliver and CUPE should reasonably be viewed as privies for the purpose of the application of the mutuality requirement since it is clear that the Crown, acting as prosecutor in the criminal case, is not privy with the City of Toronto, nor would it be with a provincial, rather than a municipal, employer (as in the *Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79* case, released concurrently).

25 There has been much academic criticism of the mutuality requirement of the doctrine of issue estoppel. In his article, Prof. Watson, *supra*, argues that explicitly abolishing the mutuality requirement, as has been done in the United States, would both reduce confusion in the law and remove the possibility that a strict application of issue estoppel may work an injustice. The arguments made by him and others (see also Donald J. Lange, *The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada* (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000)), urging Canadian courts to abandon the mutuality requirement have been helpful in articulating a principled approach to the bar against relitigation. In my view, however, appropriate guidance is available in our law without the modification to the mutuality requirement that this case would necessitate.

26 In his very useful review of the abandonment of the mutuality requirement in the United States, Prof. Watson, at p. 631, points out that mutuality was first relaxed when issue estoppel was used defensively:

The defensive use of non-mutual issue estoppel is straight forward. If P, having litigated an issue with D1 and lost, subsequently sues D2 raising the same issue, D2 can rely defensively on the issue estoppel arising from the former action, unless the first action did not provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate or other factors make it unfair or unwise to permit preclusion. The rationale is that P should not be allowed to relitigate an issue already lost by simply changing defendants

27 Professor Watson then exposes the additional difficulties that arise if the mutuality requirement is removed when issue estoppel is raised offensively, as was done by the United States Supreme Court in *Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322 (U.S.S.C. 1979). He describes the offensive use of non-mutual issue estoppel as follows (at p. 631):

The power of this offensive non-mutual issue estoppel doctrine is illustrated by single event disaster cases, such as an airline crash. Assume P1 sues Airline for negligence in the operation of the aircraft and in that action Airline is found to have been negligent. Offensive non-mutual issue estoppel permits P2 through P20, *etc.*, now to sue Airline and successfully plead issue estoppel on the question of the airline's negligence. The rationale is that if Airline fully and fairly litigated the issue of its negligence in action #1 it has had its day in court; it has had due process and it should not be permitted to relitigate the negligence issue. However, the court in *Parklane* realized that in order to ensure fairness in the operation of offensive non-mutual issue estoppel the doctrine has to be subject to qualifications.

28 Properly understood, our case could be viewed as falling under this second category - what would be described in U.S. law as "non-mutual offensive preclusion." Although, technically speaking, the City of Toronto is not the "plaintiff" in the arbitration proceedings, the City wishes to take advantage of the conviction obtained by the Crown against Oliver in a different, prior proceeding to which the City was not a party. It wishes to preclude Oliver from relitigating an issue that he fought and lost in the criminal forum. U.S. law acknowledges the peculiar difficulties with offensive use of non-mutual estoppel. Professor Watson explains, at pp. 632-633:

First, the court acknowledged that the effects of non-mutuality differ depending on whether issue estoppel is used offensively or defensively. While defensive preclusion helps to reduce litigation offensive preclusion, by contrast, encourages potential plaintiffs not to join in the first action. "Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment". Thus, without some limit, non-mutual offensive preclusion would increase rather than decrease the total amount of litigation. To meet this problem the *Parklane* court held that preclusion should be denied in action #2 "where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action".

Second, the court recognized that in some circumstances to permit non-mutual preclusion "would be unfair to the defendant" and the court referred to specific situations of unfairness: (a) the defendant may have had little incentive to defend vigorously the first action, that is, if she was sued for small or nominal damages, particularly if future suits were not foreseeable; (b) offensive preclusion may be unfair if the judgment relied upon as a basis for estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favour of the defendant; or (c) the second action affords to the defendant procedural

opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily result in a different outcome, that is, where the defendant in the first action was forced to defend in an inconvenient forum and was unable to call witnesses, or where in the first action much more limited discovery was available to the defendant than in the second action.

In the final analysis the court declared that the general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either for the reasons discussed or for other reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to the defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.

29 It is clear from the above that American non-mutual issue estoppel is not a mechanical, self-applying rule as evidenced by the discretionary elements which may militate against granting the estoppel. What emerges from the American experience with the abandonment of mutuality is a twofold concern: (1) the application of the estoppel must be sufficiently principled and predictable to promote efficiency and (2) it must contain sufficient flexibility to prevent unfairness. In my view, this is what the doctrine of abuse of process offers, particularly, as here, where the issue involves a conviction in a criminal court for a serious crime. In a case such as this one, the true concerns are not primarily related to mutuality. The true concerns, well reflected in the reasons of the Court of Appeal, are with the integrity and the coherence of the administration of justice. This will often be the case when the estoppel originates from a finding made in a criminal case where many of the traditional concerns related to mutuality lose their significance.

30 For example, there is little relevance to the concern about the "wait and see" plaintiff, the "free rider" who will deliberately avoid the risk of joining the original litigation, but will later come forward to reap the benefits of the victory obtained by the party who should have been his co-plaintiff. No such concern can ever arise when the original action is in a criminal prosecution. Victims cannot, even if they wanted to, "join in" the prosecution so as to have their civil claim against the accused disposed of in a single trial. Nor can employers "join in" the criminal prosecution to have their employee dismissed for cause.

31 On the other hand, even though no one can join the prosecution, the prosecutor as a party represents the public interest. He or she represents a collective interest in the just and correct outcome of the case. The prosecutor is said to be a minister of justice who has nothing to win or lose from the outcome of the case but who must ensure that a just and true verdict is rendered. (See Commentary R. 4.01(3) of the *Rules of Professional Conduct*, Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2002), at pp. 58 and 61; *R. v. Regan*, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, 2002 SCC 12 (S.C.C.); *R. v. Lemay* (1951), [1952] 1 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.), at pp. 256-257, *per* Cartwright J.; and *R. v. Banks*, [1916] 2 K.B. 621, at p. 623.) The mutuality requirement of the doctrine of issue estoppel, which insists that only the Crown and its privies be precluded from relitigating the guilt of the accused, is hardly reflective of the true role of the prosecutor.

32 As the present case illustrates, the primary concerns here are about the integrity of the criminal process and the increased authority of a criminal verdict, rather than some of the more traditional issue estoppel concerns that focus on the interests of the parties, such as costs and multiple "vexation." For these reasons, I see no need to reverse or relax the long-standing application of the mutuality requirement in this case and I would conclude that issue estoppel has no application. I now turn to the question of whether the decision of the arbitrator amounted to a collateral attack on the verdict of the criminal court.

(2) Collateral Attack

33 The rule against collateral attack bars actions to overturn convictions when those actions take place in the wrong forum. As stated in *R. v. Wilson*, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594 (S.C.C.), at p. 599, the rule against collateral attack

has long been a fundamental rule that a court order, made by a court having jurisdiction to make it, stands and is binding and conclusive unless it is set aside on appeal or lawfully quashed. It is also well settled in the authorities that such an order may not be attacked collaterally - and a collateral attack may be described as an attack made in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation, or nullification of the order or judgment.

Thus, in *Wilson*, *supra*, the Court held that an inferior court judge was without jurisdiction to pass on the validity of a wiretap authorized by a superior court. Other cases that form the basis for this rule similarly involve attempts to overturn decisions in other fora, and not simply to relitigate their facts. In *R. v. Sarson*, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 223 (S.C.C.), at para. 35, this Court held that

a prisoner's *habeas corpus* attack on a conviction under a law later declared unconstitutional must fail under the rule against collateral attack because the prisoner was no longer "in the system" and because he was "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction." Similarly, in *R. v. Consolidated Maybrun Mines Ltd.*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 706 (S.C.C.), this Court held that a mine owner who had chosen to ignore an administrative appeals process for a pollution fine was barred from contesting the validity of that fine in court because the legislation directed appeals to an appellate administrative body, not to the courts. Binnie J. described the rule against collateral attack in *Danyluk, supra*, at para. 20, as follows: "that a *judicial order* pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction should not be brought into question in subsequent proceedings except those provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it" (emphasis added).

34 Each of these cases concerns the appropriate forum for collateral attacks upon the judgment itself. However, in the case at bar, the union does not seek to overturn the sexual abuse conviction itself, but simply contest, for the purposes of a different claim with different legal consequences, whether the conviction was correct. It is an implicit attack on the correctness of the factual basis of the decision, not a contest about whether that decision has legal force, as clearly it does. Prohibited "collateral attacks" are abuses of the court's process. However, in light of the focus of the collateral attack rule on attacking the order itself and its legal effect, I believe that the better approach here is to go directly to the doctrine of abuse of process.

(3) Abuse of Process

35 Judges have an inherent and residual discretion to prevent an abuse of the court's process. This concept of abuse of process was described at common law as proceedings "unfair to the point that they are contrary to the interest of justice" (*R. v. Power*, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.), at p. 616), and as "oppressive treatment" (*R. v. Conway*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 (S.C.C.), at p. 1667). McLachlin J. (as she then was) expressed it this way in *R. v. Scott*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979 (S.C.C.), at p. 1007:

. . . abuse of process may be established where: (1) the proceedings are oppressive or vexatious; and, (2) violate the fundamental principles of justice underlying the community's sense of fair play and decency. The concepts of oppressiveness and vexatiousness underline the interest of the accused in a fair trial. But the doctrine evokes as well the public interest in a fair and just trial process and the proper administration of justice.

36 The doctrine of abuse of process is used in a variety of legal contexts. The unfair or oppressive treatment of an accused may disentitle the Crown to carry on with the prosecution of a charge: *Conway, supra*, at p. 1667. In *Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission)*, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, 2000 SCC 44 (S.C.C.), this Court held that unreasonable delay causing serious prejudice could amount to an abuse of process. When the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* applies, the common law doctrine of abuse of process is subsumed into the principles of the *Charter* such that there is often overlap between abuse of process and constitutional remedies (*R. v. O'Connor*, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.)). The doctrine nonetheless continues to have application as a non-*Charter* remedy: *United States v. Shulman*, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 616, 2001 SCC 21 (S.C.C.), at para. 33.

37 In the context that interests us here, the doctrine of abuse of process engages "the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would . . . bring the administration of justice into disrepute" (*Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles* (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 55, *per* Goudge J.A., dissenting (approved [2002] 3 S.C.R. 307, 2002 SCC 63 (S.C.C.))). Goudge J.A. expanded on that concept in the following terms, at paras. 55-56:

The doctrine of abuse of process engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation before it or would in some other way bring the administration of justice into disrepute. *It is a flexible doctrine unencumbered by the specific requirements of concepts such as issue estoppel.* See *House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Waite*, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 347 at p. 358, [1990] 2 All E.R. 990 (C.A.).

One circumstance in which abuse of process has been applied is where the litigation before the court is found to be in essence an attempt to relitigate a claim which the court has already determined. [Emphasis added.]

As Goudge J.A.'s comments indicate, Canadian courts have applied the doctrine of abuse of process to preclude relitigation in circumstances where the strict requirements of issue estoppel (typically the privity/mutuality requirements) are not met, but where allowing the litigation to proceed would nonetheless violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality

and the integrity of the administration of justice. (See, for example, *F. (K.) v. White* (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 391 (Ont. C.A.), *Bomac Construction Ltd. v. Stevenson*, [1986] 5 W.W.R. 21 (Sask. C.A.), and *Bjarnarson v. Manitoba* (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 32 (Man. Q.B.), affirmed (1987), 21 C.P.C. (2d) 302 at 312 (Man. C.A.)). This has resulted in some criticism, on the ground that the doctrine of abuse of process by relitigation is, in effect, non-mutual issue estoppel by another name without the important qualifications recognized by the American courts as part and parcel of the general doctrine of non-mutual issue estoppel (Watson, *supra*, at pp. 624-625).

38 It is true that the doctrine of abuse of process has been extended beyond the strict parameters of *res judicata* while borrowing much of its rationales and some of its constraints. It is said to be more of an adjunct doctrine, defined in reaction to the settled rules of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel, than an independent one (Lange, *supra*, at p. 344). The policy grounds supporting abuse of process by relitigation are the same as the essential policy grounds supporting issue estoppel (Lange, *supra*, at pp. 347-348):

The two policy grounds, namely, that there be an end to litigation and that no one should be twice vexed by the same cause, have been cited as policies in the application of abuse of process by relitigation. Other policy grounds have also been cited, namely, to preserve the courts' and the litigants' resources, to uphold the integrity of the legal system in order to avoid inconsistent results, and to protect the principle of finality so crucial to the proper administration of justice.

39 The *locus classicus* for the modern doctrine of abuse of process and its relationship to *res judicata* is *McIlkenny* [H.L.], *supra*, affirming *McIlkenny v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands*, [1980] Q.B. 283 (Eng. C.A.). The case involved an action for damages for personal injuries brought by the six men convicted of bombing two pubs in Birmingham. They claimed that they had been beaten by the police during their interrogation. The plaintiffs had raised the same issue at their criminal trial, where it was found by both the judge and jury that the confessions were voluntary and that the police had not used violence. At the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning M.R. endorsed non-mutual issue estoppel and held that the question of whether any beatings had taken place was estopped by the earlier determination, although it was raised here against a different opponent. He noted that, in analogous cases, courts had sometimes refused to allow a party to raise an issue for a second time because it was an "abuse of the process of the court," but held that the proper characterization of the matter was through non-mutual issue estoppel.

40 On appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Denning's attempt to reform the law of issue estoppel was overruled, but the higher court reached the same result via the doctrine of abuse of process. Lord Diplock stated, at p. 541:

The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies is the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had a full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court by which it was made.

41 It is important to note that a public inquiry after the civil action of the six accused in *McIlkenny* [H.L.], *supra*, resulted in the finding that the confessions of the Birmingham six had been extracted through police brutality (see *R. v. McIlkenny* (1991), 93 Cr. App. R. 287 (Eng. C.A.), at pp. 304 *et seq.* In my view, this does not support a relaxation of the existing procedural mechanisms designed to ensure finality in criminal proceedings. The danger of wrongful convictions has been acknowledged by this Court and other courts (see *United States v. Burns*, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7 (S.C.C.), at para. 1; and *R. v. Bromley* (2001), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Nfld. C.A.), at pp. 517-518). Although safeguards must be put in place for the protection of the innocent and, more generally, to ensure the trustworthiness of court findings, continuous relitigation is not a guarantee of factual accuracy.

42 The attraction of the doctrine of abuse of process is that it is unencumbered by the specific requirements of *res judicata* while offering the discretion to prevent relitigation, essentially for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the court's process. (See Doherty J.A.'s reasons, at para. 65; see also *Demeter* (H.C.), *supra*, at p. 264, and *McIlkenny* [H.L.], *supra*, at p. 536.)

43 Critics of that approach have argued that when abuse of process is used as a proxy for issue estoppel, it obscures the true question while adding nothing but a vague sense of discretion. I disagree. At least in the context before us, namely, an attempt

to relitigate a criminal conviction, I believe that abuse of process is a doctrine much more responsive to the real concerns at play. In all of its applications, the primary focus of the doctrine of abuse of process is the integrity of the adjudicative functions of courts. Whether it serves to disentitle the Crown from proceeding because of undue delays (see *Blencoe, supra*), or whether it prevents a civil party from using the courts for an improper purpose (see *McIlkenny* [H.L.], *supra*, and *Demeter, supra*) the focus is less on the interest of parties and more on the integrity of judicial decision making as a branch of the administration of justice. In a case such as the present one, it is that concern that compels a bar against relitigation, more than any sense of unfairness to a party being called twice to put its case forward, for example. When that is understood, the parameters of the doctrine become easier to define, and the exercise of discretion is better anchored in principle.

44 The adjudicative process and the importance of preserving its integrity were well described by Doherty J.A. He said, at para. 74:

The adjudicative process in its various manifestations strives to do justice. By the adjudicative process, I mean the various courts and tribunals to which individuals must resort to settle legal disputes. Where the same issues arise in various forums, the quality of justice delivered by the adjudicative process is measured not by reference to the isolated result in each forum, but by the end result produced by the various processes that address the issue. By justice, I refer to procedural fairness, the achieving of the correct result in individual cases and the broader perception that the process as a whole achieves results which are consistent, fair and accurate.

45 When asked to decide whether a criminal conviction, *prima facie* admissible in a proceeding under s. 22.1 of the OEA, ought to be rebutted or taken as conclusive, courts will turn to the doctrine of abuse of process to ascertain whether relitigation would be detrimental to the adjudicative process as defined above. When the focus is thus properly on the integrity of the adjudicative process, the motive of the party who seeks to relitigate, or whether he or she wishes to do so as a defendant rather than as a plaintiff, cannot be decisive factors in the application of the bar against relitigation.

46 Thus, in the case at bar, it matters little whether Oliver's motive for relitigation was primarily to secure re-employment, rather than to challenge his criminal conviction in an attempt to undermine its validity. Reliance on *McIlkenny* [H.L.], *supra*, and on *Demeter* (H.C.), *supra*, for the purpose of enhancing the importance of motive is misplaced. It is true that in both cases the parties wishing to relitigate had made it clear that they were seeking to impeach their earlier convictions. But this is of little significance in the application of the doctrine of abuse of process. A desire to attack a judicial finding is not, in itself, an improper purpose. The law permits that objective to be pursued through various reviewing mechanisms, such as appeals or judicial review. Indeed, reviewability is an important aspect of finality. A decision is final and binding on the parties only when all available reviews have been exhausted or abandoned. What is improper is to attempt to impeach a judicial finding by the impermissible route of relitigation in a different forum. Therefore, motive is of little or no import.

47 There is also no reason to constrain the doctrine of abuse of process only to those cases where the plaintiff has initiated the relitigation. The designation of the parties to the second litigation may mask the reality of the situation. In the present case, for instance, aside from the technical mechanism of the grievance procedures, who should be viewed as the initiator of the employment litigation between the grievor, Oliver, and his union on the one hand, and the City of Toronto on the other? Technically, the union is the "plaintiff" in the arbitration procedure. But the City of Toronto used Oliver's criminal conviction as a basis for his dismissal. I cannot see what difference it makes, again from the point of view of the integrity of the adjudicative process, whether Oliver is labelled a plaintiff or a defendant when it comes to relitigating his criminal conviction.

48 The appellant relies on *Del Core, supra*, to suggest that the abuse of process doctrine only applies to plaintiffs. *Del Core*, however, provided no majority opinion as to whether and when public policy would preclude relitigation of issues determined in a criminal proceeding. For one, Blair J.A. did not limit the circumstances in which relitigation would amount to an abuse of process to those cases in which a person convicted sought to relitigate the validity of his conviction in subsequent proceedings which he himself had instituted:

The right to challenge a conviction is subject to an important qualification. *A convicted person cannot attempt to prove that the conviction was wrong in circumstances where it would constitute an abuse of process to do so.* Courts have rejected

attempts to relitigate the very issues dealt with at a criminal trial where the civil proceedings were perceived to be a collateral attack on the criminal conviction. *The ambit of this qualification remains to be determined* . . . [Emphasis added.]

(*Del Core, supra*, at p. 22, *per* Blair J.A.)

49 While the authorities most often cited in support of a court's power to prevent relitigation of decided issues in circumstances where issue estoppel does not apply are cases where a convicted person commenced a civil proceeding for the purpose of attacking a finding made in a criminal proceeding against that person (namely, *Demeter* (H.C.), *supra*, and *McIlkenny* [H.L.], *supra*; see also *Q. v. Minto Management Ltd.* (1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 756 (Ont. H.C.), *F. (K.)*, *supra*, at paras. 29-31), there is no reason in principle why these rules should be limited to such specific circumstances. Several cases have applied the doctrine of abuse of process to preclude defendants from relitigating issues decided against them in a prior proceeding. See, for example, *Nigro v. Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Ltd.* (1977), 18 O.R. (2d) 215 (Ont. H.C.) at p. 218, affirmed without reference to this point (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 714n (Ont. H.C.); *Bomac, supra*, at pp. 26-27); *Bjarnarson, supra*, at p. 39; *Germisheid v. Valois* (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 670 (Ont. H.C.); *Simpson v. Geswein* (1995), 25 C.C.L.T. (2d) 49 (Man. Q.B.), at p. 61; *Roenisch v. Roenisch* (1991), 85 D.L.R. (4th) 540 (Alta. Q.B.), at p. 546; *Saskatoon Credit Union Ltd. v. Central Park Enterprises Ltd.* (1988), 47 D.L.R. (4th) 431 (B.C. S.C.), at p. 438; *Canadian Tire Corp. v. Summers* (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at p. 115; see also, Paul Perell, "Res Judicata and Abuse of Process" (2001), 24 *Advocates' Q.* 189, at pp. 196-197; and *Watson, supra*, at pp. 648-651.

50 It has been argued that it is difficult to see how mounting a defence can be an abuse of process (see Martin Teplitsky, "Prior Criminal Convictions: Are They Conclusive Proof? An Arbitrator's Perspective," in K. Whitaker et al., eds., *Labour Arbitration Yearbook 2001-2002*, vol. 1 (Toronto: Lancaster House, 2002), 279. A common justification for the doctrine of *res judicata* is that a party should not be twice vexed in the same cause, that is, the party should not be burdened with having to relitigate the same issue (*Watson, supra*, at p. 633). Of course, a defendant may be quite pleased to have another opportunity to litigate an issue originally decided against him. A proper focus on the process, rather than on the interests of a party, will reveal why relitigation should not be permitted in such a case.

51 Rather than focus on the motive or status of the parties, the doctrine of abuse of process concentrates on the integrity of the adjudicative process. Three preliminary observations are useful in that respect. First, there can be no assumption that relitigation will yield a more accurate result than the original proceeding. Second, if the same result is reached in the subsequent proceeding, the relitigation will prove to have been a waste of judicial resources as well as an unnecessary expense for the parties and possibly an additional hardship for some witnesses. Finally, if the result in the subsequent proceeding is different from the conclusion reached in the first on the very same issue, the inconsistency, in and of itself, will undermine the credibility of the entire judicial process, thereby diminishing its authority, its credibility and its aim of finality.

52 In contrast, proper review by way of appeal increases confidence in the ultimate result and affirms both the authority of the process as well as the finality of the result. It is therefore apparent that, from the system's point of view, relitigation carries serious detrimental effects and should be avoided unless the circumstances dictate that relitigation is in fact necessary to enhance the credibility and the effectiveness of the adjudicative process as a whole. There may be instances where relitigation will enhance, rather than impeach, the integrity of the judicial system, for example: (1) when the first proceeding is tainted by fraud or dishonesty, (2) when fresh, new evidence, previously unavailable, conclusively impeaches the original results, or (3) when fairness dictates that the original result should not be binding in the new context. This was stated unequivocally by this Court in *Danyluk, supra*, at para. 80.

53 The discretionary factors that apply to prevent the doctrine of issue estoppel from operating in an unjust or unfair way are equally available to prevent the doctrine of abuse of process from achieving a similar undesirable result. There are many circumstances in which the bar against relitigation, either through the doctrine of *res judicata* or that of abuse of process, would create unfairness. If, for instance, the stakes in the original proceeding were too minor to generate a full and robust response, while the subsequent stakes were considerable, fairness would dictate that the administration of justice would be better served by permitting the second proceeding to go forward than by insisting that finality should prevail. An inadequate incentive to

defend, the discovery of new evidence in appropriate circumstances, or a tainted original process may all overcome the interest in maintaining the finality of the original decision (*Danyluk, supra*, at para. 51; *F. (K.), supra*, at para. 55).

54 These considerations are particularly apposite when the attempt is to relitigate a criminal conviction. Casting doubt over the validity of a criminal conviction is a very serious matter. Inevitably, in a case such as this one, the conclusion of the arbitrator has precisely that effect, whether this was intended or not. The administration of justice must equip itself with all legitimate means to prevent wrongful convictions and to address any real possibility of such an occurrence after the fact. Collateral attacks and relitigation, however, are not, in my view, appropriate methods of redress since they inordinately tax the adjudicative process while doing nothing to ensure a more trustworthy result.

55 In light of the above, it is apparent that the common law doctrines of issue estoppel, collateral attack and abuse of process adequately capture the concerns that arise when finality in litigation must be balanced against fairness to a particular litigant. There is therefore no need to endorse, as the Court of Appeal did, a self-standing and independent "finality principle" either as a separate doctrine or as an independent test to preclude relitigation.

D. Application of Abuse of Process to Facts of the Appeal

56 I am of the view that the facts in this appeal point to the blatant abuse of process that results when relitigation of this sort is permitted. The grievor was convicted in a criminal court and he exhausted all his avenues of appeal. In law, his conviction must stand, with all its consequent legal effects. Yet, as pointed out by Doherty J.A. (at para. 84):

Despite the arbitrator's insistence that he was not passing on the correctness of the decision made by Ferguson J., that is exactly what he did. One cannot read the arbitrator's reasons without coming to the conclusion that he was convinced that the criminal proceedings were badly flawed and that Oliver was wrongly convicted. This conclusion, reached in proceedings to which the prosecution was not even a party, could only undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system. The reasonable observer would wonder how Oliver could be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in one proceeding and after the Court of Appeal had affirmed that finding, be found in a separate proceeding not to have committed the very same assault. That reasonable observer would also not understand how Oliver could be found to be properly convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant and deserving of 15 months in jail and yet also be found in a separate proceeding not to have committed that sexual assault and to be deserving of reinstatement in a job which would place young persons like the complainant under his charge.

57 As a result of the conflicting decisions, the City of Toronto would find itself in the inevitable position of having a convicted sex offender reinstated to an employment position where he would work with the very vulnerable young people he was convicted of assaulting. An educated and reasonable public would presumably have to assess the likely correctness of one or the other of the adjudicative findings regarding the guilt of the convicted grievor. The authority and finality of judicial decisions are designed precisely to eliminate the need for such an exercise.

58 In addition, the arbitrator is considerably less well equipped than a judge presiding over a criminal court - or the jury -, guided by rules of evidence that are sensitive to a fair search for the truth, an exacting standard of proof and expertise with the very questions in issue, to come to a correct disposition of the matter. Yet the arbitrator's conclusions, if challenged, may give rise to a less searching standard of review than that of the criminal court judge. In short, there is nothing in a case like the present one that militates against the application of the doctrine of abuse of process to bar the relitigation of the grievor's criminal conviction. The arbitrator was required as a matter of law to give full effect to the conviction. As a result of that error of law, the arbitrator reached a patently unreasonable conclusion. Properly understood in the light of correct legal principles, the evidence before the arbitrator could only lead him to conclude that the City of Toronto had established just cause for Oliver's dismissal.

VI. Disposition

59 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

LeBel J. (concurring) (Deschamps J. concurring):

I. Introduction

60 I have had the benefit of reading Arbour J.'s reasons and I concur with her disposition of the case. I agree that this case is appropriately decided on the basis of the doctrine of abuse of process, rather than the narrower and more technical doctrines of either collateral attack or issue estoppel. I also agree that the appropriate standard of review for the question of whether a criminal conviction may be relitigated in a grievance proceeding is correctness. This is a question of law requiring an arbitrator to interpret not only the *Labour Relations Act, 1995*, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, but also the *Evidence Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, as well as to rule on the applicability of a number of common law doctrines dealing with relitigation, an issue that is, as Arbour J. notes, at the heart of the administration of justice. Finally, I agree that the arbitrator's determination in this case that Glenn Oliver's criminal conviction could indeed be relitigated during the grievance proceeding was incorrect. As a matter of law, the arbitrator was required to give full effect to Oliver's conviction. His failure to do so was sufficient to render his ultimate decision that Oliver had been dismissed without just cause - a decision squarely within the arbitrator's area of specialized expertise and thus reviewable on a deferential standard - patently unreasonable, according to the jurisprudence of our Court.

61 While I agree with Arbour J.'s disposition of the appeal, I am of the view that the administrative law aspects of this case require further discussion. In my concurring reasons in *Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36*, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC 86 (S.C.C.), I raised concerns about the appropriateness of treating the pragmatic and functional methodology as an overarching analytical framework for substantive judicial review that must be applied, without variation, in *all* administrative law contexts, including those involving non-adjudicative decision makers. In certain circumstances, such as those at issue in *Chamberlain* itself, applying this methodological approach in order to determine the appropriate standard of review may, in fact, obscure the real issue before the reviewing court.

62 In the instant appeal and the appeal in *Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79*, 2003 SCC 64 (S.C.C.), released concurrently, both of which involve judicial review of adjudicative decision makers, my concern is not with the applicability of the pragmatic and functional approach itself. Having said this, I would note that, in a case such as this one, where the question at issue is so clearly a question of law that is both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's specialized area of expertise, it is unnecessary for the reviewing court to perform a detailed pragmatic and functional analysis in order to reach a standard of review of correctness. Indeed, in such circumstances reviewing courts should avoid adopting a mechanistic approach to the determination of the appropriate standard of review, which risks reducing the pragmatic and functional analysis from a contextual, flexible framework to little more than a *pro forma* application of a checklist of factors (see *C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour)*, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, 2003 SCC 29 (S.C.C.), at para. 149; *Q. v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (British Columbia)*, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19 (S.C.C.), at para. 26; *Chamberlain, supra*, at para. 195, *per* LeBel J.).

63 The more particular concern that emerges out of this case and *Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79* relates to what, in my view, is growing criticism with the ways in which the standards of review currently available within the pragmatic and functional framework are conceived of and applied. Academic commentators and practitioners have raised some serious questions as to whether the conceptual basis for each of the existing standards has been delineated with sufficient clarity by this Court, with much of the criticism directed at what has been described as "epistemological" confusion over the relationship between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* (see, for example, David J. Mullan, "Recent Developments in Standard of Review," in Canadian Bar Association (Ontario), *Taking the Tribunal to Court: A Practical Guide for Administrative Law Practitioners* (October 20, 2000), at p. 26; Jeff G. Cowan, "The Standard of Review: The Common Sense Evolution?" (2003), paper presented to the Administrative Law Section Meeting, Ontario Bar Association, January 21, 2003, at p. 28; Frank A.V. Falzon, "Standard of Review on Judicial Review or Appeal," in *Administrative Justice Review Background Papers: Background Papers Prepared by Administrative Justice Project for the Attorney General of British Columbia* (June 2002), at pp. 32-33). Reviewing courts too have occasionally expressed frustration over a perceived lack of clarity in this area, as the comments of Barry J. in *Miller v. Newfoundland (Workers' Compensation Commission)* (1997), 154 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 52 (Nfld. T.D.), at para. 27, illustrate:

In attempting to follow the court's distinctions between "patently unreasonable", "reasonable" and "correct", one feels at times as though one is watching a juggler juggle three transparent objects. Depending on the way the light falls, sometimes

one thinks one can see the objects. Other times one cannot and, indeed, wonders whether there are really three distinct objects there at all.

64 The Court cannot remain unresponsive to sustained concerns or criticism coming from the legal community in relation to the state of Canadian jurisprudence in this important part of the law. It is true that the parties to this appeal made no submissions putting into question the standards of review jurisprudence. Nevertheless, at times, an in-depth discussion or review of the state of the law may become necessary despite the absence of particular representations in a specific case. Given its broad application, the law governing the standards of review must be predictable, workable and coherent. Parties to litigation often have no personal stake in assuring the coherence of our standards of review jurisprudence as a whole and the consistency of their application. Their purpose, understandably, is to show how the positions they advance conform with the law as it stands, rather than to suggest improvements of that law for the benefit of the common good. The task of maintaining a predictable, workable and coherent jurisprudence falls primarily on the judiciary, preferably with, but exceptionally without, the benefit of counsel. I would add that, although the parties made no submissions on the analysis that I propose to undertake in these reasons, they will not be prejudiced by it.

65 In this context, this case provides an opportunity to reevaluate the contours of the various standards of review, a process that in my view is particularly important with respect to patent unreasonableness. To this end, I review below:

- the interplay between correctness and patent unreasonableness both in the instant case and, more broadly, in the context of judicial review of adjudicative decision makers generally, with a view to elucidating the conflicted relationship between these two standards; and
- the distinction between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter*, which, despite a number of attempts at clarification, remains a nebulous one.

66 As the analysis that follows indicates, the patent unreasonableness standard does not currently provide sufficiently clear parameters for reviewing courts to apply in assessing the decisions of administrative adjudicators. From the beginning, patent unreasonableness at times shaded uncomfortably into what should presumably be its antithesis, the correctness review. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish from what is ostensibly its less deferential counterpart, reasonableness *simpliciter*. It remains to be seen how these difficulties can be addressed.

II. Analysis

A. *The Two Standards of Review Applicable in this Case*

67 Two standards of review are at issue in this case, and the use of correctness here requires some preliminary discussion. As I noted in brief above, certain fundamental legal questions - for instance, constitutional and human rights questions and those involving civil liberties, as well as other questions that are of central importance to the legal system as a whole, such as the issue of relitigation - typically fall to be decided on a correctness standard. Indeed, in my view, it will rarely be necessary for reviewing courts to embark on a comprehensive application of the pragmatic and functional approach in order to reach this conclusion. I would not, however, want either my comments in this regard or the majority reasons in this case to be taken as authority for the proposition that correctness is the appropriate standard whenever arbitrators or other specialized administrative adjudicators are required to interpret and apply general common law or civil law rules. Such an approach would constitute a broad expansion of judicial review under a standard of correctness and would significantly impede the ability of administrative adjudicators, particularly in complex and highly specialized fields such as labour law, to develop original solutions to legal problems, uniquely suited to the context in which they operate. In my opinion, in many instances the appropriate standard of review in respect of the application of general common or civil law rules by specialized adjudicators should not be one of correctness, but rather of reasonableness. I now turn to a brief discussion of the rationale behind this view.

(1) *The Correctness Standard of Review*

68 This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of judicial deference in the context of labour law. Labour relations statutes typically bestow broad powers on arbitrators and labour boards to resolve the wide range of problems that may arise in this field and protect the decisions of these adjudicators by privative clauses. Such legislative choices reflect the fact that, as Cory J. noted in *Toronto (City) Board of Education v. O.S.S.T.F., District 15*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487 (S.C.C.), at para. 35, the field of labour relations is "sensitive and volatile" and "[i]t is essential that there be a means of providing speedy decisions by experts in the field who are sensitive to the situation, and which can be considered by both sides to be final and binding" (see also *Canada (Attorney General) v. P.S.A.C.*, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941 (S.C.C.) ("*P.S.A.C.*"), at pp. 960-961; and *Ivanhoe inc. c. Travailleuses & travailleuses unis de l'alimentation & du commerce, section 500*, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 565, 2001 SCC 47 (S.C.C.), at para. 32). The application of a standard of review of correctness in the context of judicial review of labour adjudication is thus rare.

69 While in this case and in *Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79* I agree that correctness is the appropriate standard of review for the arbitrator's decision on the relitigation question, I think it necessary to sound a number of notes of caution in this regard. It is important to stress, first, that while the arbitrator was required to be correct on this question of law, this did not open his decision as a whole to review on a correctness standard (see *A.C.T.R.A. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), at para. 48). The arbitrator was entitled to deference in the determination of whether Oliver was dismissed without just cause. To say that, in the circumstances of this case, the arbitrator's incorrect decision on the question of law affected the overall reasonableness of his decision, is very different from saying that the arbitrator's finding on the ultimate question of just cause had to be correct. To fail to make this distinction would be to risk "substantially expand[ing] the scope of reviewability of administrative decisions, and unjustifiably so" (see *Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, *supra*, at para. 48).

70 Second, it bears repeating that the application of correctness here is very much a product of the nature of *this particular legal question*: determining whether relitigating an employee's criminal conviction is permissible in an arbitration proceeding is a question of law involving the interpretation of the arbitrator's constitutive statute, an external statute, and a complex body of common law rules and conflicting jurisprudence. More than this, it is a question of fundamental importance and broad applicability, with serious implications for the administration of justice as a whole. It is, in other words, a question that engages the expertise and essential role of the courts. It is not a question on which arbitrators may be said to enjoy any degree of relative institutional competence or expertise. As a result, it is a question on which the arbitrator must be correct.

71 This Court has been very careful to note, however, that not all questions of law must be reviewed under a standard of correctness. As a prefatory matter, as the Court has observed, in many cases it will be difficult to draw a clear line between questions of fact, mixed fact and law, and law; in reality, such questions are often inextricably intertwined (see *Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration)*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.), at para. 37; *Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Southam Inc.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 (S.C.C.), at para. 37). More to the point, as Bastarache J. stated in *Pushpanathan*, *supra*, "even pure questions of law may be granted a wide degree of deference where other factors of the pragmatic and functional analysis suggest that such deference is the legislative intention" (at para. 37). The critical factor in this respect is expertise.

72 As Bastarache J. noted in *Pushpanathan*, *supra*, at para. 34, once a "broad relative expertise has been established," this Court has been prepared to show "considerable deference even in cases of highly generalized statutory interpretation where the instrument being interpreted is the tribunal's constituent legislation": see, for example, *Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers)*, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.), and *National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal)*, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 (S.C.C.). This Court has also held that, while administrative adjudicators' interpretations of external statutes "are generally reviewable on a correctness standard," an exception to this general rule may occur, and deference may be appropriate, where "the external statute is intimately connected with the mandate of the tribunal and is encountered frequently as a result": see *Toronto (City) Board of Education*, *supra*, at para. 39; *Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, *supra*, at para. 48. And, perhaps most importantly in light of the issues raised by this case, the Court has held that deference may be warranted where an administrative adjudicator has acquired expertise through its experience in the application of a general common or civil law rule in its specialized statutory context: see *Ivanhoe*, *supra*, at para. 26; L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting) in *Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop*, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 (S.C.C.), at pp. 599-600, endorsed in *Pushpanathan*, *supra*, at para. 37.

73 In the field of labour relations, general common and civil law questions are often closely intertwined with the more specific questions of labour law. Resolving general legal questions may thus be an important component of the work of some administrative adjudicators in this field. To subject all such decisions to correctness review would be to expand the scope of judicial review considerably beyond what the legislature intended, fundamentally undermining the ability of labour adjudicators to develop a body of jurisprudence that is tailored to the specialized context in which they operate.

74 Where an administrative adjudicator must decide a general question of law in the course of exercising its statutory mandate, that determination will typically be entitled to deference (particularly if the adjudicator's decisions are protected by a privative clause), inasmuch as the general question of law is closely connected to the adjudicator's core area of expertise. This was essentially the holding of this Court in *Ivanhoe, supra*. In *Ivanhoe*, after noting the presence of a privative clause, Arbour J. held that, while the question at issue involved both civil and labour law, the labour commissioners and the Labour Court were entitled to deference because "they have developed special expertise in this regard which is adapted to the specific context of labour relations and which is not shared by the courts" (para. 26; see also *Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890 (S.C.C.)). This appeal does not represent a departure from this general principle.

75 The final note of caution that I think must be sounded here relates to the application of two standards of review in this case. This Court has recognized on a number of occasions that it may, in certain circumstances, be appropriate to apply different standards of deference to different decisions taken by an administrative adjudicator in a single case (see *Pushpanathan, supra*, at para. 49; *MacDonell c. Québec (Commission d'accès à l'information)*, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 661, 2002 SCC 71 (S.C.C.), at para. 58, *per* Bastarache and LeBel JJ., dissenting). This case provides an example of one type of situation where this may be the proper approach. It involves a fundamental legal question falling outside the arbitrator's area of expertise. This legal question, though foundational to the decision as a whole, is easily differentiated from a second question on which the arbitrator was entitled to deference: the determination of whether there was just cause for Oliver's dismissal.

76 However, as I have noted above, the fact that the question adjudicated by the arbitrator in this case can be separated into two distinct issues, one of which is reviewable on a correctness standard, should not be taken to mean that this will often be the case. Such cases are rare; the various strands that go into a decision are more likely to be inextricably intertwined, particularly in a complex field such as labour relations, such that the reviewing court should view the adjudicator's decision as an integrated whole.

(2) *The Patent Unreasonableness Standard of Review*

77 In these reasons, I explore the way in which patent unreasonableness is currently functioning, having regard to the relationships between this standard and both correctness and reasonableness *simpliciter*. My comments in this respect are intended to have application in the context of judicial review of adjudicative administrative decision making.

(a) **The Definitions of Patent Unreasonableness**

78 This Court has set out a number of definitions of "patent unreasonableness," each of which is intended to indicate the high degree of deference inherent in this standard of review. There is some overlap between the definitions and they are often used in combination. I would characterize the two main definitional strands as, first, those that emphasize the magnitude of the defect necessary to render a decision patently unreasonable and, second, those that focus on the "immediacy or obviousness" of the defect, and thus the relative invasiveness of the review necessary to find it.

79 In considering the leading definitions, I would place in the first category Dickson J.'s (as he then was) statement in *C.U.P.E., Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.*, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.) ("*C.U.P.E.*"), that a decision will only be patently unreasonable if it "cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation" (at p. 237). Cory J.'s characterization in *P.S.A.C., supra*, of patent unreasonableness as a "very strict test," which will only be met where a decision is "clearly irrational, that is to say evidently not in accordance with reason" (pp. 963-964), would also fit into this category (though it could, depending on how it is read, be placed in the second category as well).

80 In the second category, I would place Iacobucci J.'s description in *Southam, supra*, of a patently unreasonable decision as one marred by a defect that is characterized by its "immediacy or obviousness": "If the defect is apparent on the face of the tribunal's reasons, then the tribunal's decision is patently unreasonable. But if it takes some significant searching or testing to find the defect, then the decision is unreasonable but not patently unreasonable" (para. 57).

81 More recently, in *Ryan v. Law Society (New Brunswick)*, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20 (S.C.C.), Iacobucci J. characterized a patently unreasonable decision as one that is "so flawed that no amount of curial deference can justify letting it stand," drawing on both of the definitional strands that I have identified in formulating this definition. He wrote, at para. 52:

In *Southam, supra*, at para. 57, the Court described the difference between an unreasonable decision and a patently unreasonable one as rooted "in the immediacy or obviousness of the defect". Another way to say this is that a patently unreasonable defect, once identified, can be explained simply and easily, leaving no real possibility of doubting that the decision is defective. A patently unreasonable decision has been described as "clearly irrational" or "evidently not in accordance with reason" (*Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada*, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941 at pp. 963-64, per Cory J.; *Centre communautaire juridique de l'Estrie v. Sherbrooke (City)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 84 at paras. 9-12, per Gonthier J.). A decision that is patently unreasonable is so flawed that no amount of curial deference can justify letting it stand.

82 Similarly, in *C.U.P.E. v. Ontario, supra*, Binnie J. yoked together the two definitional strands, describing a patently unreasonable decision as "one whose defect is 'immedia[te] and obviou[s]'" (*Southam, supra*, at para. 57), and so flawed in terms of implementing the legislative intent that no amount of curial deference can properly justify letting it stand (*Ryan, supra*, at para. 52)" (para. 165 (emphasis added)).

83 It has been suggested that the Court's various formulations of the test for patent unreasonableness are "not independent, alternative tests. They are simply ways of getting at the single question: What makes something patently unreasonable?" (*C.U.P.E. v. Ontario, supra*, at para. 20, per Bastarache J., dissenting). While this may indeed be the case, I nonetheless think it important to recognize that, because of what are in some ways subtle but nonetheless quite significant differences between the Court's various answers to this question, the parameters of "patent unreasonableness" are not as clear as they could be. This has contributed to the growing difficulties in the application of this standard that I discuss below.

(b) The Interplay between the Patent Unreasonableness and Correctness Standards

84 As I observed in *Chamberlain, supra*, the difference between review on a standard of correctness and review on a standard of patent unreasonableness is "intuitive and relatively easy to observe" (*Chamberlain, supra*, at para. 204, per LeBel J.). These standards fall on opposite sides of the existing spectrum of curial deference, with correctness entailing an exacting review and patent unreasonableness leaving the issue in question to the near exclusive determination of the decision maker (see *Q., supra*, at para. 22). Despite the clear conceptual boundary between these two standards, however, the distinction between them is not always as readily discernable in practice as one would expect.

(i) Patent Unreasonableness and Correctness in Theory

85 In terms of understanding the interplay between patent unreasonableness and correctness, it is of interest that, from the beginning, there seems to have been at least some conceptual uncertainty as to the proper breadth of patent unreasonableness review. In *C.U.P.E., supra*, Dickson J. offered two characterizations of patent unreasonableness that tend to pull in opposite directions (see David J. Mullan, *Administrative Law* (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at p. 69; see also H. Wade MacLauchlan, "Transforming Administrative Law: The Didactic Role of the Supreme Court of Canada" (2001), 80 *Can. Bar Rev.* 281, at pp. 285-286).

86 Professor Mullan explains that, on the one hand, Dickson J. rooted review for patent unreasonableness in the recognition that statutory provisions are often ambiguous and thus may allow for multiple interpretations; the question for the reviewing court is whether the adjudicator's interpretation is one that can be "rationally supported by the relevant legislation" (*C.U.P.E.,*

supra, at p. 237). On the other hand, Dickson J. also invoked an idea of patent unreasonableness as a threshold defined by certain nullifying errors, such as those he had previously enumerated in *S.E.I.U., Local 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Assn.* (1973), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382 (S.C.C.) ("*Nipawin*"), at p. 389, and in *C.U.P.E., supra*, at p. 237:

. . . acting in bad faith, basing the decision on extraneous matters, failing to take relevant factors into account, breaching the provisions of natural justice or misinterpreting provisions of the Act so as to embark on an inquiry or answer a question not remitted to it.

87 Curiously, as Mullan notes, this list "repeats the list of 'nullifying' errors that Lord Reid laid out in the landmark House of Lords' judgment in *Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission* (1968), [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (U.K. H.L.). *Anisminic* "is usually treated as the foundation case in establishing in English law the reviewability of all issues of law on a *correctness* basis" (emphasis added), and, indeed, the Court "had cited with approval this portion of Lord Reid's judgment and deployed it to justify judicial intervention in a case described as the 'high water mark of activist' review in Canada: *Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. I.U.O.E., Local 796*," [1970] S.C.R. 425 (S.C.C.) (see Mullan, *Administrative Law, supra*, at pp. 69-70; see also *National Corn Growers Assn., supra*, at p. 1335, *per* Wilson J.).

88 In characterizing patent unreasonableness in *C.U.P.E.*, then, Dickson J. simultaneously invoked a highly deferential standard (choice among a range of reasonable alternatives) and a historically interventionist one (based on the presence of nullifying errors). For this reason, as Mullan acknowledges, "it is easy to see why Dickson J.'s use of [the quotation from *Anisminic*] is problematic" (Mullan, *Administrative Law, supra*, at p. 70).

89 If Dickson J.'s reference to *Anisminic* in *C.U.P.E., supra*, suggests some ambiguity as to the intended scope of "patent unreasonableness" review, later judgments also evidence a somewhat unclear relationship between patent unreasonableness and correctness in terms of establishing and, particularly, applying the methodology for review under the patent unreasonableness standard. The tension in this respect is rooted, in part, in differing views of the premise from which patent unreasonableness review should begin. A useful example is provided by *C.A.I.M.A.W., Local 14 v. Canadian Kenworth Co.*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983 (S.C.C.) ("*C.A.I.M.A.W.*").

90 In *C.A.I.M.A.W.*, Sopinka J. (Lamer J. (as he then was) concurring) described the proper approach under the patent unreasonableness standard as one in which the reviewing court first queries whether the administrative adjudicator's decision is correct: "curial deference does not enter the picture until the court finds itself in disagreement with the tribunal. Only then is it necessary to consider whether the error (so found) is within or outside the boundaries of reasonableness" (p. 1018). As Mullan has observed, this approach to patent unreasonableness raises concerns in that it not only conflicts "with the whole notion espoused by Dickson J. in [*C.U.P.E., supra*] of there often being no single correct answer to statutory interpretation problems but it also assumes the primacy of the reviewing court over the agency or tribunal in the delineation of the meaning of the relevant statute" (Mullan, "Recent Developments in Standard of Review," *supra*, at p. 20).

91 In my view, this approach presents additional problems as well. Reviewing courts may have difficulty ruling that "an error has been committed but . . . then do[ing] nothing to correct that error on the basis that it was not as big an error as it could or might have been" (see Mullan, "Recent Developments in Standard of Review," *supra*, at p. 20; see also David J. Mullan, "Of Chaff Midst the Corn: American Farm Bureau Federation v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal) and Patent Unreasonableness Review" (1991), 45 Admin. L.R. 264, at pp. 269-270). Furthermore, starting from a finding that the adjudicator's decision is incorrect may colour the reviewing court's subsequent assessment of the reasonableness of competing interpretations (see Margaret Allars, "On Deference to Tribunals, With Deference to Dworkin" (1994), 20 *Queen's L.J.* 163, at p. 187). The result is that the critical distinction between that which is, in the court's eyes, "incorrect" and that which is "not rationally supportable" is undermined.

92 The alternative approach is to leave the "correctness" of the adjudicator's decision undecided (see Allars, *supra*, at p. 197). This is essentially the approach that La Forest J. (Dickson C.J. concurring) took to patent unreasonableness in *C.A.I.M.A.W., supra*. He wrote, at pp. 1004 and 1005:

The courts must be careful to focus their inquiry on the existence of a rational basis for the decision of the tribunal, and not on their agreement with it.

.

I do not find it necessary to conclusively determine whether the decision of the Labour Relations Board is "correct" in the sense that it is the decision I would have reached had the proceedings been before this Court on their merits. It is sufficient to say that the result arrived at by the Board is not patently unreasonable.

93 It is this theoretical view that has, at least for the most part, prevailed. As L'Heureux-Dubé J. observed in *S.C.F.P., Local 301 c. Québec (Conseil des services essentiels)*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.) ("*C.U.P.E., Local 301*"), "this Court has stated repeatedly, in assessing whether administrative action is patently unreasonable, the goal is not to review the decision or action on its merits but rather to determine whether it is patently unreasonable, given the statutory provisions governing the particular body and the evidence before it" (para. 53). Patent unreasonableness review, in other words, should not "become an avenue for the court's substitution of its own view" (*C.U.P.E., Local 301, supra*, at para. 59; see also *Domtar Inc. c. Québec (Commission d'appel en matière de lésions professionnelles)*, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 756 (S.C.C.), at pp. 771 and 774-775).

94 This view was recently forcefully rearticulated in *Ryan, supra*. Iacobucci J. wrote, at paras. 50-51:

[W]hen deciding whether an administrative action was unreasonable, a court should not at any point ask itself what the correct decision would have been The standard of reasonableness does not imply that a decision maker is merely afforded a "margin of error" around what the court believes is the correct result.

. . . Unlike a review for correctness, there will often be no single right answer to the questions that are under review against the standard of reasonableness Even if there could be, notionally, a single best answer, it is not the court's role to seek this out when deciding if the decision was unreasonable.

Though Iacobucci J.'s comments here were made in relation to reasonableness *simpliciter*, they are also applicable to the more deferential standard of patent unreasonableness.

95 I think it important to emphasize that neither the case at bar nor the companion case of *C.U.P.E., Local 79*, should be misinterpreted as a retreat from the position that, in reviewing a decision under the existing standard of patent unreasonableness, the court's role is not to identify the "correct" result. In each of these cases, there were *two* standards of review in play: there was a fundamental legal question on which the adjudicators were subject to a standard of correctness - whether the employees' criminal convictions could be relitigated - and there was a question at the core of the adjudicators' expertise on which they were subject to a standard of patent unreasonableness - whether the employees had been dismissed for just cause. As Arbour J. has outlined, the adjudicators' failure to decide the fundamental relitigation question correctly was sufficient to lead to a patently unreasonable outcome. Indeed, in circumstances such as those at issue in the case at bar, this cannot but be the case: the adjudicators' incorrect decisions on the fundamental legal question provided the entire foundation on which their legal analyses, and their conclusions as to whether the employees were dismissed with just cause, were based. To pass a review for patent unreasonableness, a decision must be one that can be "*rationaly supported*"; this standard cannot be met where, as here, what supports the adjudicator's decision - indeed, what that decision is wholly premised on - is a legal determination that the adjudicator was required, but failed, to decide correctly. To say, however, that in such circumstances a decision will be patently unreasonable - a conclusion that flows from the applicability of *two separate* standards of review - is very different from suggesting that a reviewing court, before applying the standard of patent unreasonableness, must first determine whether the adjudicator's decision is (in)correct or that in applying patent unreasonableness the court should ask itself at any point in the analysis what the correct decision would be. In other words, the application of patent unreasonableness itself is not, and should not be, understood to be predicated on a finding of incorrectness, for the reasons that I discussed above.

(ii) Patent Unreasonableness and Correctness in Practice

96 While the Court now tends toward the view that La Forest J. articulated in *C.A.I.M.A.W.*, at p. 1004 - "courts must be careful [under a standard of patent unreasonableness] to focus their inquiry on the existence of a rational basis for the decision of the tribunal, and not on their agreement with it" - the tension between patent unreasonableness and correctness has not been completely resolved. Slippage between the two standards is still evident at times in the way in which patent unreasonableness is applied.

97 In analyzing a number of recent cases, commentators have pointed to both the intensity and the underlying character of the review in questioning whether the Court is applying patent unreasonableness in a manner that is in fact deferential. In this regard, the comments of Professor Lorne Sossin on the application of patent unreasonableness in *Canada Safeway Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U., Local 454*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1079 (S.C.C.), are illustrative:

Having established that deference was owed to the statutory interpretation of the Board, the Court proceeded to dissect its interpretation. The majority was of the view that the Board had misconstrued the term "constructive lay-off" and had failed to place sufficient emphasis on the terms of the collective agreement. The majority reasons convey clearly why the Court would adopt a different approach to the Board. They are less clear as to why the Board's approach lacked a rational foundation. Indeed, there is very little evidence of the Court according deference to the Board's interpretation of its own statute, or to its choice as to how much weight to place on the terms of the collective agreement. *Canada Safeway* raises the familiar question of how a court should demonstrate its deference, particularly in the labour relations context.

(Lorne Sossin, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 1997-98 and 1998-99 Terms" (2000), 11 *S.C.L.R.* (2d) 37, at p. 49)

98 Professor Ian Holloway makes a similar observation with regard to *W.W. Lester (1978) Ltd. v. U.A., Local 740*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644 (S.C.C.):

In her judgment, [McLachlin J. (as she then was)] quoted from the familiar passages of *CUPE*, yet she . . . reached her decision on the basis of a review of the case law. She did not ask whether, despite the fact that it differed from holdings in other jurisdictions, the conclusion of the Newfoundland Labour Relations Board could be "rationally supported" on the basis of the wording of the successorship provisions of the *Labour Relations Act*. Instead, she looked at whether the Board had reached the correct legal interpretation of the Act in the same manner that a court of appeal would determine whether a trial judge had made a correct interpretation of the law. In other words, she effectively *equated patent unreasonableness with correctness at law*.

(Ian Holloway, "A Sacred Right: Judicial Review of Administrative Action as a Cultural Phenomenon" (1993), 22 *Man. L.J.* 28, at pp. 64-65; see also Allars, *supra*, at p. 178.)

99 At times the Court's application of the standard of patent unreasonableness may leave it vulnerable to criticism that it may in fact be doing implicitly what it has rejected explicitly: intervening in decisions that are, in its view, incorrect, rather than limiting any intervention to those decisions that lack a rational foundation. In the process, what should be an indelible line between correctness, on the one hand, and patent unreasonableness, on the other, becomes blurred. It may very well be that review under any standard of reasonableness, given the nature of the intellectual process it involves, entails such a risk. Nevertheless, the existence of two standards of reasonableness appears to have magnified the underlying tension between the two standards of reasonableness and correctness.

(c) The Relationship between the Patent Unreasonableness and Reasonableness *Simpliciter* Standards

100 While the conceptual difference between review on a correctness standard and review on a patent unreasonableness standard may be intuitive and relatively easy to observe (though in practice elements of correctness at times encroach uncomfortably into patent unreasonableness review), the boundaries between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* are far less clear, even at the theoretical level.

(i) *The Theoretical Foundation for Patent Unreasonableness and Reasonableness Simpliciter*

101 The lack of sufficiently clear boundaries between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* has its origins in the fact that patent unreasonableness was developed prior to the birth of the pragmatic and functional approach (see *C.U.P.E. v. Ontario, supra*, at para. 161) and, more particularly, prior to (rather than in conjunction with) the formulation of reasonableness *simpliciter* in *Southam, supra*. Because patent unreasonableness, as a posture of curial deference, was conceived in opposition only to a correctness standard of review, it was sufficient for the Court to emphasize in defining its scope the principle that there will often be no one interpretation that can be said to be correct in interpreting a statute or otherwise resolving a legal dispute and that specialized administrative adjudicators may, in many circumstances, be better equipped than courts to choose between the possible interpretations. Where this is the case, provided that the adjudicator's decision is one that can be "rationally supported on a construction which the relevant legislation may reasonably be considered to bear," the reviewing court should not intervene (*Nipawin, supra*, at p. 389).

102 Upon the advent of reasonableness *simpliciter*, however, the validity of multiple interpretations became the underlying premise for this new variant of reasonableness review as well. Consider, for instance, the discussion of reasonableness *simpliciter* in *Ryan, supra*, that I cited above:

Unlike a review for correctness, there will often be no single right answer to the questions that are under review against the standard of reasonableness Even if there could be, notionally, a single best answer, it is not the court's role to seek this out when deciding if the decision was unreasonable.

(*Ryan, supra*, at para. 51; see also para. 55.)

It is difficult to distinguish this language from that used to describe patent unreasonableness not only in the foundational judgments establishing that standard, such as *Nipawin, supra*, and *C.U.P.E., supra*, but also in this Court's more contemporary jurisprudence applying it. In *Ivanhoe, supra*, for instance, Arbour J. stated that "the recognition by the legislature and the courts that there are many potential solutions to a dispute is the very essence of the patent unreasonableness standard of review, which would be meaningless if it was found that there is only one acceptable solution" (at para. 116).

103 Because patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* are both rooted in this guiding principle, it has been difficult to frame the standards as analytically, rather than merely semantically, distinct. The efforts to sustain a workable distinction between them have taken, in the main, two forms, which mirror the two definitional strands of patent unreasonableness that I identified above. One of these forms distinguishes between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* on the basis of the relative magnitude of the defect. The other looks to the "immediacy or obviousness" of the defect, and thus the relative invasiveness of the review necessary to find it. Both approaches raise their own problems.

(ii) The Magnitude of the Defect

104 In *P.S.A.C., supra*, at pp. 963-964, Cory J. described a patently unreasonable decision in these terms:

In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary "patently", an adverb, is defined as "openly, evidently, clearly". "Unreasonable" is defined as "[n]ot having the faculty of reason; irrational Not acting in accordance with reason or good sense". Thus, based on the dictionary definition of the words "patently unreasonable", it is apparent that if the decision the Board reached, acting within its jurisdiction, is not clearly irrational, that is to say evidently not in accordance with reason, then it cannot be said that there was a loss of jurisdiction.

While this definition may not be inherently problematic, it has become so with the emergence of reasonableness *simpliciter*, in part because of what commentators have described as the "tautological difficulty of distinguishing standards of rationality on the basis of the term 'clearly' " (see Cowan, *supra*, at pp. 27-2; see also Gabrielle Perreault, *Le contrôle judiciaire des décisions de l'administration: de l'erreur juridictionnelle à la norme de contrôle* (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2002), at p. 116; Suzanne Comtois, *Vers la primauté de l'approche pragmatique et fonctionnelle: Précis du contrôle judiciaire des décisions de fond rendues par les organismes administratifs* (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2003), at pp. 34-35; P. Garant, *Droit administratif*, 4^e éd., vol. 2 (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1996), at p. 193).

105 Mullan alludes to both the practical and the theoretical difficulties of maintaining a distinction based on the magnitude of the defect, i.e., the degree of irrationality, that characterizes a decision:

. . . admittedly in his judgment in *PSAC*, Cory J. did attach the epithet "clearly" to the word "irrational" in delineating a particular species of patent unreasonableness. However, I would be most surprised if, in so doing, he was using the term "clearly" for other than rhetorical effect. Indeed, I want to suggest . . . that to maintain a position that it is only the "clearly irrational" that will cross the threshold of patent unreasonableness while irrationality *simpliciter* will not is to make a nonsense of the law. Attaching the adjective "clearly" to irrational is surely a tautology. Like "uniqueness", irrationality either exists or it does not. There cannot be shades of irrationality. In other words, I defy any judge or lawyer to provide a concrete example of the difference between the merely irrational and the clearly irrational! In any event, there have to be concerns with a regime of judicial review which would allow any irrational decision to escape rebuke even under the most deferential standard of scrutiny.

(Mullan, "Recent Developments in Standard of Review," *supra*, at pp. 24-25)

Also relevant in this respect are the comments of Reed J. in *Hao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)* (2000), 184 F.T.R. 246 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 9:

I note that I have never been convinced that "patently unreasonable" differs in a significant way from "unreasonable". The word "patently" means clearly or obviously. If the unreasonableness of a decision is not clear or obvious, I do not see how that decision can be said to be unreasonable.

106 Even a brief review of this Court's descriptions of the defining characteristics of patently unreasonable and unreasonable decisions demonstrates that it is difficult to sustain a meaningful distinction between two forms of reasonableness on the basis of the magnitude of the defect and the extent of the decision's resulting deviation from the realm of the reasonable. Under both standards, the reviewing court's inquiry is focused on "the existence of a rational basis for the [adjudicator's] decision" (see, for example, *C.A.I.M.A.W.*, *supra*, at p. 1004, *per* La Forest J.; *Ryan*, *supra*, at paras. 55-56). A patently unreasonable decision has been described as one that "cannot be sustained on any reasonable interpretation of the facts or of the law" (*National Corn Growers*, *supra*, at pp. 1369-1370, *per* Gonthier J., or "rationally supported on a construction which the relevant legislation may reasonably be considered to bear" (*Nipawin*, *supra*, at p. 389). An unreasonable decision has been described as one for which there are "no lines of reasoning supporting the decision which could reasonably lead that tribunal to reach the decision it did" (*Ryan*, *supra*, at para. 53).

107 Under both patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter*, mere disagreement with the adjudicator's decision is insufficient to warrant intervention (see, for example, *C.A.I.M.A.W.*, *supra*, at pp. 1003-1004, *per* La Forest J., and *Chamberlain*, *supra*, at para. 15, *per* McLachlin C.J.). Applying the patent unreasonableness standard, "the court will defer even if the interpretation given by the tribunal . . . is not the 'right' interpretation in the court's view nor even the 'best' of two possible interpretations, so long as it is an interpretation reasonably attributable to the words of the agreement" (*C.J.A., Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd.*, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 316 (S.C.C.), at p. 341). In the case of reasonableness *simpliciter*, "a decision may satisfy the . . . standard if it is supported by a tenable explanation even if this explanation is not one that the reviewing court finds compelling" (*Ryan*, *supra*, at para. 55). There seems to me to be no qualitative basis on which to differentiate effectively between these various characterizations of a rationality analysis; how, for instance, would a decision that is not "tenably supported" (and is thus "merely" unreasonable) differ from a decision that is not "rationally supported" (and is thus patently unreasonable)?

108 In the end, the essential question remains the same under both standards: Was the decision of the adjudicator taken in accordance with reason? Where the answer is no, for instance, because the legislation in question cannot rationally support the adjudicator's interpretation, the error will invalidate the decision, regardless of whether the standard applied is reasonableness *simpliciter* or patent unreasonableness (see Deborah K. Lovett, "That Curious Curial Deference Just Gets Curiouser and Curiouser - *Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.*" (1997), 55 *Advocate (B.C.)* 541, at p. 545). Because the two variants of reasonableness are united at their theoretical source, the imperative for the reviewing court to

intervene will turn on the conclusion that the adjudicator's decision deviates from what falls within the ambit of the reasonable, not on "fine distinctions" between the test for patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* (see Flazon, *supra*, at p. 33).

109 The existence of these two variants of reasonableness review forces reviewing courts to continue to grapple with the significant practical problems inherent in distinguishing meaningfully between the two standards. To the extent that a distinction is advanced on the basis of the relative severity of the defect, this poses not only practical difficulties but also difficulties in principle, as this approach implies that patent unreasonableness, in requiring "clear" rather than "mere" irrationality, allows for a margin of appreciation for decisions that are not in accordance with reason. In this respect, I would echo Mullan's comments that there would "have to be concerns with a regime of judicial review which would allow any irrational decision to escape rebuke even under the most deferential standard of scrutiny" (Mullan, "Recent Developments in Standard of Review," *supra*, at p. 25).

(iii) The "Immediacy or Obviousness" of the Defect

110 There is a second approach to distinguishing between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* that requires discussion. *Southam, supra*, at para. 57, emphasized the "immediacy or obviousness" of the defect:

The difference between "unreasonable" and "patently unreasonable" lies in the immediacy or obviousness of the defect. If the defect is apparent on the face of the tribunal's reasons, then the tribunal's decision is patently unreasonable. But if it takes some significant searching or testing to find the defect, then the decision is unreasonable but not patently unreasonable.

111 In my view, two lines of difficulty have emerged from emphasizing the "immediacy or obviousness" of the defect, and thus the relative invasiveness of the review necessary to find it, as a means of distinguishing between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter*. The first is the difficulty of determining how invasive a review is invasive enough, but not too invasive, in each case. The second is the difficulty that flows from ambiguity as to the intended meaning of "immediacy or obviousness" in this context: is it the obviousness of the defect in the sense of its transparency on the face of the decision that is the defining characteristic of patent unreasonableness review (see James L.H. Sprague, "Another View of *Baker*" (1999), 7 *Reid's Administrative Law* 163, at pp. 163 and 165, note 5), or is it rather the obviousness of the defect in terms of the ease with which, once found, it can be identified as severe? The latter interpretation may bring with it difficulties of the sort I referred to above - *i.e.*, attempting to qualify degrees of irrationality. The former interpretation, it seems to me, presents problems of its own, which I discuss below.

112 Turning first to the difficulty of actually applying a distinction based on the "immediacy or obviousness" of the defect, we are confronted with the criticism that the "somewhat probing examination" criterion (see *Southam, supra*, at para. 56) is not clear enough (see David W. Elliott, "Suresh and the Common Borders of Administrative Law: Time for the Tailor?" (2002), 65 *Sask. L. Rev.* 469, at pp. 486-487). As Elliott notes: "[t]he distinction between a 'somewhat probing examination' and those which are simply probing, or are less than probing, is a fine one. It is too fine to permit courts to differentiate clearly among the three standards" (Elliott, *supra*, at pp. 486-487).

113 This Court has itself experienced some difficulty in consistently performing patent unreasonableness review in a way that is less probing than the "somewhat probing" analysis that is the hallmark of reasonableness *simpliciter*. Despite the fact that a less invasive review has been described as a defining characteristic of the standard of patent unreasonableness, in a number of the Court's recent decisions, including *Toronto (City) Board of Education, supra*, and *Ivanhoe, supra*, one could fairly characterize the Court's analysis under this standard as at least "somewhat" probing in nature.

114 Even prior to *Southam* and the development of reasonableness *simpliciter*, there was some uncertainty as to how intensely patent unreasonableness review is to be performed. This is particularly evident in *National Corn Growers, supra* (see generally Mullan, "Of Chaff Midst the Corn," *supra*; Mullan, *Administrative Law, supra*, at pp. 72-73). In that case, while Wilson J. counselled restraint on the basis of her reading of *C.U.P.E., supra*, Gonthier J., for the majority, performed quite a searching review of the decision of the Canadian Import Tribunal. He reasoned, at p. 1370, that "[i]n some cases, the unreasonableness

of a decision may be apparent without detailed examination of the record. In others, it may be no less unreasonable but this can only be understood upon an in-depth analysis."

115 *Southam* itself did not definitively resolve the question of how invasively review for patent unreasonableness should be performed. An intense review would seem to be precluded by the statement that, "if it takes some significant searching or testing to find the defect, then the decision is unreasonable but not patently unreasonable" (para. 57). The possibility that, in certain circumstances, quite a thorough review for patent unreasonableness will be appropriate, however, is left open: "[i]f the decision under review is sufficiently difficult, then perhaps a great deal of reading and thinking will be required before the judge will be able to grasp the dimensions of the problem" (para. 57).

116 This brings me to the second problem: In what sense is the defect immediate or obvious? *Southam* left some ambiguity on this point. As I have outlined, on the one hand, a patently unreasonable decision is understood as one that is flawed by a defect that is evident on the face of the decision, while an unreasonable decision is one that is marred by a defect that it takes significant searching or testing to find. In other places, however, *Southam* suggests that the "immediacy or obviousness" of a patently unreasonable defect refers not to the ease of its detection, but rather to the ease with which, once detected, it can be identified as severe. Particularly relevant in this respect is the statement that "once the lines of the problem have come into focus, if the decision is patently unreasonable, then the unreasonableness will be evident" (para. 57). It is the (admittedly sometimes only tacit) recognition that what must in fact be evident - *i.e.*, clear, obvious, or immediate - is the defect's magnitude upon detection that allows for the possibility that in certain circumstances "it will simply not be possible to understand and respond to a patent unreasonableness argument without a thorough examination and appreciation of the tribunal's record and reasoning process" (see Mullan, *Administrative Law*, *supra*, at p. 72; see also *Ivanhoe*, *supra*, at para. 34).

117 Our recent decision in *Ryan* has brought more clarity to *Southam*, but still reflects a degree of ambiguity on this issue. In *Ryan*, at para. 52, the Court held:

In *Southam*, *supra*, at para. 57, the Court described the difference between an unreasonable decision and a patently unreasonable one as rooted "in the immediacy or obviousness of the defect". *Another way to say this is that a patently unreasonable defect, once identified, can be explained simply and easily, leaving no real possibility of doubting that the decision is defective.* A patently unreasonable decision has been described as "clearly irrational" or "evidently not in accordance with reason" (*Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada*, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941, at pp. 963-64, *per* Cory J.; *Centre communautaire juridique de l'Estrie v. Sherbrooke (City)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 84, at paras. 9-12, *per* Gonthier J.). A decision that is patently unreasonable is so flawed that no amount of curial deference can justify letting it stand. [Emphasis added.]

This passage moves the focus away from the obviousness of the defect in the sense of its transparency "on the face of the decision" to the obviousness of its magnitude once it has been identified. At other points, however, the relative invasiveness of the review required to identify the defect is emphasized as the means of distinguishing between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter*:

A decision may be unreasonable without being patently unreasonable when the defect in the decision is less obvious and might only be discovered after "significant searching or testing" (*Southam*, *supra*, at para. 57). Explaining the defect may require a detailed exposition to show that there are no lines of reasoning supporting the decision which could reasonably lead that tribunal to reach the decision it did (*Ryan*, *supra*, at para. 53).

118 Such ambiguity led commentators such as David Phillip Jones to continue to question in light of *Ryan* whether

. . . whatever it is that makes the decision "patently unreasonable" [must] appear on the face of the record? . . . Or can one go beyond the record to demonstrate - "identify" - why the decision is patently unreasonable? Is it the "immediacy and obviousness of the defect" which makes it patently unreasonable, or does patently unreasonable require outrageousness so that the decision is so flawed that no amount of curial deference can justify letting it stand?

(David Phillip Jones, "Notes on *Dr. Q* and *Ryan*: Two More Decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada on the Standard of Review in Administrative Law," paper originally presented at the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, Western Roundtable, Edmonton, April 25, 2003, at p. 10)

119 As we have seen, the answers to such questions are far from self-evident, even at the level of theoretical abstraction. How much more difficult must they be for reviewing courts and counsel struggling to apply not only patent unreasonableness, but also reasonableness *simpliciter*? (See in this regard, the comments of Mullan in "Recent Developments in Standard of Review," *supra*, at p. 4.)

120 Absent reform in this area or a further clarification of the standards, the "epistemological" confusion over the relationship between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* will continue. As a result, both the types of errors that the two variants of reasonableness are likely to catch - *i.e.*, interpretations that fall outside the range of those that can be "reasonably," "rationally" or "tenably" supported by the statutory language - and the way in which the two standards are applied will in practice, if not necessarily in theory, be much the same.

121 There is no easy way out of this conundrum. Whatever attempts are made to clarify the contours of, or the relationship between, the existing definitional strands of patent unreasonableness, this standard and reasonableness *simpliciter* will continue to be rooted in a shared rationale: statutory language is often ambiguous and "admits of more than one possible meaning," provided that the expert administrative adjudicator's interpretation "does not move outside the bounds of reasonably permissible visions of the appropriate interpretation, there is no justification for court intervention" (Mullan, "Recent Developments in Standard of Review," *supra*, at p. 18). It will thus remain difficult to keep these standards conceptually distinct, and I query whether, in the end, the theoretical efforts necessary to do so are productive. Obviously, any decision that fails the test of patent unreasonableness must also fall on a standard of reasonableness *simpliciter*, but it seems hard to imagine situations where the converse is not also true: if a decision is not supported by a tenable explanation (and is thus unreasonable) (*Ryan*, *supra*, at para. 55), how likely is it that it could be sustained on "any reasonable interpretation of the facts or of the law" (and thus not be patently unreasonable) (*National Corn Growers*, *supra*, at pp. 1369-1370, *per* Gonthier J.)?

122 Thus, both patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter* require that reviewing courts pay "respectful attention" to the reasons of adjudicators in assessing the rationality of administrative decisions (see *Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)*, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.), at para. 65, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J., citing David Dyzenhaus, "The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy," in Michael Taggart, ed., *The Province of Administrative Law* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997), 279, at p. 286, and *Ryan*, *supra*, at para. 49).

123 Attempting to differentiate between these two variants of curial deference by classifying one as "somewhat more probing" in its attentiveness than the other is unlikely to prove any more successful in practice than it has proven in the past. Basing the distinction on the relative ease with which a defect may be detected also raises a more theoretical quandary: the difficulty of articulating why a defect that is obvious on the face of a decision should present more of an imperative for court intervention than a latent defect. While a defect may be readily apparent because it is severe, a severe defect will not necessarily be readily apparent; by the same token, a flaw in a decision may be immediately evident, or obvious, but relatively inconsequential in nature.

124 On the other hand, the effect of clarifying that the language of "immediacy or obviousness" goes not to ease of detection, but rather to the ease with which, once detected (on either a superficial or a probing review), a defect may be identified as severe might well be to increase the regularity with which reviewing courts subject decisions to as intense a review on a standard of patent unreasonableness as on a standard of reasonableness *simpliciter*, thereby further eliding any difference between the two.

125 An additional effect of clarifying that the "immediacy or obviousness" of the defect refers not to its transparency on the face of the decision but rather to its magnitude upon detection is to suggest that it is feasible and appropriate for reviewing courts to attempt to qualify degrees of irrationality in assessing the decisions of administrative adjudicators: *i.e.*, this decision is irrational enough to be unreasonable, but not so irrational as to be overturned on a standard of patent unreasonableness. Such

an outcome raises questions as to whether the legislative intent could ever be to let irrational decisions stand. In any event, such an approach would seem difficult to reconcile with the rule of law.

126 I acknowledge that there are certain advantages to the framework to which this Court has adhered since its adoption in *Southam, supra*, of a third standard of review. The inclusion of an intermediate standard does appear to provide reviewing courts with an enhanced ability to tailor the degree of deference to the particular situation. In my view, however, the lesson to be drawn from our experience since then is that those advantages appear to be outweighed by the current framework's drawbacks, which include the conceptual and practical difficulties that flow from the overlap between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness *simpliciter*, and the difficulty caused at times by the interplay between patent unreasonableness and correctness.

127 In particular, the inability to sustain a viable analytical distinction between the two variants of reasonableness has impeded their application in practice in a way that fulfils the theoretical promise of a more precise reflection of the legislature's intent. In the end, attempting to distinguish between the unreasonable and the patently unreasonable may be as unproductive as attempting to differentiate between the "illegible" and the "patently illegible." While it may be possible to posit, in the abstract, some kind of conceptual distinction, the functional reality is that once a text is illegible - whether its illegibility is evident on a cursory glance or only after a close examination - the result is the same. There is little to be gained from debating as to whether the text is illegible *simpliciter* or patently illegible; in either case, it cannot be read.

128 It is also necessary to keep in mind the theoretical foundations for judicial review and its ultimate purpose. The purpose of judicial review is to uphold the normative legal order by ensuring that the decisions of administrative decision makers are both procedurally sound and substantively defensible. As McLachlin C.J. explained in *Q., supra*, at para. 21, the two touchstones of judicial review are legislative intent and the rule of law:

[In *Pushpanathan*,] Bastarache J. affirmed that "[t]he central inquiry in determining the standard of review exercisable by a court of law is the legislative intent of the statute creating the tribunal whose decision is being reviewed" (para. 26). However, this approach also gives due regard to "the consequences that flow from a grant of powers" (*Bibeault, supra*, at p. 1089) and, while safeguarding "[t]he role of the superior courts in maintaining the rule of law" (p. 1090), reinforces that this reviewing power should not be employed unnecessarily. In this way, the pragmatic and functional approach inquires into legislative intent, but does so against the backdrop of the courts' constitutional duty to protect the rule of law.

In short, the role of a court in determining the standard of review is to be faithful to the intent of the legislature that empowered the administrative adjudicator to make the decision, as well as to the animating principle that, in a society governed by the rule of law, power is not to be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

129 As this Court has observed, the rule of law is a "highly textured expression, importing many things which are beyond the need of these reasons to explore but conveying, for example, a sense of orderliness, of subjection to known legal rules and of executive accountability to legal authority" (*Reference re Amendment to the Constitution of Canada*, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.), at pp. 805-806). As the Court elaborated in *Reference re Secession of Quebec*, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.), at para. 71:

In the *Manitoba Language Rights Reference, supra*, at pp. 747-52, this Court outlined the elements of the rule of law. We emphasized, first, that the rule of law provides that the law is supreme over the acts of both government and private persons. There is, in short, one law for all. Second, we explained, at p. 749, that "the rule of law requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order" A third aspect of the rule of law is . . . that "the exercise of all public power must find its ultimate source in a legal rule". Put another way, the relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated by law. Taken together, these three considerations make up a principle of profound constitutional and political significance.

"At its most basic level," as the Court affirmed, at para. 70, "the rule of law vouchsafes to the citizens and residents of the country a stable, predictable and ordered society in which to conduct their affairs. It provides a shield for individuals from arbitrary state action."

130 Because arbitrary state action is not permissible, the exercise of power must be justifiable. As the Chief Justice has noted,

. . . societies governed by the Rule of Law are marked by a certain *ethos of justification*. In a democratic society, this may well be the general characteristic of the Rule of Law within which the more specific ideals . . . are subsumed. Where a society is marked by a culture of justification, an exercise of public power is only appropriate where it can be justified to citizens in terms of *rationality and fairness*.

(See the Honourable Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin, "The Roles of Administrative Tribunals and Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law" (1998-1999), 12 *C.J.A.L.P.* 171, at p. 174, italics in original; see also MacLauchlan, *supra* at pp. 289-291.)

Judicial review on substantive grounds ensures that the decisions of administrative adjudicators are capable of rational justification; review on procedural grounds (*i.e.*, does the decision meet the requirements of procedural fairness?) ensures that they are fair.

131 In recent years, this Court has recognized that both courts and administrative adjudicators have an important role to play in upholding and applying the rule of law. As Wilson J. outlined in *National Corn Growers, supra*, courts have come to accept that " 'statutory provisions often do not yield a single, uniquely correct interpretation' " and that an expert administrative adjudicator may be " 'better equipped than a reviewing court to resolve the ambiguities and fill the voids in the statutory language' " in a way that makes sense in the specialized context in which that adjudicator operates (p. 1336, citing J.M. Evans et al., *Administrative Law*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1989), at p. 414). The interpretation and application of the law is thus no longer seen as exclusively the province of the courts. Administrative adjudicators play a vital and increasing role. As McLachlin J. helpfully put it in a recent speech on the roles of courts and administrative tribunals in maintaining the rule of law: "A culture of justification shifts the analysis from the institutions themselves to, more subtly, what those institutions are capable of doing for the rational advancement of civil society. The Rule of Law, in short, can speak in several voices so long as the resulting chorus echoes its underlying values of fairness and rationality" (McLachlin, *supra*, at p. 175).

132 In affirming the place for administrative adjudicators in the interpretation and application of the law, however, there is an important distinction that must be maintained: to say that the administrative state is a legitimate player in resolving legal disputes is properly to say that administrative adjudicators are capable (and perhaps *more* capable) of choosing among reasonable decisions. It is *not* to say that unreasonable decision making is a legitimate presence in the legal system. Is this not the effect of a standard of patent unreasonableness informed by an intermediate standard of reasonableness *simpliciter*?

133 On the assumption that we can distinguish effectively between an unreasonable and a patently unreasonable decision, there are situations where an unreasonable (*i.e.*, irrational) decision must be allowed to stand. This would be the case where the standard of review is patent unreasonableness and the decision under review is unreasonable, but not patently so. As I have noted, I doubt that such an outcome could be reconciled with the intent of the legislature which, in theory, the pragmatic and functional analysis aims to reflect as faithfully as possible. As a matter of statutory interpretation, courts should always be very hesitant to impute to the legislature any intent to let irrational administrative acts stand, absent the most unequivocal statement of such an intent (see Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 4th ed. (Markham: Butterworths, 2002), at pp. 367-368). As a matter of theory, the constitutional principle of the primacy of the rule of law, which is an ever-present background principle of interpretation in this context, reinforces the point: if a court concludes that the legislature intended that there be no recourse from an *irrational* decision, it seems highly likely that the court has misconstrued the intent of the legislature.

134 Administrative law has developed considerably over the last 25 years since *C.U.P.E. v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.* This evolution, which reflects a strong sense of deference to administrative decision makers and an acknowledgment of the importance of their role, has given rise to some problems or concerns. It remains to be seen, in an appropriate case, what should be the solution to these difficulties. Should courts move to a two standard system of judicial review, correctness and a revised unified standard of reasonableness? Should we attempt to more clearly define the nature and scope of each standard or rethink their relationship and application? This is perhaps some of the work which lies ahead for courts, building on the developments of recent years as well as on the legal tradition which created the framework of the present law of judicial review.

III. Disposition

135 Subject to my comments in these reasons, I concur with Arbour J.'s disposition of the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Pourvoi rejeté.

Footnotes

* On November 13, 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a corrigendum; the changes have been incorporated herein.

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2015 ONCA 631
Ontario Court of Appeal

Frank v. Legate

2015 CarswellOnt 14043, 2015 ONCA 631, 23 C.C.L.T. (4th)
190, 257 A.C.W.S. (3d) 483, 339 O.A.C. 359, 390 D.L.R. (4th) 39

**Cathy Frank, Plaintiff (Appellant) and Barbara
Legate, Joni Dobson, Keith Finley and Legate
& Associates LLP, Defendants (Respondents)**

P. Lauwers, C.W. Hourigan, G. Pardu JJ.A.

Heard: March 5, 2015
Judgment: September 18, 2015
Docket: CA C59283

Counsel: Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, for Appellant
Paul Michell, for Respondents

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Evidence; Public; Torts

APPEAL by plaintiff from decision of motion judge striking plaintiff's statement of claim alleging defamation, champerty and maintenance, malicious prosecution, intentional interference with economic relations, intentional infliction of mental distress, and claiming punitive damages.

C.W. Hourigan J.A.:

Introduction

1 Cathy Frank appeals from the order of Carey J. striking her statement of claim under rule 21.01 of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, on the ground that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

2 The appellant submits that the motion judge erred by effectively turning the pleadings motion into a summary judgment motion and thereby applied the wrong test in his review of her statement of claim.

3 For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal. The appellant's action was fundamentally misconceived. I see no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the causes of

action advanced by the appellant were either premature or were not properly pleaded. Regardless, the appellant's claim was also an abuse of process and could have been struck on that basis.

Background Facts

4 The appellant is an obstetrician and gynecologist who practices medicine in London, Ontario.

5 The respondents are lawyers who represent the appellant's former patients in complaints with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario ("the College") and medical malpractice actions against the appellant.

6 The appellant's statement of claim alleged that certain statements by the respondents, six of which were published on the website of the respondents' law firm and one of which was published in an article on the CTV news website, were defamatory. Those statements are set forth below.

7 In addition to the defamation claim, the appellant also asserted claims for malicious prosecution, champerty and maintenance, intentional interference with economic relations and intentional infliction of mental distress. She claimed \$5 million in damages, including \$500,000 in punitive damages.

8 The respondents brought a motion to strike the appellant's statement of claim under Rule 21 on the basis that it failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action. In their notice of motion they also sought to strike the claim under rule 25.11 on the ground that it was scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. Prior to the motion, the appellant delivered a "proposed amended statement of claim" to the respondents. The appellant did not bring a motion to amend the original statement of claim.

The Decision Below

9 The motion judge struck the appellant's claim in its entirety. In his reasons, he considered each of the causes of action asserted by the appellant.

10 With respect to the defamation claim, the motion judge noted that courts will only strike defamation pleadings in the "clearest of cases". He described his task as determining whether an ordinary, thoughtful, well-informed member of society would reasonably conclude that the words complained of were capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. None of the impugned statements met this standard. The first five were purely informational and expressed no view on the merits of any of the claims against the appellant. The sixth statement was appropriately qualified by the words "we allege". The seventh and final statement again did not comment on the merits of any claims against the appellant.

11 The motion judge found that the malicious prosecution action was premature because none of the lawsuits or complaints to the College had yet been terminated or resolved. The appellant's

statement of claim alleged that all the cases and complaints had, or will be resolved in her favour. While the motion judge recognized that he was required to accept the appellant's allegations as true unless they were not provable, he concluded that the question of whether the complaints and actions would terminate in the appellant's favour was not yet provable.

12 Given that the lawsuits against the appellant were ongoing, the claim for champerty and maintenance was also premature. Regardless, the factual allegations in the statement of claim did not support these causes of action. The appellant did not plead that the respondents "stirred up" litigation that would not otherwise have been pursued or that they brought baseless claims as a form of intimidation.

13 On the claim of intentional interference with economic relations, the motion judge noted that this cause of action permits a plaintiff to sue a defendant for economic loss caused by the defendant's unlawful act against a third party where the defendant intended to damage the plaintiff. The motion judge concluded that the appellant's pleadings were "unspecified" and did not suggest that the elements of this tort were met. Further, the alleged "unlawful act" appeared to be that the respondents made misrepresentations to the appellant's former patients. These communications are protected by solicitor-client privilege. As a result, this claim was also struck under rule 25.11 since it relied on inadmissible evidence.

14 The motion judge concluded that the appellant failed to particularize the conduct giving rise to her claim for intentional infliction of mental distress. He noted that a defendant reading the statement of claim would not know what conduct was at issue in relation to this claim.

15 On the claim for punitive damages, the motion judge found that the appellant's allegation that the respondents' conduct was a "callous, flagrant, arbitrary, malicious, high-handed, capricious, arrogant and complete and flagrant disregard of the rights of the plaintiff and of the plaintiff's patients" did not particularize any conduct that could give rise to this type of award.

16 The motion judge went on to consider the putative amended statement of claim and concluded that the proposed amendments did not remedy any of the defects in the issued claim.

17 Finally, the motion judge noted that absent further substantial, specific allegations, any continued action against the respondents ran the risk of being seen as an abuse of process. He found that the claims would likely be viewed as a collateral attack aimed at intimidating and distracting the respondents.

18 Quite unusually, the motion judge did not consider the issue of whether the appellant should be granted leave to amend her statement of claim. The appellant does not seek that relief in her notice of appeal or factum.

Positions of the Parties

(i) Position of the Appellant

19 The appellant submits that a defamation claim should only be struck on a Rule 21 motion where the impugned statements are clearly not capable of a defamatory meaning. The statements at issue in this case do not fall within the clearest of cases. She argues that the motion judge also erred by suggesting that the defamatory statements pleaded in the proposed amended statement of claim could not support an allegation of defamation.

20 The appellant argues that the tort of malicious prosecution applies to civil actions and disciplinary proceedings. The motion judge was required to assume that the facts pleaded in the statement of claim were true. Given that the statement of claim stated that all proceedings "have, or will, terminate" in the appellant's favour, the motion judge erred in finding that no proceedings had terminated in her favour and in relying on a representation by counsel for the respondents regarding the current status of the actions and complaints in reaching that conclusion.

21 Regarding the claim for champerty and maintenance, the appellant submits that the elements were properly pleaded and that the motion judge erred by failing to read the pleadings broadly.

22 With respect to the intentional interference with economic relations claim, the appellant pleaded that the respondents made misrepresentations to induce the appellant's former patients to pursue claims against the appellant. Because the misrepresentations were public statements, the motion judge's finding that the alleged misrepresentations were protected by privilege was an error.

23 The appellant also submits that the motion judge erred by dismissing her claim for intentional infliction of mental distress on the ground that the statement of claim did not particularize the comments or actions. The motion judge should have read the pleadings as a whole, rather than focusing solely on one paragraph.

24 Finally, the appellant argues that the motion judge erred by relying on a breach of contract case to conclude that the appellant's statement of claim for punitive damages did not sufficiently particularize her claim. The causes of action advanced by the appellant are significantly more egregious than a breach of contract claim. Consequently, the claim for punitive damages in the present case does not require the same level of detail as a breach of contract case. The appellant submits that the general reference to conduct pleaded elsewhere in the statement of claim was sufficient.

(ii) Position of the Respondents

25 The respondents submit that the motion judge correctly concluded that the statements attacked by the appellant are not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. In a defamation action, the statement of claim must identify each alleged defamatory statement specifically, as well as

who made the statement, when it was made and to whom. The appellant's statement of claim did not comply with these requirements.

26 With regard to the proposed amended statement of claim, the appellant did not take steps to have it issued, nor did she seek leave to amend the existing statement of claim. As a result, the motion judge did not have jurisdiction to rule on the proposed amended statement of claim. To the extent that he expressed his opinion regarding its contents, this had no legal effect and is thus irrelevant to this appeal.

27 The respondents submit that the tort of malicious prosecution is unavailable in the circumstances because it only applies to criminal prosecutions where the proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff's favour.

28 The respondents argue that complaints to the College cannot give rise to a claim for champerty, since they do not constitute litigation where damages are sought. As for the civil proceedings, champerty and maintenance are only actionable if the plaintiff has suffered special damages. Since the civil proceedings against the appellant have not concluded, the appellant has not suffered any damages and this claim is premature.

29 The respondents argue that to succeed on a claim of intentional interference with economic relations, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to cause loss to the plaintiff as an end in itself or as a means of enriching itself. The appellant's statement of claim does not satisfy this test and does not identify what "unlawful means" were used by the respondents. In addition, the claim will necessarily require evidence regarding the communications between the respondents and their clients, which are protected by solicitor-client privilege.

30 The respondents argue that the motion judge correctly concluded the appellant's pleadings did not particularize the conduct that she alleged gave rise to an intentional infliction of mental distress claim.

31 Regarding the punitive damage claim, the respondents submit that the motion judge correctly concluded that the appellant's pleading did not identify the facts giving rise to the claim for punitive damages with sufficient particularity. The general reference to "aforesaid conduct" was insufficient.

32 Finally, the respondents raise an additional issue. They submit that the appellant's statement of claim was a collateral attack on ongoing proceedings before the courts and the College. Consequently, they argue that it was open to the motion judge to strike the statement of claim in its entirety as an abuse of process.

Issues

33 This appeal raises the following issues:

- Did the motion judge err in striking the appellant's claim for defamation?
- Did the motion judge err by striking the appellant's claim for malicious prosecution?
- Did the motion judge err by striking the appellant's claim for champerty and maintenance?
- Did the motion judge err by striking the appellant's claim for intentional interference with economic relations?
- Did the motion judge err by striking the appellant's claim for intentional infliction of mental distress?
- Did the motion judge err by striking the appellant's claim for punitive damages?
- Should the claim be dismissed as an abuse of process?

Analysis

(i) *General Principles*

34 Before turning to a review of the causes of action pleaded in this case, it is useful to have regard to three important legal principles that govern on this appeal.

35 The first principle is the standard of review. There is no issue between the parties, and I agree, that the motion judge was engaged in a purely legal analysis. Therefore, the standard of review is correctness: *Housen v. Nikolaisen*, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 (S.C.C.), at para. 36.

36 The second principle is the governing test on a motion to strike a pleading under rule 21.01(1) (b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The parameters of the test are well established in the case law. A claim should only be struck under this rule if it is plain and obvious that there is no reasonable prospect it can succeed: *Hunt v. T & N plc*, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.), at p. 980; *Guergis v. Novak*, 2013 ONCA 449, 116 O.R. (3d) 280 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34. In undertaking that analysis, the motion judge must assume the allegations of fact in the statement of claim are true, unless they are patently ridiculous or incapable of proof: *McCreight v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2013 ONCA 483, 116 O.R. (3d) 429 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 29. The motion judge must also read the statement of claim as generously as possible, with a view to accommodating any inadequacies in the pleading: *Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.), at paras. 17-22.

37 Third, the court has discretion under rule 25.11 to strike a pleading that may prejudice or delay the fair trial of an action or that is scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

38 With these principles in mind, I turn to an analysis of each of the causes of action asserted in the statement of claim and a consideration of the respondents' submission that the claim should be struck as an abuse of process.

(ii) Defamation

39 In *Grant v. Torstar Corp.*, 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.), at para. 28, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a plaintiff must prove the following three elements in a defamation action: 1) the defendant made a defamatory statement, in the sense that the impugned words would tend to lower the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; 2) the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and 3) the words were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff.

40 A reasonable person in this context is one who is reasonably thoughtful and informed, who would understand the difference between allegations and proof of guilt. Such a person would keep in mind that an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty: *Guergis*, at paras. 38 and 57; *Miguna v. Toronto Police Services Board*, [2004] O.J. No. 2455 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 4-6, aff'd [2005] O.J. No. 107 (Ont. C.A.).

41 Courts will only grant a motion by a defendant to strike a pleading on the basis that the statement at issue is incapable of a defamatory meaning in the clearest of cases. If this standard is not met, determination of the issue will be left to the trier of fact at trial: *Guergis*, at para. 41.

42 The statements in issues are as follows:

(i) "There are over 100 former patients of Dr. Frank who contacted Legate & Associates about her treatment. Legate & Associates has issued 58 claims in the Superior Court of Justice to date. Several more cases are under investigation."

(ii) "It is expected that many more lawsuits will be issued."

(iii) "... [S]ince releasing the details of lawsuits undertaken on behalf of three women who were patients of Dr. Cathy Frank, over 90 women have come forward."

(iv) "If you think you or your baby may have a claim against Dr. Frank, please contact Legate & Associates."

(v) "Legate is pursuing the public review by the Discipline Committee instead of the secretive Complaints Committee process."

(vi) "... [She] passed all of the exams but when [she] went out to practice, there was a problem ... the unfortunate consequence of that, we allege, is that children have been born with disabilities that they wouldn't have otherwise had."

(vii) "Over 100 women contacted Legate & Associates about their treatment and that of their babies at the hands of Dr. Frank. Approximately 60 women have issued claims for themselves and several more actions are under investigation for compromised babies, and one has been commenced. These women have made complaints to the CPSO as far back as 2006 about Dr. Frank."

43 In my view, the motion judge correctly concluded that the seven impugned statements in the appellant's statement of claim were clearly incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning.

44 Statements (i) to (iv) and (vii), quoted above, were purely informational and did not comment in any way on the merits of the ongoing litigation. The comments are neutral in their description of the appellant. References to the numerous women who have come forward are supported by the appellant's own pleading, which indicates that 58 actions have been commenced against her. No reasonable person, who is taken to understand the difference between allegations and proof of guilt, could interpret these statements in the manner suggested by the appellant (i.e. as suggestive of her being negligent and/or incompetent as a physician).

45 The appellant effectively seeks to prohibit law firms from describing allegations that form the basis of potential or ongoing claims. If this type of statement amounted to defamation, no law firm in the province could ever solicit clients because they could not provide the necessary information for people to determine if they should consult a lawyer about a potential claim. The class action process, for example, would be effectively eviscerated if lawyers were restricted in their communications in the manner urged upon us by the appellant.

46 Statement (v), which describes the pursuit of a public review process rather than a private review process before the College, does not even mention the appellant. Rather, it simply refers to the respondents' preferred course of action.

47 Statement (vi) comes from an article that appeared on the CTV News website. The appellant's pleading and factum suggest that this statement is one sentence. In fact, this is a combination of two sentences. It also omits a number of other sentences that are found in between.

48 Allegedly defamatory comments must be read in context: *Guergis* at para. 65; *Mantini v. Smith Lyons LLP* (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 516 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 14, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, (2004), [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 344 (S.C.C.). Context is important in determining the meaning of words and whether they are capable of being defamatory. Reading impugned comments in isolation is unfair and is of no assistance to the court in its analysis. This problem is

exacerbated where, as here, the appellant has combined portions of different comments into one statement.

49 The first portion of statement (vi) reads as follows in the appellant's statement of claim: "[She] passed all of the exams but when [she] went out to practice, there was a problem." The appellant misquotes this statement in her pleading. The correct wording, found in the CTV news article, uses the pronoun "you" instead of "she". When this statement is corrected and read in context, it is clear that the respondent Barbara Legate was making a general comment about why the College may impose restrictions on a physician's practice. To the extent that the comment can be taken to refer to the appellant specifically, it is again a purely factual statement about the restrictions imposed on her medical licence by the College.

50 The second part of the statement, which is found four paragraphs below the first part of the impugned statement in the original article, reads as follows in the appellant's pleading: "... the unfortunate consequence of that, we allege, is that children have been born with disabilities that they wouldn't otherwise have had." The words "of that" do not appear in the original quote, but appear to have been added by the appellant when she combined the two sentences that form statement (vi). Although not pleaded, the appellant also now takes issue with the first part of this sentence, which reads: "She didn't take the steps we'd expect a physician to take". The appellant invites us to parse this statement to conclude that the phrase "we allege" modifies only the second part of the sentence and not the first part. In other words, the phrase "we allege" relates to the consequence of the problem but does not qualify the existence of the problem.

51 Leaving aside the fact that the first part of the sentence, which is now the focal point of the appellant's complaint, is not pleaded, I am of the view that the statement could not be interpreted as defamatory. A reasonable person who read the entirety of the sentence in issue would understand that Ms. Legate was merely describing the nature of the allegation against the appellant. This includes both the existence and consequences of the alleged problem. A reasonable person would not parse the statement in the manner suggested by the appellant.

52 The appellant also made various general references in her statement of claim to false and defamatory statements by the respondents. Those statements were not detailed or identified in her pleading. To the extent that they are different than the seven statements above, they cannot support a defamation claim because the appellant failed to plead the exact statements complained of and the details of who made them, when they were made and to whom: *Khan v. Canada (Attorney General)* [2009 CarswellOnt 905 (Ont. S.C.J.)], 2009 CanLII 7090, at para. 29, aff'd 2009 ONCA 737 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, (2010), [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 516 (S.C.C.).

53 For reasons that are not clear, after striking the statement of claim in its entirety, and over the objection of counsel for the respondents, the motion judge went on to provide his "opinion" on whether the proposed amended statement of claim remedied the defects in the now struck

statement of claim. He did not order any relief with respect to the amended statement of claim and did not, as noted above, make any order regarding whether the appellant should be granted leave to amend her claim.

54 I agree with the submission of the respondents that since the appellant did not seek leave to amend her claim or issue the proposed amended statement of claim, and given that the motion judge did not order any relief with respect to it, his comments had no legal effect.

55 I do note, however, that the motion judge's conclusion that two of the allegedly defamatory statements in the proposed amended statement of claim were incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning despite the fact that they "could be interpreted in one way as commenting on the merits of the case and of being defamatory", appears to be an error of law. As this court made clear in *Guergis*, at para. 73, where the range of possible meanings for a statement includes one that is defamatory, it is not a clear case enabling the pleading to be struck. In fairness to the motion judge, he went on to suggest that any claim based on these statements could be struck as an abuse of process. In any event, his statements regarding the proposed amended statement of claim were clearly *obiter* and had no impact on the final outcome of the motion.

(iii) Malicious Prosecution

56 The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution were summarized by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Kvello v. Miazga*, 2009 SCC 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.), at paras. 53-56, as follows: 1) a proceeding initiated by the defendant; 2) a proceeding terminated in favour of the plaintiff; 3) the defendant had no reasonable and probable cause to initiate the proceeding; and 4) the defendant acted with malice.

57 As a preliminary matter, there is an issue between the parties regarding whether malicious prosecution applies to civil actions and disciplinary proceedings. Traditionally, this tort was limited to criminal prosecutions and petitions to wind up a public company or a petition in bankruptcy. However, one Divisional Court case, *Stoffman v. Veterinary Assn. (Ontario)* (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 737 (Ont. Div. Ct.), suggests that the tort may apply to disciplinary proceedings. It is unnecessary to determine this issue because the pleading of malicious prosecution in this case can and should be struck on numerous other grounds.

58 First, with respect to the second element, a careful review of the statement of claim discloses that it does not contain a definitive statement that the proceedings have terminated in favour of the plaintiff. With respect to two of the civil actions, the appellant pleads that they are ongoing. The closest the appellant comes to an unequivocal statement are her assertions that the disciplinary proceedings "have, or will, terminate in her favour" and that the civil actions "are bound to fail." I need not comment on the propriety of the motion judge's reliance on the statement made by counsel for the respondents on the present stage of the actions and complaints. The fact is that the appellant failed to unequivocally plead that all of the various proceedings, or any of them, had

been terminated in her favour. Therefore, there was no error in the motion judge's finding that this element of the tort was not properly pleaded.

59 Second, the crucial element of malice was also not properly pleaded. There was no allegation of malice at all regarding the civil actions. With respect to the complaints to the College, it was pleaded only as one potential, alternative motivation. As the Supreme Court of Canada found in *Miazga*, at para. 56, malice is the key element in striking the balance this tort was designed to maintain between the effective administration of justice and the need to compensate individuals who have been wrongly prosecuted. The appellant's statement of claim does not adequately plead this element.

60 Third, s. 36(3) of the *Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991*, S.O. 1991, c. 18, provides:

No record of a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the *Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act*, no report, document or thing prepared for or statement given at such a proceeding and no order or decision made in such a proceeding is admissible in a civil proceeding other than a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the *Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act* or a proceeding relating to an order under section 11.1 or 11.2 of the *Ontario Drug Benefit Act*. 1991, c. 18, s. 36 (3); 1996, c. 1, Sched. G, s. 27 (2).

61 The effect of this provision is that although reference to a complaint to the College having been made may be proven at trial, nothing from the record of a complaint — from the initial statement given by a complainant to the final order made by the tribunal — is admissible in a civil action, including an action for malicious prosecution. The practical result is that actions for malicious prosecution based on complaints to the College are effectively barred: *Conroy v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (Ontario)*, 2011 ONSC 324, 329 D.L.R. (4th) 689 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 51-55, aff'd 2011 ONCA 517 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, (2012), 432 N.R. 388 (note) (S.C.C.); *Montgomery v. Seiden*, 2012 ONSC 6235 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 41-42; *F. (M.) v. S. (N.)* (2000), 188 D.L.R. (4th) 296 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 26-39, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, (2001), [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 531 (S.C.C.).

62 For these reasons, I am of the view that the motion judge made no error in striking the malicious prosecution claim.

(iv) *ChamPERTY AND MAINTENANCE*

63 The entirety of the plaintiff's pleading in this regard is contained in the following two paragraphs from the statement of claim:

[20] The Plaintiff pleads that the assistance and encouragement of the Defendants provided to third parties on whose behalf the Complainants were submitted and actions commenced, for no lawful reason, constitutes maintenance and champerty. The Defendants have no motive or

lawful reason to encourage the Complaints or actions commenced on behalf of third parties, and have entered into agreements with these third parties to share in the proceeds, if any of the litigation.

[21] As a result the Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, damages as a result of the Defendants' actions, the full extent of which will be provided prior to trial.

64 In *McIntyre Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General)* (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.), O'Connor A.C.J.O. noted, at para. 25, that the torts of champerty and maintenance continue to be actionable upon proof of special damage. Associate Chief Justice O'Connor undertook a thorough review of the development of these torts in Canada and England. He discerned four general principles from this review of the common law, at para. 34:

- Champerty is a subspecies of maintenance. Without maintenance, there can be no champerty.
- For there to be maintenance, the person allegedly maintaining an action or proceeding must have an improper motive, which motive may include, but is not limited to, officious intermeddling or stirring up strife. There can be no maintenance if the alleged maintainer has a justifying motive or excuse.
- The type of conduct that has been found to constitute champerty and maintenance has evolved over time so as to keep in step with the fundamental aim of protecting the administration of justice from abuse.
- When the courts have had regard to statutes such as the *Champerty Act* and the *Statute Concerning Conspirators*, they have not interpreted those statutes as cutting down or restricting the elements that were otherwise considered necessary to establish champerty and maintenance at common law.

65 With these principles in mind, I turn to the champerty and maintenance pleading in the present action.

66 I disagree with the motion's judge's conclusion that the pleading is deficient because it does not specifically allege that the respondents improperly stirred up litigation that would not otherwise have been pursued or that they brought baseless claims as a form of intimidation. Such an explicit plea is not necessary as it is possible to ascertain, with a liberal consideration of the pleading, that the respondents are alleged to have encouraged litigation with improper motives.

67 Notwithstanding the foregoing, I conclude that the motion judge did not err in striking the champerty and maintenance claim.

68 First, it is not possible to make a claim for champerty, which requires the maintainer to share in the profits of the litigation, with respect to complaints made to the College. Damages cannot be awarded in those proceedings. Consequently, there are no profits to share. I am also aware of no case law, and the appellant has not provided the court with any, where a maintenance claim has been made regarding complaints to a regulatory body.

69 Second, I also agree with the submission of the respondents that the claim was premature, since none of the underlying actions or complaints had been concluded at the time the claim was issued.

70 Other than a passing reference in *Lorch v. McHale* (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 305 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 34, aff'd 2009 ONCA 161 (Ont. C.A.), there is no Ontario case law that addresses the issue of whether a claim for champerty and maintenance can be asserted prior to the conclusion of the underlying action.

71 In *Oldford v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, 2004 NSSC 105, 223 N.S.R. (2d) 380 (N.S. S.C.), Coughlan J. dealt with the issue squarely. He concluded that a claim for maintenance is not actionable without proof of actual loss. Actual loss will not be incurred if the maintainer is successful in the underlying action. On that basis, he struck a claim for champerty and maintenance regarding an underlying claim that had not been concluded.

72 Justice Coughlan thoroughly reviewed the English authorities that address this point. He placed considerable reliance on the reasoning of Lord Shaw and Lord Phillimore in *Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd.* (1918), [1919] A.C. 368 (U.K. H.L.). While Coughlan J. recognized that the two majority decisions in *Neville* were divided on the issue of whether unsuccessful litigants can later make a claim for champerty and maintenance, he ultimately concluded that they could not.

73 I agree with Coughlan J.'s analysis on this issue. There can be no champerty or maintenance if the maintainer has a justifying motive or excuse. As stated by Lord Phillimore in *Neville*, at p. 433, "the justification or excuse is to be found in the righteousness of the suit and the proof of its righteousness is its success." It follows that the lawfulness of a defendant's position in maintaining litigation can only be determined once the litigation has concluded.

74 As noted in *McIntyre* at para. 47, the public policy animating the law of champerty and maintenance has always been to protect the administration of justice from abuse. In those instances where our judicial system is being abused, it is only fair that the aggrieved party is entitled to compensation. But where the underlying action or defence is a valid and legitimate use of the court system, there can be no damages based on these causes of action.

75 An action for champerty and maintenance that precedes the conclusion of the underlying action puts the cart squarely before the horse. Moreover, the premature use of these torts is abusive to the administration of justice because it serves to obstruct the prosecution of legitimate claims and defeat the assertion of valid defences. This, of course, is contrary to the public policy rationale for these torts.

(v) *Intentional Interference with Economic Relations*

76 The gravamen of the appellant's claim for intentional interference with economic relations is that the respondents improperly and maliciously intended to interfere with her practice and ensure that she could not work as a physician. The appellant relies upon the fact that the respondents have commenced at least 58 civil actions against her. She also pleads that through advertisements, statements and misrepresentations, the respondents solicited third parties and made various misrepresentations to induce them to commence unmeritorious civil actions and complaints to the College regarding the appellant.

77 The appellant pleads that these actions were intended to "injure [her], or that the unlawful or illegal actions of the Defendants were directed against [her]." The appellant pleads that but for the advertisements, statements and misrepresentations, the legal proceedings against her, or a vast majority of them, would not have been commenced. Finally, the appellant pleads that she has suffered economic loss as a consequence of this conduct by the respondents.

78 The motion judge struck this portion of the claim on the grounds that the allegations are unspecified and are inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's narrow definition of this tort in *Bram Enterprises Ltd. v. A.I. Enterprises Ltd.*, 2014 SCC 12, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.). The motion judge also found that, to the extent that the pleadings rely on confidential communications between the respondents and their clients, the appellant relied on inadmissible facts. Consequently, the claim should be struck pursuant to rule 25.11.

79 In *A.I. Enterprises*, Cromwell J. extensively reviewed the history and elements of intentional interference with economic relations, which is also referred to as, among other names, the "unlawful means tort". He traced the development of the tort and considered the state of the law in various common law jurisdictions. Justice Cromwell concluded that this tort should be restricted to three-party situations in which the defendant commits an unlawful act against a third party and intentionally causes economic harm to the plaintiff through that act. Unlawful conduct is limited to conduct that is actionable by the third party or would have been actionable if the third party suffered loss. The defendant must intend to cause injury to the plaintiff as an end in itself or as a means of achieving an ulterior motive (e.g. enriching itself): *A.I. Enterprises*, at paras. 5 and 95.

80 For the following reasons, I agree with the conclusion of the motion judge that the claim for damages for intentional interference with economic relations should be struck because it was not pleaded properly.

81 First, the appellant's plea is equivocal, as it states that the respondents' intention was to injure *or* the actions were directed against the plaintiff. This pleading does not meet the narrow definition of the tort adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. It is not enough to plead that the actions of respondents were directed at the appellant. The respondents must have intended to injure her.

82 Second, the unlawful means alleged are not clear. Whatever they may be, they would have to be actionable by the appellant's patients against the respondents. Defamatory statements about the appellant made in private or in advertisements or solicitations would not be actionable by the patients. It is possible that misrepresentations to the clients could be actionable, but the alleged misrepresentations are never specified or described in any level of detail in the statement of claim.

83 Third, and in any event, I also agree with the finding of the motion judge that in order to understand the nature of the misrepresentations and whether the clients relied upon them, the appellant would need to lead evidence of the privileged communications between the respondents and their clients. Consequently, this claim was properly struck under rule 25.11 as it relies on inadmissible evidence.

(vi) Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress

84 I agree with the conclusion of the motion judge that the brief reference to this tort in the pleading was so vague that a defendant who read it would have no idea what conduct was being alleged against them. There were no specified allegations in the appellant's pleadings. I see no error in the motion judge's decision to strike this part of the claim.

(vii) Punitive Damages

85 The motion judge, relying upon *Research Capital*, struck the claim for punitive damages on the ground that it was pleaded in a conclusory manner with insufficient particulars. The appellant's contention that the motion judge erred in law by relying on that case because it involved a breach of contract is untenable. This case was cited for the general proposition that claims for punitive damages must be pleaded with some degree of particularity. The fact that the case involved a breach of contract does not make it distinguishable on this rather uncontroversial legal point.

86 The wording of the claim for punitive damages in the present case was pure boilerplate and contrary to the admonition of Binnie J. in the seminal case *Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co.*, 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.), at para. 87, over ten years ago, that claims for punitive damages must be pleaded with particularity and that boilerplate language is conclusory rather

than explanatory. It is not sufficient, as the appellant submits, to simply reference the "aforesaid conduct" described in the remainder of the pleading to support a claim for punitive damages.

87 I see no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding that the claim for punitive damages should be struck.

(viii) Abuse of Process

88 Even if the statement of claim had properly pleaded tenable causes of action, it should have been struck as an abuse of process.

89 In my view, the statement of claim, which I hasten to add was not drafted by counsel on the appeal, is an abuse of process. It is a collateral attack on the civil lawsuits against the appellant and the complaints to the College. It appears to be designed to frustrate those processes and deny the appellant's patients redress before the courts and the College. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.

90 First, the appellant asserted causes of action (i.e. malicious prosecution and champerty and maintenance) that were clearly premature as no underlying action or complaint had been resolved, let alone in her favour. She attempted to evade this issue by asserting in the statement of claim that proceedings were or could in the future be decided in her favour. She then attempted to rely on this statement to argue that the motion judge must accept that she had met this part of the test for a malicious prosecution claim.

91 Second, the appellant's malicious prosecution claim was willfully blind to the clearly established case law and s. 36(3) of the *Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991*, which make it clear that an action for malicious prosecution was unavailable in the circumstances.

92 Third, the intentional interference with economic relations claim necessarily involved the disclosure of privileged solicitor and client communications related to ongoing litigation against the appellant. It is hard to imagine that the appellant in good faith actually believed that this claim could proceed while the complaints against her were outstanding.

93 Fourth, the assertion of multiple poorly pleaded causes of action was a transparent effort to dress up a libel claim that had no chance of success.

94 For these reasons, I find that it would be an abuse of the court's process to permit the appellant's claim to continue.

Disposition

95 For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. The respondents, as the successful parties, are entitled to their costs of the appeal, which I would fix at \$12,500.

P. Lauwers J.A.:

I agree

G. Pardu J.A.:

I agree

Appeal dismissed.

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C

2011 SCC 42
Supreme Court of Canada

Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.

2011 CarswellBC 1968, 2011 CarswellBC 1969, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 11 W.W.R. 215, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6757, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6758, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6759, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6761, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6832, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6931, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6932, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6933, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 6948, [2011] A.C.S. No. 42, [2011] S.C.J. No. 42, 205 A.C.W.S. (3d) 92, 21 B.C.L.R. (5th) 215, 25 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 308 B.C.A.C. 1, 335 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 419 N.R. 1, 521 W.A.C. 1, 83 C.B.R. (5th) 169, 86 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1

Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada (Appellant / Respondent on cross-appeal) and Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited (Respondent / Appellant on cross-appeal) and Attorney General of Ontario and Attorney General of British Columbia (Interveners)

Attorney General of Canada (Appellant / Respondent on cross-appeal) and Her Majesty The Queen in Right of British Columbia (Respondent) Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc., Rothmans Inc., JTI-MacDonald Corp., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International Inc., B.A.T. Industries p.l.c., British American Tobacco (Investments) Limited, Carreras Rothmans Limited, Philip Morris USA Inc. and Philip Morris International Inc. (Respondents / Appellants on cross-appeal) and Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia and Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of New Brunswick (Interveners)

McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.

Heard: February 24, 2011

Judgment: July 29, 2011 *

Docket: 33559, 33563

Proceedings: reversing *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 313 D.L.R. (4th) 651, 2009 BCCA 540, 2009 CarswellBC 3307, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 385, 280 B.C.A.C. 100, 474 W.A.C. 100 (B.C. C.A.); reversing in part *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2008), 2008 BCSC 419, 2008 CarswellBC 687, [2008] 12 W.W.R. 241, 292 D.L.R. (4th) 353, 82 B.C.L.R. (4th) 362 (B.C. S.C.); and reversing *Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 2009 BCCA 541, 2009 CarswellBC 3300, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 9, 99 B.C.L.R. (4th) 93, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 695, 280 B.C.A.C. 160, 474 W.A.C. 160 (B.C. C.A.); reversing in part *Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2007), 2007 BCSC 964, 2007 CarswellBC 1806, [2008] 4 W.W.R. 156, 76 B.C.L.R. (4th) 100 (B.C. S.C.)

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Subject: Public; Torts; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Tax — Miscellaneous

APPEAL by Crown from judgments reported at *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 313 D.L.R. (4th) 651, 2009 BCCA 540, 2009 CarswellBC 3307, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 385, 280 B.C.A.C. 100, 474 W.A.C. 100 (B.C. C.A.) and *Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 2009 BCCA 541, 2009 CarswellBC 3300, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 9, 99 B.C.L.R. (4th) 93, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 695, 280 B.C.A.C. 160, 474 W.A.C. 160 (B.C. C.A.), allowing defendants' claims for negligent misrepresentation and negligent design; CROSS-APPEAL by defendants from judgments reported at *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 313 D.L.R. (4th) 651, 2009 BCCA 540, 2009 CarswellBC 3307, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 385, 280 B.C.A.C. 100, 474 W.A.C. 100 (B.C. C.A.) and *Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 2009 BCCA 541, 2009 CarswellBC 3300, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 9, 99 B.C.L.R. (4th) 93, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 695, 280 B.C.A.C. 160, 474 W.A.C. 160 (B.C. C.A.), dismissing defendants' claims other than claims for negligent misrepresentation and negligent design.

POURVOI formé par l'État à l'encontre de jugements publiés à *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 313 D.L.R. (4th) 651, 2009 BCCA 540, 2009 CarswellBC 3307, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 385, 280 B.C.A.C. 100, 474 W.A.C. 100 (B.C. C.A.) et à *Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 2009 BCCA 541, 2009 CarswellBC 3300, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 9, 99 B.C.L.R. (4th) 93, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 695, 280 B.C.A.C. 160, 474 W.A.C. 160 (B.C. C.A.), ayant accueilli les requêtes des défenderesses faisant valoir une déclaration inexacte faite par négligence et une conception négligente; POURVOI INCIDENT formé par les défenderesses à l'encontre de jugements publiés à *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 313 D.L.R. (4th) 651, 2009 BCCA 540, 2009 CarswellBC 3307, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 385, 280 B.C.A.C. 100, 474 W.A.C. 100 (B.C. C.A.) et à *Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.* (2009), 2009 BCCA 541, 2009 CarswellBC 3300, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 9, 99 B.C.L.R. (4th) 93, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 695, 280 B.C.A.C. 160, 474 W.A.C. 160 (B.C. C.A.), ayant rejeté les requêtes des défenderesses faisant valoir d'autres moyens qu'une déclaration inexacte faite par négligence et une conception négligente.

McLachlin C.J.C.:

I. Introduction

1 Imperial Tobacco ("Imperial") is a defendant in two cases before the courts in British Columbia, *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, Docket: S010421, and *Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, Docket: L031300. In the first case, the Government of British Columbia is seeking to recover the cost of paying for the medical treatment of individuals suffering from tobacco-related illnesses from a group of 14 tobacco companies, including Imperial ("Costs Recovery case"). The second case is a class action brought against Imperial alone by Mr. Knight on behalf of class members who purchased "light" or "mild" cigarettes, seeking a refund of the cost of the cigarettes and punitive damages ("*Knight* case").

2 In both cases, the tobacco companies issued third-party notices to the Government of Canada, alleging that if the tobacco companies are held liable to the plaintiffs, they are entitled to compensation from Canada for negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, and failure to warn, as well as at equity. They also allege that Canada would itself be liable under the statutory schemes at issue in the two cases. In the *Costs Recovery* case, it is alleged that Canada would be liable under the *Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act*, S.B.C. 2000, c. 30 ("CRA"), as a "manufacturer". In the *Knight* case, it is

alleged that Canada would be liable as a "supplier" under the *Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act*, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2 ("*BPCPA*"), and its predecessor, the *Trade Practice Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 457 ("*TPA*").

3 In both cases, Canada brought motions to strike the third party notices under r. 19(24) of the *Supreme Court Rules*, B.C. Reg. 221/90 (replaced by the *Supreme Court Civil Rules*, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 9-5), arguing that it was plain and obvious that the third-party claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action. In both cases, the chambers judges agreed with Canada, and struck all of the third-party notices. The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the tobacco companies' appeals in part. A majority of 3-2 held that the negligent misrepresentation claims arising from Canada's alleged duty of care to the tobacco companies in both the *Costs Recovery* case and the *Knight* case should proceed to trial. A majority in the *Knight* case further held that the negligent misrepresentation claim based on Canada's alleged duty of care to consumers should proceed, as should the negligent design claims in the *Knight* case. The court unanimously struck the remainder of the tobacco companies' claims.

4 The Government of Canada appeals the finding that the claims for negligent misrepresentation and the claim for negligent design should be allowed to go to trial. The tobacco companies cross-appeal the striking of the other claims.

5 For the reasons that follow, I conclude that all the claims of Imperial and the other tobacco companies brought against the Government of Canada are bound to fail, and should be struck. I would allow the appeals of the Government of Canada in both cases and dismiss the cross-appeals.

II. Underlying Claims and Judicial History

A. The *Knight* Case

6 In the *Knight* case, consumers in British Columbia have brought a class action against Imperial under the *BPCPA* and its predecessor, the *TPA*. The class consists of consumers of light or mild cigarettes. It alleges that Imperial engaged in deceptive practices when it promoted low-tar cigarettes as less hazardous to the health of consumers. The class alleges that the levels of tar and nicotine listed on Imperial's packages for light and mild cigarettes did not reflect the actual deliveries of toxic emissions to smokers, and alleges that the smoke produced by light cigarettes was just as harmful as that produced by regular cigarettes. The class seeks reimbursement of the cost of the cigarettes purchased, and punitive damages.

7 Imperial issued a third-party notice against Canada. It alleges that Health Canada advised tobacco companies and the public that low-tar cigarettes were less hazardous than regular cigarettes. Imperial alleges that while Health Canada was initially opposed to the use of health warnings on cigarette packaging, it changed its policy in 1967. It instructed smokers to switch to low-tar cigarettes if they were unwilling to quit smoking altogether, and it asked tobacco companies to voluntarily list the tar and nicotine levels on their advertisements to encourage consumers to purchase low-tar brands. Contrary to expectations, it now appears that low-tar cigarettes are potentially more harmful to smokers.

8 Imperial also alleges that Agriculture Canada researched, developed, manufactured, and licensed several strains of low-tar tobacco, and collected royalties from the companies, including Imperial, that used these strains. By 1982, Imperial pleads, the tobacco strains developed by Agriculture Canada were "almost the only tobacco varieties available to Canadian tobacco manufacturers" (*Knight* case, amended third-party notice of Imperial, at para. 97).

9 Imperial makes five allegations against Canada:

1) Canada is itself liable under the *BPCPA* and the *TPA* as a "supplier" of tobacco products that engaged in deceptive practices, and Imperial is entitled to contribution and indemnity from Canada pursuant to the provisions of the *Negligence Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 333.

2) Canada breached private law duties to consumers by negligently misrepresenting the health attributes of low-tar cigarettes, by failing to warn them against the hazards of low-tar cigarettes, and by failing to design its tobacco strain with due care. Consequently, Imperial alleges that it is entitled to contribution and indemnity from Canada under the *Negligence Act*.

3) Canada breached its private law duties to Imperial by negligently misrepresenting the health attributes of low-tar cigarettes, by failing to warn Imperial about the hazards of low-tar cigarettes, and by failing to design its tobacco strain with due care. Imperial alleges that it is entitled to damages against Canada to the extent of any liability Imperial may have to the class members.

4) In the alternative, Canada is obliged to indemnify Imperial under the doctrine of equitable indemnity.

5) If Canada is not liable to Imperial under any of the above claims, Imperial is entitled to declaratory relief against Canada so that it will remain a party to the action and be subject to discovery procedures under the *Supreme Court Rules*.

10 Canada brought an application to strike the third-party claims. It was successful before Satanove J. in the Supreme Court of British Columbia (*Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, 2007 BCSC 964, 76 B.C.L.R. (4th) 100 (B.C. S.C.)). The chambers judge struck all of the claims against Canada. Imperial was partially successful in the Court of Appeal (2009 BCCA 541, 99 B.C.L.R. (4th) 93 (B.C. C.A.)). The Court of Appeal unanimously struck the statutory claim, the claim of negligent design between Canada and Imperial, and the equitable indemnity claim. However, the majority, *per* Tysoe J.A., held that the two negligent misrepresentation claims and the negligent design claim between Canada and consumers should be allowed to proceed. The majority reasons did not address the failure to warn claim. Hall J.A., dissenting, would have struck all the third-party claims.

B. The Costs Recovery Case

11 The Government of British Columbia has brought a claim under the *CRA* to recover the expense of treating tobacco-related illnesses caused by "tobacco related wrong[s]". Under the *CRA*, manufacturers of tobacco products are liable to the province directly. The claim was brought against 14 tobacco companies. British Columbia alleges that by 1950, these tobacco companies knew or ought to have known that cigarettes were harmful to one's health, and that they failed to properly warn the public about the risks associated with smoking their product.

12 Various defendants in the *Costs Recovery* case, including Imperial, brought third-party notices against Canada for its alleged role in the tobacco industry. I refer to them collectively as the "tobacco companies". The allegations in this claim are strikingly similar to those in the *Knight* case. The tobacco companies plead that Health Canada advised them and the public that low-tar cigarettes were less hazardous and instructed smokers that they should quit smoking or purchase low-tar cigarettes. The tobacco companies allege that Canada was initially opposed to the use of warning labels on cigarette packaging, but ultimately instructed the industry that warning labels should be used and what they should say. The tobacco companies also plead that Agriculture Canada researched, developed, manufactured and licensed the strains of low-tar tobacco which they used for their cigarettes in exchange for royalties.

13 The tobacco companies brought the following claims against Canada:

1) Canada is itself liable under the *CRA* as a "manufacturer" of tobacco products, and the tobacco companies are entitled to contribution and indemnity from Canada pursuant to the *Negligence Act*.

2) Canada breached private law duties to consumers for failure to warn, negligent design, and negligent misrepresentation, and the tobacco companies are entitled to contribution and indemnity from Canada to the extent of any liability they may have to British Columbia under the *CRA*.

3) Canada breached its private law duties owed to the tobacco companies for failure to warn and negligent design, and negligently misrepresented the attributes of low-tar cigarettes. The tobacco companies allege that they are entitled to damages against Canada to the extent of any liability they may have to British Columbia under the *CRA*.

4) In the alternative, Canada is obliged to indemnify the tobacco companies under the doctrine of equitable indemnity.

5) If Canada is not liable to the tobacco companies under any of the above claims, they are entitled to declaratory relief.

14 Canada was successful before the chambers judge, Wedge J., who struck all of the claims (2008 BCSC 419, 82 B.C.L.R. (4th) 362 (B.C. S.C.)). In the Court of Appeal, the majority, *per* Tysoe J.A., allowed the negligent misrepresentation claim between Canada and the tobacco companies to proceed (2009 BCCA 540, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201 (B.C. C.A.)). Hall J.A., dissenting, would have struck all the third-party claims.

III. Issues Before the Court

15 There is significant overlap between the issues on appeal in the *Costs Recovery* case and the *Knight* case, particularly in relation to the common law claims. Both cases discuss whether Canada could be liable at common law in negligent misrepresentation, negligent design and failure to warn, and in equitable indemnity. To reduce duplication, I treat the issues common to both cases together.

16 There are also issues and arguments that are distinct in the two cases. Uniquely in the *Costs Recovery* case, Canada argues that all the contribution claims based on the *Negligence Act* and Canada's alleged duties of care to smokers should be struck because even if these alleged duties were breached, Canada would not be liable to the sole plaintiff British Columbia. The statutory claims are also distinct in the two cases. The issues may therefore be stated as follows:

1. What is the test for striking out claims for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action?
2. Should the claims for contribution and indemnity based on the *Negligence Act* and alleged breaches of duties of care to smokers be struck in the *Costs Recovery* case?
3. Should the tobacco companies' negligent misrepresentation claims be struck out?
4. Should the tobacco companies' claims of failure to warn be struck out?
5. Should the tobacco companies' claims of negligent design be struck out?
6. Should the tobacco companies' claim in the *Costs Recovery* case that Canada could qualify as a "manufacturer" under the *CRA* be struck out?
7. Should Imperial's claim in the *Knight* case that Canada could qualify as a "supplier" under the *TPA* and the *BPCPA* be struck out?
8. Should the tobacco companies' claims of equitable indemnity be struck out?
9. If Canada is not liable to the tobacco companies under any of the third-party claims, are the tobacco companies nonetheless entitled to declaratory relief against Canada so that it will remain a party to both actions and be subject to discovery procedures under the *Supreme Court Rules*?

IV. Analysis

A. The Test for Striking Out Claims

17 The parties agree on the test applicable on a motion to strike for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action under r. 19(24)(a) of the B.C. *Supreme Court Rules*. This Court has reiterated the test on many occasions. A claim will only be struck if it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action: *Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse*, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 (S.C.C.), at para. 15; *Hunt v. T & N plc*, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.), at p. 980. Another way of putting the test is that the claim has no reasonable prospect of success. Where a reasonable prospect of success exists, the matter should be allowed to proceed to trial: see, generally, *D. (B.) v. Children's Aid Society of Halton (Region)*, 2007 SCC 38, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83 (S.C.C.); *Odhavji Estate*; *Hunt*; *Inuit Tapirisat of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [1980] 2 F.C.R. 735 (S.C.C.).

18 Although all agree on the test, the arguments before us revealed different conceptions about how it should be applied. It may therefore be useful to review the purpose of the test and its application.

19 The power to strike out claims that have no reasonable prospect of success is a valuable housekeeping measure essential to effective and fair litigation. It unclutters the proceedings, weeding out the hopeless claims and ensuring that those that have some chance of success go on to trial.

20 This promotes two goods — efficiency in the conduct of the litigation and correct results. Striking out claims that have no reasonable prospect of success promotes litigation efficiency, reducing time and cost. The litigants can focus on serious claims, without devoting days and sometimes weeks of evidence and argument to claims that are in any event hopeless. The same applies to judges and juries, whose attention is focused where it should be — on claims that have a reasonable chance of success. The efficiency gained by weeding out unmeritorious claims in turn contributes to better justice. The more the evidence and arguments are trained on the real issues, the more likely it is that the trial process will successfully come to grips with the parties' respective positions on those issues and the merits of the case.

21 Valuable as it is, the motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care. The law is not static and unchanging. Actions that yesterday were deemed hopeless may tomorrow succeed. Before *McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson*, [1932] A.C. 562 (U.K. H.L.) introduced a general duty of care to one's neighbour premised on foreseeability, few would have predicted that, absent a contractual relationship, a bottling company could be held liable for physical injury and emotional trauma resulting from a snail in a bottle of ginger beer. Before *Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.*, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (U.K. H.L.), a tort action for negligent misstatement would have been regarded as incapable of success. The history of our law reveals that often new developments in the law first surface on motions to strike or similar preliminary motions, like the one at issue in *McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson*. Therefore, on a motion to strike, it is not determinative that the law has not yet recognized the particular claim. The court must rather ask whether, assuming the facts pleaded are true, there is a reasonable prospect that the claim will succeed. The approach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed to trial.

22 A motion to strike for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action proceeds on the basis that the facts pleaded are true, unless they are manifestly incapable of being proven: *Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R.*, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.), at p. 455. No evidence is admissible on such a motion: r. 19(27) of the *Supreme Court Rules* (now r. 9-5(2) of the *Supreme Court Civil Rules*). It is incumbent on the claimant to clearly plead the facts upon which it relies in making its claim. A claimant is not entitled to rely on the possibility that new facts may turn up as the case progresses. The claimant may not be in a position to prove the facts pleaded at the time of the motion. It may only hope to be able to prove them. But plead them it must. The facts pleaded are the firm basis upon which the possibility of success of the claim must be evaluated. If they are not pleaded, the exercise cannot be properly conducted.

23 Before us, Imperial and the other tobacco companies argued that the motion to strike should take into account, not only the facts pleaded, but the possibility that as the case progressed, the evidence would reveal more about Canada's conduct and role in promoting the use of low-tar cigarettes. This fundamentally misunderstands what a motion to strike is about. It is not about evidence, but the pleadings. The facts pleaded are taken as true. Whether the evidence substantiates the pleaded facts, now or at some future date, is irrelevant to the motion to strike. The judge on the motion to strike cannot consider what evidence adduced in the future might or might not show. To require the judge to do so would be to gut the motion to strike of its logic and ultimately render it useless.

24 This is not unfair to the claimant. The presumption that the facts pleaded are true operates in the claimant's favour. The claimant chooses what facts to plead, with a view to the cause of action it is asserting. If new developments raise new possibilities — as they sometimes do — the remedy is to amend the pleadings to plead new facts at that time.

25 Related to the issue of whether the motion should be refused because of the possibility of unknown evidence appearing at a future date is the issue of speculation. The judge on a motion to strike asks if the claim has any reasonable prospect of success.

In the world of abstract speculation, there is a mathematical chance that any number of things might happen. That is not what the test on a motion to strike seeks to determine. Rather, it operates on the assumption that the claim will proceed through the court system in the usual way — in an adversarial system where judges are under a duty to apply the law as set out in (and as it may develop from) statutes and precedent. The question is whether, considered in *the context of the law and the litigation process*, the claim has no reasonable chance of succeeding.

26 With this framework in mind, I proceed to consider the tobacco companies' claims.

B. Canada's Alleged Duties of Care to Smokers in the Costs Recovery Case

27 In the *Costs Recovery* case, Canada argues that all the claims for contribution based on its alleged duties of care to smokers must be struck. Under the *Negligence Act*, Canada submits, contribution may only be awarded if the third party would be liable to the plaintiff directly. It argues that even if Canada breached duties to smokers, such breaches cannot ground the tobacco companies' claims for contribution if they are found liable to British Columbia, the sole plaintiff in the *Costs Recovery* case. This argument was successful in the Court of Appeal.

28 The tobacco companies argue that direct liability to the plaintiff is not a requirement for being held liable in contribution. They argue that contribution in the *Negligence Act* turns on fault, not liability. The object of the *Negligence Act* is to allow defendants to recover from other parties that were also at fault for the damage that resulted to the plaintiff, and barring a claim against Canada would defeat this purpose, they argue.

29 I agree with Canada and the Court of Appeal that a third party may only be liable for contribution under the *Negligence Act* if it is directly liable to the plaintiff. In *Dominion Chain Co. v. Eastern Construction Co.*, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1346 (S.C.C.), dealing with a statutory provision similar to that in British Columbia, Laskin C.J. stated:

I am of the view that it is a precondition of the right to resort to contribution that there be liability to the plaintiff. I am unable to appreciate how a claim for contribution can be made under s. 2(1) by one person against another in respect of loss resulting to a third person unless each of the former two came under a liability to the third person to answer for his loss.

[Emphasis added; p. 1354.]

30 Accordingly, it is plain and obvious that the private law claims against Canada in the *Costs Recovery* case that arise from an alleged duty of care to consumers must be struck. Even if Canada breached duties to smokers, this would have no effect on whether it was liable to British Columbia, the plaintiff in that case. This holding has no bearing on the consumer claim in the *Knight* case since consumers of light or mild cigarettes are the plaintiffs in the underlying action.

31 The discussion of the private law claims in the remainder of these reasons will refer exclusively to the claims based on Canada's alleged duties of care to the tobacco companies in both cases before the Court, and Canada's alleged duties to consumers in the *Knight* case.

C. The Claims for Negligent Misrepresentation

32 There are two types of negligent misrepresentation claims that remain at issue on this appeal. First, in the *Knight* case, Imperial alleges that Canada negligently misrepresented the health attributes of low-tar cigarettes to consumers, and is therefore liable for contribution and indemnity on the basis of the *Negligence Act* if the class members are successful in this suit. Second, in both cases before the Court, Imperial and the other tobacco companies allege that Canada made negligent misrepresentations to the tobacco companies, and that Canada is liable for any losses that the tobacco companies incur to the plaintiffs in either case.

33 Canada applies to have the claims struck on the ground that they have no reasonable prospect of success.

34 For the purposes of the motion to strike, we must accept as true the facts pleaded. We must therefore accept that Canada represented to consumers and to tobacco companies that light or mild cigarettes were less harmful, and that these representations

were not accurate. We must also accept that consumers and the tobacco companies relied on Canada's representations and acted on them to their detriment.

35 The law first recognized a tort action for negligent misrepresentation in *Hedley Byrne*. Prior to this, parties were confined to contractual remedies for misrepresentations. *Hedley Byrne* represented a break with this tradition, allowing a claim for economic loss in tort for misrepresentations made in the absence of a contract between the parties. In the decades that have followed, liability for negligent misrepresentation has been imposed in a variety of situations where the relationship between the parties disclosed sufficient proximity and foreseeability, and policy considerations did not negate liability.

36 Imperial and the other tobacco companies argue that the facts pleaded against Canada bring their claims within the settled parameters of the tort of negligent misrepresentation, and therefore a *prima facie* duty of care is established. The majority in the Court of Appeal accepted this argument in both decisions below (*Knight* case, at paras. 45 and 66; *Costs Recovery* case, at para. 70).

37 The first question is whether the facts as pleaded bring Canada's relationships with consumers and the tobacco companies within a settled category that gives rise to a duty of care. If they do, a *prima facie* duty of care will be established: see *Childs v. Desormeaux*, 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.), at para. 15. However, it is important to note that liability for negligent misrepresentation depends on the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, as discussed more fully below. The question is not whether negligent misrepresentation is a recognized tort, but whether there is a reasonable prospect that the relationship alleged in the pleadings will give rise to liability for negligent misrepresentation.

38 In my view, the facts pleaded do not bring either claim within a settled category of negligent misrepresentation. The law of negligent misrepresentation has thus far not recognized liability in the kinds of relationships at issue in these cases. The error of the tobacco companies lies in assuming that the relationships disclosed by the pleadings between Canada and the tobacco companies on the one hand and between Canada and consumers on the other are like other relationships that have been held to give rise to liability for negligent misrepresentation. In fact, they differ in important ways. It is sufficient at this point to note that the tobacco companies have not been able to point to any case where a government has been held liable in negligent misrepresentation for statements made to an industry. To determine whether such a cause of action has a reasonable prospect of success, we must therefore consider whether the general requirements for liability in tort are met, on the test set out by the House of Lords in *Anns v. Merton London Borough Council* (1977), [1978] A.C. 728 (U.K. H.L.), and somewhat reformulated but consistently applied by this Court, most notably in *Cooper v. Hobart*, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.).

39 At the first stage of this test, the question is whether the facts disclose a relationship of proximity in which failure to take reasonable care might foreseeably cause loss or harm to the plaintiff. If this is established, a *prima facie* duty of care arises and the analysis proceeds to the second stage, which asks whether there are policy reasons why this *prima facie* duty of care should not be recognized: *Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board*, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 (S.C.C.).

(1) Stage One: Proximity and Foreseeability

40 On the first branch of the test, the tobacco companies argue that the facts pleaded establish a sufficiently close and direct, or "proximate", relationship between Canada and consumers (in the *Knight* case) and between Canada and tobacco companies (in both cases) to support a duty of care with respect to government statements about light and mild cigarettes. They also argue that Canada could reasonably have foreseen that consumers and the tobacco industry would rely on Canada's statements about the health advantages of light cigarettes, and that such reliance was reasonable. Canada responds that it was acting exclusively in a regulatory capacity when it made statements to the public and to the industry, which does not give rise to sufficient proximity to ground the alleged duty of care. In the *Costs Recovery* case, Canada also alleges that it could not have reasonably foreseen that the B.C. legislature would enact the *CRA* and therefore cannot be liable for the potential losses of the tobacco companies under that Act.

41 Proximity and foreseeability are two aspects of one inquiry — the inquiry into whether the facts disclose a relationship that gives rise to a *prima facie* duty of care at common law. Foreseeability is the touchstone of negligence law. However, not every foreseeable outcome will attract a commensurate duty of care. Foreseeability must be grounded in a relationship of sufficient closeness, or proximity, to make it just and reasonable to impose an obligation on one party to take reasonable care not to injure the other.

42 Proximity and foreseeability are heightened concerns in claims for economic loss, such as negligent misrepresentation: see, generally, *Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co.*, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 (S.C.C.); *Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd.*, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 (S.C.C.). In a claim of negligent misrepresentation, both these requirements for a *prima facie* duty of care are established if there was a "special relationship" between the parties: *Hercules Management Ltd. v. Ernst & Young*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165 (S.C.C.). In *Hercules Management*, the Court, *per* La Forest J., held that a special relationship will be established where: (1) the defendant ought reasonably to foresee that the plaintiff will rely on his or her representation; and (2) reliance by the plaintiff would be reasonable in the circumstances of the case (para. 24). Where such a relationship is established, the defendant may be liable for loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of a negligent misstatement.

43 A complicating factor is the role that legislation should play when determining if a government actor owed a *prima facie* duty of care. Two situations may be distinguished. The first is the situation where the alleged duty of care is said to arise explicitly or by implication from the statutory scheme. The second is the situation where the duty of care is alleged to arise from interactions between the claimant and the government, and is not negated by the statute.

44 The argument in the first kind of case is that the statute itself creates a private relationship of proximity giving rise to a *prima facie* duty of care. It may be difficult to find that a statute creates sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty of care. Some statutes may impose duties on state actors with respect to particular claimants. However, more often, statutes are aimed at public goods, like regulating an industry (*Cooper*), or removing children from harmful environments (*D. (B.)*). In such cases, it may be difficult to infer that the legislature intended to create private law tort duties to claimants. This may be even more difficult if the recognition of a private law duty would conflict with the public authority's duty to the public: see, e.g., *Cooper* and *D. (B.)*. As stated in *D. (B.)*, "[w]here an alleged duty of care is found to conflict with an overarching statutory or public duty, this may constitute a compelling policy reason for refusing to find proximity" (at para. 28; see also *Fallowka v. Royal Oak Ventures Inc.*, 2010 SCC 5, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 132 (S.C.C.), at para. 39).

45 The second situation is where the proximity essential to the private duty of care is alleged to arise from a series of specific interactions between the government and the claimant. The argument in these cases is that the government has, through its conduct, entered into a special relationship with the plaintiff sufficient to establish the necessary proximity for a duty of care. In these cases, the governing statutes are still relevant to the analysis. For instance, if a finding of proximity would conflict with the state's general public duty established by the statute, the court may hold that no proximity arises: *D. (B.)*; see also *Heaslip Estate v. Mansfield Ski Club Inc.*, 2009 ONCA 594, 96 O.R. (3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.). However, the factor that gives rise to a duty of care in these types of cases is the specific interactions between the government actor and the claimant.

46 Finally, it is possible to envision a claim where proximity is based both on interactions between the parties and the government's statutory duties.

47 Since this is a motion to strike, the question before us is simply whether, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, there is any reasonable prospect of successfully establishing proximity, on the basis of a statute or otherwise. On one hand, where the sole basis asserted for proximity is the statute, conflicting public duties may rule out any possibility of proximity being established as a matter of statutory interpretation: *D. (B.)*. On the other, where the asserted basis for proximity is grounded in specific conduct and interactions, ruling a claim out at the proximity stage may be difficult. So long as there is a reasonable prospect that the asserted interactions could, if true, result in a finding of sufficient proximity, and the statute does not exclude that possibility, the matter must be allowed to proceed to trial, subject to any policy considerations that may negate the *prima facie* duty of care at the second stage of the analysis.

48 As mentioned above, there are two relationships at issue in these claims: the relationship between Canada and consumers (the *Knight* case), and the relationship between Canada and tobacco companies (both cases). The question at this stage is whether there is a *prima facie* duty of care in either or both these relationships. In my view, on the facts pleaded, Canada did not owe a *prima facie* duty of care to consumers, but did owe a *prima facie* duty to the tobacco companies.

49 The facts pleaded in Imperial's third-party notice in the *Knight* case establish no direct relationship between Canada and the consumers of light cigarettes. The relationship between the two was limited to Canada's statements to the general public that low-tar cigarettes are less hazardous. There were no specific interactions between Canada and the class members. Consequently, a finding of proximity in this relationship must arise from the governing statutes: *Cooper*, at para. 43.

50 The relevant statutes establish only general duties to the public, and no private law duties to consumers. The *Department of Health Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 8, establishes that the duties of the Minister of Health relate to "the promotion and preservation of the health of the people of Canada": s. 4(1). Similarly, the *Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-9, s. 4, the *Tobacco Act*, S.C. 1997, c. 13, s. 4, and the *Tobacco Products Control Act*, S.C. 1988, c. 20, s. 3 (repealed), only establish duties to the general public. These general duties to the public do not give rise to a private law duty of care to particular individuals. To borrow the words of Sharpe J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Eliopoulos v. Ontario (Minister of Health & Long Term Care)* (2006), 276 D.L.R. (4th) 411 (Ont. C.A.), "I fail to see how it could be possible to convert any of the Minister's public law discretionary powers, to be exercised in the general public interest, into private law duties owed to specific individuals": para. 17. At the same time, the governing statutes do not foreclose the possibility of recognizing a duty of care to the tobacco companies. Recognizing a duty of care on the government when it makes representations to the tobacco companies about the health attributes of tobacco strains would not conflict with its general duty to protect the health of the public.

51 Turning to the relationship between Canada and the tobacco companies, at issue in both of the cases before the Court, the tobacco companies contend that a duty of care on Canada arose from the transactions between them and Canada over the years. They allege that Canada went beyond its role as regulator of industry players and entered into a relationship of advising and assisting the companies in reducing harm to their consumers. They hope to show that Canada gave erroneous information and advice, knowing that the companies would rely on it, which they did.

52 The question is whether these pleadings bring the tobacco companies within the requirements for a special relationship under the law of negligent misrepresentation as set out in *Hercules Management*. As noted above, a special relationship will be established where (1) the defendant ought reasonably to foresee that the plaintiff will rely on his or her representation, and (2) such reliance would, in the particular circumstances of the case, be reasonable. In the cases at bar, the facts pleaded allege a history of interactions between Canada and the tobacco companies capable of fulfilling these conditions.

53 What is alleged against Canada is that Health Canada assumed duties separate and apart from its governing statute, including research into and design of tobacco and tobacco products and the promotion of tobacco and tobacco products (third-party statement of claim of Imperial in the *Costs Recovery* case, 5 A.R., vol. 2, at p. 66). In addition, it is alleged that Agriculture Canada carried out a programme of cooperation with and support for tobacco growers and cigarette manufacturers including advising cigarette manufacturers of the desirable content of nicotine in tobacco to be used in the manufacture of tobacco products. It is alleged that officials, drawing on their knowledge and expertise in smoking and health matters, provided both advice and directions to the manufacturers including advice that the tobacco strains designed and developed by officials of Agriculture Canada and sold or licensed to the manufacturers for use in their tobacco products would not increase health risks to consumers or otherwise be harmful to them (pp. 109-10). Thus, what is alleged is not simply that broad powers of regulation were brought to bear on the tobacco industry, but that Canada assumed the role of adviser to a finite number of manufacturers and that there were commercial relationships entered into between Canada and the companies based in part on the advice given to the companies by government officials.

54 What is alleged with respect to Canada's interactions with the manufacturers goes far beyond the sort of statements made by Canada to the public at large. Canada is alleged to have had specific interactions with the manufacturers in contrast to the absence of such specific interactions between Canada and the class members. Whereas the claims in relation to consumers

must be founded on a statutory framework establishing very general duties to the public, the claims alleged in relation to the manufacturers are not alleged to arise primarily from such general regulatory duties and powers but from roles undertaken specifically in relation to the manufacturers by Canada apart from its statutory duties, namely its roles as designer, developer, promoter and licensor of tobacco strains. With respect to the issue of reasonable reliance, Canada's regulatory powers over the manufacturers, coupled with its specific advice and its commercial involvement, could be seen as supporting a conclusion that reliance was reasonable in the pleaded circumstance.

55 The indices of proximity offered in *Hercules Management* for a special relationship (direct financial interest; professional skill or knowledge; advice provided in the course of business, deliberately or in response to a specific request) may not be particularly apt in the context of alleged negligent misrepresentations by government. I note, however, that the representations are alleged to have been made in the course of Health Canada's regulatory and other activities, not in the course of casual interaction. They were made specifically to the manufacturers who were subject to Health Canada's regulatory powers and by officials alleged to have special skill, judgment and knowledge.

56 Before leaving this issue, two final arguments must be considered. First, in the *Costs Recovery* case, Canada submits that there is no *prima facie* duty of care between Canada and the tobacco companies because the potential damages that the tobacco companies may incur under the *CRA* were not foreseeable. It argues that "[i]t was not reasonably foreseeable by Canada that a provincial government might create a wholly new type of civil obligation to reimburse costs incurred by a provincial health care scheme in respect of defined tobacco related wrongs, with unlimited retroactive and prospective reach" (A.F. at para. 36).

57 In my view, Canada's argument was correctly rejected by the majority of the Court of Appeal. It is not necessary that Canada should have foreseen the precise statutory vehicle that would result in the tobacco companies' liability. All that is required is that it could have foreseen that its negligent misrepresentations would result in a harm of some sort to the tobacco companies: *Hercules Management*, at paras. 25-26 and 42. On the facts pleaded, it cannot be ruled out that the tobacco companies may succeed in proving that Canada foresaw that the tobacco industry would incur this type of penalty for selling a more hazardous product. As held by Tysoe J.A., it is not necessary that Canada foresee that the liability would extend to health care costs specifically, or that provinces would create statutory causes of action to recover these costs. Rather, "[i]t is sufficient that Canada could have reasonably foreseen in a general way that the appellants would suffer harm if the light and mild cigarettes were more hazardous to the health of smokers than regular cigarettes" (at para. 78).

58 Second, Canada argues that the relationship in this case does not meet the requirement of reasonable reliance because Canada was not acting in a commercial capacity, but rather as a regulator of an industry. It was therefore not reasonable for the tobacco companies to have relied on Canada as an advisor, it submits. This view was adopted by Hall J.A. in dissent, holding that "it could never have been the perception of the appellants that Canada was taking responsibility for their interests" (*Costs Recovery* case, at para. 51).

59 In my view, this argument misconceives the reliance necessary for negligent misrepresentation under the test in *Hercules Management*. When the jurisprudence refers to "reasonable reliance" in the context of negligent misrepresentation, it asks whether it was reasonable for the listener to rely on the speaker's statement as accurate, not whether it was reasonable to believe that the speaker is guaranteeing the accuracy of its statement. It is not plain and obvious that it was unreasonable for the tobacco companies to rely on Canada's statements about the advantages of light or mild cigarettes. In my view, Canada's argument that it was acting as a regulator does not relate to reasonable reliance, although it exposes policy concerns that should be considered at stage two of the *Anns/Cooper* test: *Hercules Management*, at para. 41.

60 In sum, I conclude that the claims between the tobacco companies and Canada should not be struck out at the first stage of the analysis. The pleadings, assuming them to be true, disclose a *prima facie* duty of care in negligent misrepresentation. However, the facts as pleaded in the *Knight* case do not show a relationship between Canada and consumers that would give rise to a duty of care. That claim should accordingly be struck at this stage of the analysis.

(2) Stage Two: Conflicting Policy Considerations

61 Canada submits that there can be no duty of care in the cases at bar because of stage-two policy considerations. It relies on four policy concerns: (1) that the alleged misrepresentations were policy decisions of the government; (2) that recognizing a duty of care would give rise to indeterminate liability to an indeterminate class; (3) that recognizing a duty of care would create an unintended insurance scheme; and (4) that allowing Imperial's claim would transfer responsibility for tobacco products to the government from the manufacturer, and the manufacturer "is best positioned to address liability for economic loss" (A.F., at para. 72).

62 For the reasons that follow, I accept Canada's submission that its alleged negligent misrepresentations to the tobacco industry in both cases should not give rise to tort liability because of stage-two policy considerations. First, the alleged statements are protected expressions of government policy. Second, recognizing a duty of care would expose Canada to indeterminate liability.

(a) Government Policy Decisions

63 Canada contends that it had a policy of encouraging smokers to consume low-tar cigarettes, and pursuant to this policy, promoted this variety of cigarette and developed strains of low-tar tobacco. Canada argues that statements made pursuant to this policy cannot ground tort liability. It relies on the statement of Cory J. in *Just v. British Columbia*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228 (S.C.C.), that "[t]rue policy decisions should be exempt from tortious claims so that governments are not restricted in making decisions based upon social, political or economic factors" (p. 1240).

64 The tobacco companies, for their part, contend that Canada's actions were not matters of policy, but operational acts implementing policy, and therefore, are subject to tort liability. They submit that Canada's argument fails to account for the "facts" as pleaded in the third-party notices, namely that Canada was acting in an operational capacity, and as a participant in the tobacco industry. The tobacco companies also argue that more evidence is required to determine if the government's actions were operational or pursuant to policy, and that the matter should therefore be permitted to go to trial.

65 In the *Knight* case, the majority in the Court of Appeal, *per* Tysoe J.A., agreed with Imperial's submissions, holding that "evidence is required to determine which of the actions and statements of Canada in this case were policy decisions and which were operational decisions" (para. 52). Hall J.A. dissented; in his view, it was clear that all of Canada's initiatives were matters of government policy:

[Canada] had a responsibility, as pleaded in the Third Party Notice, to protect the health of the Canadian public including smokers. Any initiatives it took to develop less hazardous strains of tobacco, or to publish the tar and nicotine yields of different cigarette brands were directed to this end. While the development of new strains of tobacco involved Agriculture Canada, in my view the government engaged in such activities as a regulator of the tobacco industry seeking to protect the health interests of the Canadian public. Policy considerations underlaid all of these various activities undertaken by departments of the federal government. [para. 100]

66 In order to resolve the issue of whether the alleged "policy" nature of Canada's conduct negates the *prima facie* duty of care for negligent misrepresentation established at stage one of the analysis, it is necessary to first consider several preliminary matters.

(i) Conduct at Issue

67 The first preliminary matter is the conduct at issue for purposes of this discussion. The third-party notices describe two distinct types of conduct — one that is related to the allegation of negligent misrepresentation and one that is not. The first type of conduct relates to representations by Canada that low-tar and light cigarettes were less harmful to health than other cigarettes. The second type of conduct relates to Agriculture Canada's role in developing and growing a strain of low-tar tobacco and collecting royalties on the product. In argument, the tobacco companies merged the two types of conduct, emphasizing aspects that cast Canada in the role of a business operator in the tobacco industry. However, in considering negligent misrepresentation, only the first type of conduct — conduct relevant to statements and representations made by Canada — is at issue.

(ii) Relevance of Evidence

68 This brings us to the second and related preliminary matter — the helpfulness of evidence in resolving the question of whether the third-party claims for negligent misrepresentation should be struck. The majority of the Court Appeal concluded that evidence was required to establish whether Canada's alleged misrepresentations were made pursuant to a government policy. Likewise, the tobacco companies in this Court argued strenuously that insofar as Canada was developing, growing, and profiting from low-tar tobacco, it should not be regarded as a government regulator or policy maker, but rather a business operator. Evidence was required, they urged, to determine the extent to which this was business activity.

69 There are two problems with this argument. The first is that, as mentioned, it relies mainly on conduct — the development and marketing of a strain of low-tar tobacco — that is not directly related to the allegation of negligent misrepresentation. The only question at this point of the analysis is whether policy considerations weigh against finding that Canada was under a duty of care to the tobacco companies to take reasonable care to accurately represent the qualities of low-tar tobacco. Whether Canada produced strains of low-tar tobacco is not directly relevant to that inquiry. The question is whether, insofar as it made statements on this matter, policy considerations militate against holding it liable for those statements.

70 The second problem with the argument is that, as discussed above, a motion to strike is, by its very nature, not dependent on evidence. The facts pleaded must be assumed to be true. Unless it is plain and obvious that on those facts the action has no reasonable chance of success, the motion to strike must be refused. To put it another way, if there is a reasonable chance that the matter as pleaded may in fact turn out not to be a matter of policy, then the application to strike must be dismissed. Doubts as to what may be proved in the evidence should be resolved in favour of proceeding to trial. The question for us is therefore whether, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, it is plain and obvious that any duty of care in negligent misrepresentation would be defeated on the ground that the conduct grounding the alleged misrepresentation is a matter of government policy and hence not capable of giving rise to liability in tort.

71 Before we can answer this question, we must consider a third preliminary issue: what constitutes a policy decision immune from review by the courts?

(iii) What Constitutes a Policy Decision Immune from Judicial Review?

72 The question of what constitutes a policy decision that is generally protected from negligence liability is a vexed one, upon which much judicial ink has been spilled. There is general agreement in the common law world that government policy decisions are not justiciable and cannot give rise to tort liability. There is also general agreement that governments may attract liability in tort where government agents are negligent in carrying out prescribed duties. The problem is to devise a workable test to distinguish these situations.

73 The jurisprudence reveals two approaches to the problem, one emphasizing discretion, the other, policy, each with variations. The first approach focuses on the discretionary nature of the impugned conduct. The "discretionary decision" approach was first adopted in *Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office*, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1140 (U.K. H.L.). This approach holds that public authorities should be exempt from liability if they are acting within their discretion, unless the challenged decision is irrational.

74 The second approach emphasizes the "policy" nature of protected state conduct. Policy decisions are conceived of as a subset of discretionary decisions, typically characterized as raising social, economic and political considerations. These are sometimes called "true" or "core" policy decisions. They are exempt from judicial consideration and cannot give rise to liability in tort, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in bad faith. A variant of this is the policy/operational test, in which "true" policy decisions are distinguished from "operational" decisions, which seek to implement or carry out settled policy. To date, the policy/operational approach is the dominant approach in Canada: *Just; Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation & Highways)*, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420 (S.C.C.); *Swinamer v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445 (S.C.C.); *Lewis (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia*, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1145 (S.C.C.).

75 To complicate matters, the concepts of discretion and policy overlap and are sometimes used interchangeably. Thus Lord Wilberforce in *Anns* defined policy as a synonym for discretion (p. 500).

76 There is wide consensus that the law of negligence must account for the unique role of government agencies: *Just*. On the one hand, it is important for public authorities to be liable in general for their negligent conduct in light of the pervasive role that they play in all aspects of society. Exempting all government actions from liability would result in intolerable outcomes. On the other hand, "the Crown is not a person and must be free to govern and make true policy decisions without becoming subject to tort liability as a result of those decisions": *Just*, at p. 1239. The challenge, to repeat, is to fashion a just and workable legal test.

77 The main difficulty with the "discretion" approach is that it has the potential to create an overbroad exemption for the conduct of government actors. Many decisions can be characterized as to some extent discretionary. For this reason, this approach has sometimes been refined or replaced by tests that narrow the scope of the discretion that confers immunity.

78 The main difficulty with the policy/operational approach is that courts have found it notoriously difficult to decide whether a particular government decision falls on the policy or operational side of the line. Even low-level state employees may enjoy some discretion related to how much money is in the budget or which of a range of tasks is most important at a particular time. Is the decision of a social worker when to visit a troubled home, or the decision of a snow-plow operator when to sand an icy road, a policy decision or an operational decision? Depending on the circumstances, it may be argued to be either or both. The policy/operational distinction, while capturing an important element of why some government conduct should generally be shielded from liability, does not work very well as a legal test.

79 The elusiveness of a workable test to define policy decisions protected from judicial review is captured by the history of the issue in various courts. I begin with the House of Lords. The House initially adopted the view that all discretionary decisions of government are immune, unless they are irrational: *Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office*. It then moved on to a two-stage test that asked first whether the decision was discretionary and, if so, rational; and asked second whether it was a core policy decision, in which case it was entirely exempt from judicial scrutiny: *X (minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council*, [1995] 3 All E.R. 353 (U.K. H.L.). Within a year of adopting this two-stage test, the House abandoned it with a ringing declamation of the policy/operational distinction as unworkable in difficult cases, a point said to be evidenced by the Canadian jurisprudence: *Stovin v. Wise*, [1996] A.C. 923 (U.K. H.L.), *per* Lord Hoffman. In its most recent foray into the subject, the House of Lords affirmed that both the policy/operational distinction and the discretionary decision approach are valuable tools for discerning which government decisions attract tort liability, but held that the final test is a "justiciability" test: *Barrett v. Enfield LBC* (1979), [2001] 2 A.C. 550 (Eng. H.L.). The ultimate question on this test is whether the court is institutionally capable of deciding on the question, or "whether the court should accept that it has no role to play" (p. 571). Thus at the end of the long judicial voyage the traveller arrives at a test that essentially restates the question. When should the court hold that a government decision is protected from negligence liability? When the court concludes that the matter is one for the government and not the courts.

80 Australian judges in successive cases have divided between a discretionary/irrationality model and a "true policy" model. In *Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman* (1985), 157 C.L.R. 424 (Australia H.C.), two of the justices (Gibbs C.J. and Wilson J.) adopted the *Dorset Yacht* rule that all discretionary decisions are immune, provided they are rational (p. 442). They endorsed the policy/operational distinction as a logical test for discerning which decisions should be protected, and adopted Lord Wilberforce's definition of policy as a synonym for discretion. Mason J., by contrast, held that only core policy decisions, which he viewed as a narrower subset of discretionary decisions, were protected (p. 500). Deane J. agreed with Mason J. for somewhat different reasons. Brennan J. did not comment on which test should be adopted, leaving the test an open question. The Australian High Court again divided in *Pyrenees Shire Council v. Day*, [1998] H.C.A. 3, 192 C.L.R. 330, with three justices holding that a discretionary government action will only attract liability if it is irrational and two justices endorsing different versions of the policy/operational distinction.

81 In the United States, the liability of the federal government is governed by the *Federal Tort Claims Act* of 1946, 28 U.S.C. ("FTCA"), which waived sovereign immunity for torts, but created an exemption for discretionary decisions. Section 2680(a) excludes liability in tort for

[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

[Emphasis added.]

Significantly, s. 2680(h) of the *FTCA* exempts the federal government from any claim of misrepresentation, either intentional or negligent: *Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond*, 496 U.S. 414 (U.S.S.C. 1990), at p. 430; *U.S. v. Neustadt*, 366 U.S. 696 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1961).

82 Without detailing the complex history of the American jurisprudence on the issue, it suffices to say that the cases have narrowed the concept of discretion in the *FTCA* by reference to the concept of policy. Some cases develop this analysis by distinguishing between policy and operational decisions: e.g., *Dalehite v. United States*, 346 U.S. 15 (U.S. Tex. 1953). The Supreme Court of the United States has since distanced itself from the approach of defining a true policy decision negatively as "not operational", in favour of an approach that asks whether the impugned state conduct was based on public policy considerations. In *United States v. Gaubert*, 499 U.S. 315 (U.S. Tex. 1991), White J. faulted the Court of Appeals for relying on "a nonexistent dichotomy between discretionary functions and operational activities" (p. 326). He held that the "discretionary function exception" of the *FTCA* "*protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy*" (at p. 323, citing *Berkovitz v. U.S.*, 486 U.S. 531 (U.S. Pa. S.C. 1988), at p. 537 (emphasis added)), such as those involving social, economic and political considerations: see also *United States v. S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)*, 467 U.S. 797 (U.S. Cal. 1984).

83 In *Gaubert*, only Scalia J. found lingering appeal in defining policy decisions as "not operational", but only in the narrow sense that people at the operational level will seldom make policy decisions. He stated that "there is something to the planning vs. operational dichotomy — though ... not precisely what the Court of Appeals believed" (p. 335). That "something" is that "[o]rdinarily, an employee working at the operational level is not responsible for policy decisions, even though policy considerations may be highly relevant to his actions". For Scalia J., a government decision is a protected policy decision if it "ought to be informed by considerations of social, economic, or political policy and is made by an officer whose official responsibilities include assessment of those considerations".

84 A review of the jurisprudence provokes the following observations. The first is that a test based simply on the exercise of government discretion is generally now viewed as too broad. Discretion can imbue even routine tasks, like driving a government vehicle. To protect all government acts that involve discretion unless they are irrational simply casts the net of immunity too broadly.

85 The second observation is that there is considerable support in all jurisdictions reviewed for the view that "true" or "core" policy decisions should be protected from negligence liability. The current Canadian approach holds that only "true" policy decisions should be so protected, as opposed to operational decisions: *Just*. The difficulty in defining such decisions does not detract from the fact that the cases keep coming back to this central insight. Even the most recent "justiciability" test in the U.K. looks to this concept for support in defining what should be viewed as justiciable.

86 A third observation is that defining a core policy decision negatively as a decision that it is not an "operational" decision may not always be helpful as a stand-alone test. It posits a stark dichotomy between two water-tight compartments — policy decisions and operational decisions. In fact, decisions in real life may not fall neatly into one category or the other.

87 Instead of defining protected policy decisions negatively, as "not operational", the majority in *Gaubert* defines them positively as discretionary legislative or administrative decisions and conduct that are grounded in social, economic, and political considerations. Generally, policy decisions are made by legislators or officers whose official responsibility requires them to assess and balance public policy considerations. The decision is a considered decision that represents a "policy" in the sense of a general rule or approach, applied to a particular situation. It represents "a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by

a government": *New Oxford Dictionary of English* (1998), at p. 1434. When judges are faced with such a course or principle of action adopted by a government, they generally will find the matter to be a policy decision. The weighing of social, economic, and political considerations to arrive at a course or principle of action is the proper role of government, not the courts. For this reason, decisions and conduct based on these considerations cannot ground an action in tort.

88 Policy, used in this sense, is not the same thing as discretion. Discretion is concerned with whether a particular actor had a choice to act in one way or the other. Policy is a narrow subset of discretionary decisions, covering only those decisions that are based on public policy considerations, like economic, social and political considerations. Policy decisions are always discretionary, in the sense that a different policy could have been chosen. But not all discretionary decisions by government are policy decisions.

89 While the main focus on the *Gaubert* approach is on the nature of the decision, the role of the person who makes the decision may be of assistance. Did the decision maker have the responsibility of looking at social, economic or political factors and formulating a "course" or "principle" of action with respect to a particular problem facing the government? Without suggesting that the question can be resolved simply by reference to the rank of the actor, there is something to Scalia J.'s observation in *Gaubert* that employees working at the operational level are not usually involved in making policy choices.

90 I conclude that "core policy" government decisions protected from suit are decisions as to a course or principle of action that are based on public policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in bad faith. This approach is consistent with the basic thrust of Canadian cases on the issue, although it emphasizes positive features of policy decisions, instead of relying exclusively on the quality of being "non-operational". It is also supported by the insights of emerging jurisprudence here and elsewhere. This said, it does not purport to be a litmus test. Difficult cases may be expected to arise from time to time where it is not easy to decide whether the degree of "policy" involved suffices for protection from negligence liability. A black and white test that will provide a ready and irrefutable answer for every decision in the infinite variety of decisions that government actors may produce is likely chimerical. Nevertheless, most government decisions that represent a course or principle of action based on a balancing of economic, social and political considerations will be readily identifiable.

91 Applying this approach to motions to strike, we may conclude that where it is "plain and obvious" that an impugned government decision is a policy decision, the claim may properly be struck on the ground that it cannot ground an action in tort. If it is not plain and obvious, the matter must be allowed to go to trial.

(iv) Conclusion on the Policy Argument

92 As discussed, the question is whether the alleged representations of Canada to the tobacco companies that low-tar cigarettes are less harmful to health are matters of policy, in the sense that they constitute a course or principle of action of the government. If so, the representations cannot ground an action in tort.

93 The third-party notices plead that Canada made statements to the public (and to the tobacco companies) warning about the hazards of smoking, and asserting that low-tar cigarettes are less harmful than regular cigarettes; that the representations that low-tar cigarettes are less harmful to health were false; and that insofar as consumption caused extra harm to consumers for which the tobacco companies are held liable, Canada is required to indemnify the tobacco companies and/or contribute to their losses.

94 The third-party notices implicitly accept that in making the alleged representations, Health Canada was acting out of concern for the health of Canadians, pursuant to its policy of encouraging smokers to switch to low-tar cigarettes. They assert, in effect, that Health Canada had a policy to warn the public about the hazardous effects of smoking, and to encourage healthier smoking habits among Canadians. The third-party claims rest on the allegation that Health Canada accepted that some smokers would continue to smoke despite the adverse health effects, and decided that these smokers should be encouraged to smoke lower-tar cigarettes.

95 In short, the representations on which the third-party claims rely were part and parcel of a government policy to encourage people who continued to smoke to switch to low-tar cigarettes. This was a "true" or "core" policy, in the sense of a course or principle of action that the government adopted. The government's alleged course of action was adopted at the highest level in the Canadian government, and involved social and economic considerations. Canada, on the pleadings, developed this policy out of concern for the health of Canadians and the individual and institutional costs associated with tobacco-related disease. In my view, it is plain and obvious that the alleged representations were matters of government policy, with the result that the tobacco companies' claims against Canada for negligent misrepresentation must be struck out.

96 Having concluded that the claims for negligent misrepresentation are not actionable because the alleged representations were matters of government policy, it is not necessary to canvas the other stage-two policy grounds that Canada raised against the third-party claims relating to negligent misrepresentation. However, since the argument about indeterminate liability was fully argued, I will briefly discuss it. In my view, it confirms that no liability in tort should be recognized for Canada's alleged misrepresentations.

(b) Indeterminate Liability

97 Canada submits that allowing the defendants' claims in negligent misrepresentation would result in indeterminate liability, and must therefore be rejected. It submits that Canada had no control over the number of cigarettes being sold. It argues that in cases of economic loss, the courts must limit liability to cases where the third party had a means of controlling the extent of liability.

98 The tobacco companies respond that Canada faces extensive, but not indeterminate liability. They submit that the scope of Canada's liability to tobacco companies is circumscribed by the tort of negligent misrepresentation. Canada would only be liable to the smokers of light cigarettes and to the tobacco companies.

99 I agree with Canada that the prospect of indeterminate liability is fatal to the tobacco companies' claims of negligent misrepresentation. Insofar as the claims are based on representations to consumers, Canada had no control over the number of people who smoked light cigarettes. This situation is analogous to *Cooper v. Hobart*, where this Court held that it would have declined to apply a duty of care to the Registrar of Mortgage Brokers in respect of economic losses suffered by investors because "[t]he Act itself imposes no limit and the Registrar has no means of controlling the number of investors or the amount of money invested in the mortgage brokerage system" (para. 54). While this statement was made in *obiter*, the argument is persuasive.

100 The risk of indeterminate liability is enhanced by the fact that the claims are for pure economic loss. In *Design Services Ltd. v. R.*, 2008 SCC 22, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.), the Court, *per* Rothstein J., held that "in cases of pure economic loss, to paraphrase Cardozo C.J., care must be taken to find that a duty is recognized only in cases where the class of plaintiffs, the time and the amounts are determinate" (para. 62). If Canada owed a duty of care to consumers of light cigarettes, the potential class of plaintiffs and the amount of liability would be indeterminate.

101 Insofar as the claims are based on representations to the tobacco companies, they are at first blush more circumscribed. However, this distinction breaks down on analysis. Recognizing a duty of care for representations to the tobacco companies would effectively amount to a duty to consumers, since the quantum of damages owed to the companies in both cases would depend on the number of smokers and the number of cigarettes sold. This is a flow-through claim of negligent misrepresentation, where the tobacco companies are passing along their potential liability to consumers and to the province of British Columbia. In my view, in both cases, these claims should fail because Canada was not in control of the extent of its potential liability.

(c) Summary on Stage-Two Policy Arguments

102 In my view, this Court should strike the negligent misrepresentation claims in both cases as a result of stage-two policy concerns about interfering with government policy decisions and the prospect of indeterminate liability.

D. Failure to Warn

103 The tobacco companies make two allegations of failure to warn: B.A.T. alleges that Canada directed the tobacco companies not to provide warnings on cigarette packages (the labelling claim) about the health hazards of cigarettes; and Imperial alleges that Canada failed to warn the tobacco companies about the dangers posed by the strains of tobacco designed and licensed by Canada.

(1) Labelling Claim

104 B.A.T. alleges that by instructing the industry to not put warning labels on their cigarettes, Canada is liable in tort for failure to warn. In the *Knight* case, Tysoe J.A. did not address the failure to warn claims. Hall J.A., writing for the minority, would have struck those claims on stage-two grounds, finding that Canada's decision was a policy decision and that liability would be indeterminate. Hall J.A. also held that liability would conflict with the government's public duties (para. 99). In the *Costs Recovery* case, Tysoe J.A. adopted Hall J.A.'s analysis from the *Knight* case in rejecting the failure to warn claim as between Canada and the tobacco companies (para. 89). B.A.T. challenges these findings.

105 The crux of this failure to warn claim is essentially the same as the negligent misrepresentation claim, and should be rejected for the same policy reasons. The Minister of Health's recommendations on warning labels were integral to the government's policy of encouraging smokers to switch to low-tar cigarettes. As such, they cannot ground a claim in failure to warn.

(2) Failure to Warn Imperial About Health Hazards

106 The Court of Appeal, *per* Tysoe J.A., held that the third-party notices did not sufficiently plead that Canada failed to warn the industry about the health hazards of its strains of tobacco. Imperial argues that this was in error, because the elements of a failure to warn claim are identical to the elements of the negligence claim, which was sufficiently pleaded.

107 Canada points out that the two paragraphs of the third-party notices that discuss failure to warn only mention the claims that relate to labels, and not the claim that Canada failed to warn Imperial about potential health hazards of the tobacco strains. Canada also argues that to support a claim of failure to warn, the plaintiff must not only show that the defendant acted negligently, but that the defendant was also under a positive duty to act. It submits that nothing in the third-party notices suggests that Canada was under such a positive duty here.

108 I agree with Canada that the tort of failure to warn requires evidence of a positive duty towards the plaintiff. Positive duties in tort law are the exception rather than the rule. In *Childs v. Desormeaux*, the Court held:

Although there is no doubt that an omission may be negligent, as a general principle, the common law is a jealous guardian of individual autonomy. Duties to take positive action in the face of risk or danger are not free-standing. Generally, the mere fact that a person faces danger, or has become a danger to others, does not itself impose any kind of duty on those in a position to become involved. [para. 31]

Moreover, none of the authorities cited by Imperial support the proposition that a plea of negligence, without more, will suffice to raise a duty to warn: *Day v. Central Okanagan (Regional District)*, 2000 BCSC 1134, 79 B.C.L.R. (3d) 36 (B.C. S.C.), *per* Drossos J.; see also *Elias v. Headache & Pain Management Clinic* [2008 CarswellOnt 8657 (Ont. S.C.J.)], 2008 CanLII 53133, *per* Macdonald J. (paras. 6 to 9).

109 Even if pleading negligence were viewed as sufficient to raise a claim of duty to warn, which I do not accept, the claim would fail for the stage-two policy reasons applicable to the negligent misrepresentation claim.

E. Negligent Design

110 The tobacco companies have brought two types of negligent design claims against Canada that remain to be considered. First, they submit that Canada breached its duty of care to the tobacco companies when it negligently designed its strains of low-tar tobacco. The Court of Appeal held that the pleadings supported a *prima facie* duty of care in this respect, but held that

the duty was negated by the stage-two policy concern of indeterminate liability. Second, Imperial submits that Canada breached its duty of care to the consumers of light and mild cigarettes in the *Knight* case. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that this claim should proceed to trial.

111 In my view, both remaining negligent design claims establish a *prima facie* duty of care, but fail at the second stage of the analysis because they relate to core government policy decisions.

(1) Prima Facie Duty of Care

112 I begin with the claim that Canada owed a *prima facie* duty of care to the tobacco companies. Canada submits that there was no *prima facie* duty of care since there is no proximity between Canada and the tobacco companies, relying on the same arguments that it raises in the negligent misrepresentations claims.

113 In my view, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that Canada owed a *prima facie* duty of care towards the tobacco companies with respect to its design of low-tar tobacco strains. I agree with Tysoe J.A. that the alleged relationship in this case meets the requirements for proximity:

If sufficient proximity exists in the relationship between a designer of a product and a purchaser of the product, it would seem to me to follow that there is sufficient proximity in the relationship between the designer of a product and a manufacturer who uses the product in goods sold to the public. Also, the designer of the product ought reasonably to have the manufacturer in contemplation as a person who would be affected by its design in the context of the present case. It would have been reasonably foreseeable to the designer of the product that a manufacturer of goods incorporating the product could be required to refund the purchase price paid by consumers if the design of the product did not accomplish that which it was intended to accomplish. [*Knight* case, para. 67]

114 The allegation is that Canada was acting like a private company conducting business, and conducted itself toward the tobacco companies in a way that established proximity. The proximity alleged is not based on a statutory duty, but on interactions between Canada and the tobacco companies. Canada's argument that a duty of care would result in conflicting private and public duties does not negate proximity arising from conduct, although it may be a relevant stage-two policy consideration.

115 For similar reasons, I conclude that on the facts pleaded, Canada owed a *prima facie* duty of care to the consumers of light and mild cigarettes in the *Knight* case. On the facts pleaded, it is at least arguable that Canada was acting in a commercial capacity when it designed its strains of tobacco. As Tysoe J.A. held in the court below, "a person who designs a product intended for sale to the public owes a *prima facie* duty of care to the purchasers of the product" (para. 48).

(2) Stage-Two Policy Considerations

116 For the reasons given in relation to the negligent misrepresentation claim, I am of the view that stage-two policy considerations negate this *prima facie* duty of care for the claims of negligent design. The decision to develop low-tar strains of tobacco on the belief that the resulting cigarettes would be less harmful to health is a decision that constitutes a course or principle of action based on Canada's health policy. It was a decision based on social and economic factors. As a core government policy decision, it cannot ground a claim for negligent design. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the argument of indeterminate liability also raised as a stage- two policy objection to the claim of negligent design.

F. The Direct Claims Under the Costs Recovery Act

117 The tobacco companies submit that the Court of Appeal erred when it held that it was plain and obvious that Canada could not qualify as a manufacturer under the *CRA*. They also present three alternative arguments: (1) that if Canada is not liable under the Act, it is liable under the recently adopted *Health Care Costs Recovery Act*, S.B.C. 2008, c. 27 ("*HCCRA*"); (2) that if Canada is not liable under either the *CRA* or the *HCCRA*, it is nonetheless liable to the defendants for contribution under the *Negligence Act*; and (3) that in the further alternative, Canada could be liable for contribution under the common law (joint factum of Rothmans, Benson & Hedges ("*RBH*") and Philip Morris only).

118 Section 2 of the *CRA* establishes that "[t]he government has a direct and distinct action against a manufacturer to recover the cost of health care benefits caused or contributed to by a tobacco related wrong". The words "manufacture" and "manufacturer" are defined in s. 1 of the Act as follows:

"**manufacture**" includes, for a tobacco product, the production, assembly or packaging of the tobacco product;

"**manufacturer**" means a person who manufactures or has manufactured a tobacco product and includes a person who currently or in the past

(a) causes, directly or indirectly, through arrangements with contractors, subcontractors, licensees, franchisees or others, the manufacture of a tobacco product,

(b) for any fiscal year of the person, derives at least 10% of revenues, determined on a consolidated basis in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in Canada, from the manufacture or promotion of tobacco products by that person or by other persons,

(c) engages in, or causes, directly or indirectly, other persons to engage in the promotion of a tobacco product, or

(d) is a trade association primarily engaged in

(i) the advancement of the interests of manufacturers,

(ii) the promotion of a tobacco product, or

(iii) causing, directly or indirectly, other persons to engage in the promotion of a tobacco product;

The third-party notices allege that Canada grew (manufactured) tobacco and licensed it to the tobacco industry for a profit, and that Canada "promoted" the use of mild or light cigarettes to the industry and the public. These facts, they say, brings Canada within the definition of "manufacturer" of the *CRA*.

119 Canada submits that it is not a manufacturer under the Act. In the alternative, it submits that it is immune from the operation of this provincial statute at common law and alternatively under the Constitution.

120 For the reasons that follow, I conclude that Canada is not a manufacturer under the Act. Indeed, holding Canada accountable under the *CRA* would defeat the legislature's intention of transferring the health-care costs resulting from tobacco related wrongs from taxpayers to the tobacco industry. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider Canada's arguments that it would in any event be immune from liability under the provincial Act. I would also reject the tobacco companies' argument for contribution under the *HCCRA* and the *Negligence Act*, and the common law contribution argument.

(1) Could Canada Qualify as a Manufacturer Under the Costs Recovery Act?

121 The Court of Appeal held that the definition of "manufacturer" could not apply to the Government of Canada. I agree. While the argument that Canada could qualify as a manufacturer under the *CRA* has superficial appeal, when the Act is read in context and all of its provisions are taken into account, it is apparent that the British Columbia legislature did not intend for Canada to be liable as a manufacturer. This is confirmed by the text of the statute, the intent of the legislature in adopting the Act, and the broader context of the relationship between the province and the federal government.

(a) Text of the Statute

122 The definition of manufacturer in s. 1 "manufacturer" (b) of the Act includes a person who "for any fiscal year of the person, derives at least 10% of revenues, determined on a consolidated basis in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in Canada, from the manufacture or promotion of tobacco products by that person or by other persons". Hall J.A.

held that this definition indicated that the legislature intended the Act to apply to companies involved in the tobacco industry, and not to governments.

123 The tobacco companies respond that the definition of "manufacturer" is disjunctive since it uses the word "or", such that an individual will qualify as a manufacturer if it meets any of the four definitions in (a) to (d). Even if Canada is incapable of meeting the definition in (b) of the Act (deriving 10% of its revenues from the manufacture or promotion of tobacco products), Canada qualifies under subparagraphs (a) (causing the manufacture of tobacco products) and (c) (engaging in or causing others to engage in the promotion of tobacco products) on the facts pled, they argue.

124 Like the Court of Appeal, I would reject this argument. It is true that s. 1 must be read disjunctively, and that an individual will qualify as a manufacturer if it meets any of the four definitions in (a) to (d). However, the Act must nevertheless be read purposively and as a whole. A proper reading of the Act will therefore take each of the four definitions into account. It will also consider the rest of the statutory scheme, and the legislative context. When the Act is read in this way, it is clear that the B.C. legislature did not intend to include the federal government as a potential manufacturer under the *CRA*.

125 The fact that one of the statutory definitions is based on revenue percentage suggests that the term "manufacturer" is meant to capture businesses or individuals who earn profit from tobacco-related activities. This interpretation is reinforced by the provisions of the Act that establish the liability of defendants. Section 3(3)(b) provides that "each defendant to which the presumptions [provided in s. 3(2) of the *CRA*] apply is liable for the proportion of the aggregate cost referred to in paragraph (a) equal to its market share in the type of tobacco product". This language cannot be stretched to include the Government of Canada.

126 I conclude that the text of the *CRA*, read as a whole, does not support the view that Canada is a "manufacturer" under the Act.

(b) Legislative Intention

127 I agree with Canada that considerations related to legislative intent further support the view that Canada does not fall within the definition of "manufacturer". When the *CRA* was introduced in the legislature, the Minister responsible stated that "the industry" manufactured a lethal product, and that "the industry" composed of "tobacco companies" should accordingly be held accountable (B.C. *Debates of the Legislative Assembly*, vol. 20, 4th Sess., 36th Parl., June 7, 2000, at p. 16314). It is plain and obvious that the Government of Canada would not fit into these categories.

128 Imperial submits that it is improper to rely on excerpts from *Hansard* on an application to strike a pleading, since evidence is not admissible on such an application. However, a distinction lies between evidence that is introduced to prove a point of fact and evidence of legislative intent that is provided to assist the court in discerning the proper interpretation of a statute. The former is not relevant on an application to strike; the latter may be. Applications to strike are intended to economize judicial resources in cases where on the facts pled, the law does not support the plaintiff's claim. Courts may consider all evidence relevant to statutory interpretation, in order to achieve this purpose.

(c) Broader Context

129 The broader context of the statute strongly supports the conclusion that the British Columbia legislature did not intend the federal government to be liable as a manufacturer of tobacco products. The object of the Act is to recover the cost of providing health care to British Columbians from the companies that sold them tobacco products. As held by this Court in *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 (S.C.C.):

[T]he driving force of the Act's cause of action is compensation for the government of British Columbia's health care costs, not remediation of tobacco manufacturers' breaches of duty. While the Act makes the existence of a breach of duty one of several necessary conditions to a manufacturer's liability to the government, it is not the mischief at which the cause of action created by the Act is aimed. [para. 40]

The legislature sought to transfer the medical costs from provincial taxpayers to the private sector that sold a harmful product. This object would be fundamentally undermined if the funds were simply recovered from the federal government, which draws its revenue from the same taxpayers.

130 The tobacco companies' proposed application of the *CRA* to Canada is particularly problematic in light of the long-standing funding relationship between the federal and provincial governments with regards to health care. The federal government has been making health transfer payments to the provinces for decades. As held by Hall J.A.:

If the *Costs Recovery Act* were to be construed to permit the inclusion of Canada as a manufacturer targeted for the recovery of provincial health costs, this would permit a direct economic claim to be advanced against Canada by British Columbia to obtain further funding for health care costs. In light of these longstanding fiscal arrangements between governments, I cannot conceive that the legislature of British Columbia could ever have envisaged that Canada might be a target under the *Costs Recovery Act*. [para. 33]

131 Imperial argues that the only way to achieve the object of the *CRA* is to allow the province to recover from all those who participated in the tobacco industry, including the federal government. I disagree. Holding the federal government accountable under the Act would defeat the legislature's intention of transferring the cost of medical treatment from taxpayers to the tobacco industry.

(d) Summary

132 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that it is plain and obvious that the federal government does not qualify as a manufacturer of tobacco products under the *CRA*. This pleading must therefore be struck.

(2) *Could Canada Be Found Liable Under the Health Care Costs Recovery Act?*

133 The tobacco companies submit that if Canada is not liable under the *CRA*, it would be liable under the *HCCRA*, which creates a cause of action for the province to recover health care costs generally from wrongdoers (s. 8(1)). Canada submits that the *HCCRA* is inapplicable because it provides that the cause of action does not apply to cases that qualify as "tobacco related wrong[s]" under the *CRA* (s. 24(3)(b)). RBH and Philip Morris respond that a "tobacco related wrong" under the *CRA* may only be committed by a "manufacturer". Consequently, if the *CRA* does not apply to Canada because it cannot qualify as a manufacturer, it is not open to Canada to argue that the more general *HCCRA* does not apply either.

134 In my view, the tobacco companies cannot rely on the *HCCRA* in a *CRA* action for contribution. While it is true that Canada is incapable of committing a tobacco-related wrong itself if it is not a manufacturer, the underlying cause of action in this case is that it is the defendants who are alleged to have committed a tobacco-related wrong. The *HCCRA* specifies that it does not apply in cases "arising out of a tobacco related wrong as defined in the *Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act*" (s. 24(3)(b)). This precludes contribution claims arising out of that Act.

(3) *Could Canada Be Liable for Contribution Under the Negligence Act if It Is not Directly Liable to British Columbia?*

135 RBH and Philip Morris submit that even if Canada is not liable to British Columbia, it can still be held liable for contribution under the *Negligence Act*. They argue that direct liability to the plaintiff is not a requirement for being held liable in contribution.

136 As noted above, I agree with Canada's submission that, following *Giffels*, a party can only be liable for contribution if it is also liable to the plaintiff directly.

137 Accordingly, I would reject the argument that the *Negligence Act* in British Columbia allows recovery from a third party that could not be liable to the plaintiff.

(4) *Could Canada Be Liable for Common Law Contribution?*

138 RBH and Philip Morris submit that if this Court rejects the contribution claim under the *Negligence Act*, it should allow a contribution claim under the common law. They rely on this Court's decisions in *Bow Valley* and *Blackwater v. Plint*, 2005 SCC 58, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), in which this Court recognized claims of contribution which were not permitted by statute.

139 I would reject this argument. In my view, the cases cited by RBH and Philip Morris support common law contribution claims only if the third party is directly liable to the plaintiff. In *Bow Valley*, the Court recognized a limited right of contribution "between tortfeasors", and noted that the defendants were "jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff" (paras. 101 and 102). A similar point was made by this Court in *Blackwater* (per McLachlin C.J.), which stated that a "common law right of contribution between tortfeasors may exist" (para. 68 (emphasis added)). There is no support in our jurisprudence for allowing contribution claims in cases where the third party is not liable to the plaintiff.

G. Liability Under the Trade Practices Act and the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act

140 In the *Knight* case, Imperial alleges that Canada satisfies the definition of a "supplier" under the *Trade Practices Act* (*TPA*) and the *Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act* (*BPCPA*). The *TPA* was repealed and replaced by the *BPCPA* in 2004. Imperial argues that the Court of Appeal erred in striking its claim against Canada under these statutes.

141 In my view, Canada could not qualify as a "supplier" under the Acts on the facts pled. Section 1 of the *TPA* defined supplier as follows:

"**supplier**" means a person, other than a consumer, who in the course of the person's business solicits, offers, advertises or promotes the disposition or supply of the subject of a consumer transaction or who engages in, enforces or otherwise participates in a consumer transaction, whether or not privity of contract exists between that person and the consumer, and includes the successor to, and assignee of, any rights or obligations of the supplier.

Section 1 of the *BPCPA* defines supplier as follows:

"**supplier**" means a person, whether in British Columbia or not, who in the course of business participates in a consumer transaction by

- (a) supplying goods or services or real property to a consumer, or
- (b) soliciting, offering, advertising or promoting with respect to a transaction referred to in paragraph (a) of the definition of "consumer transaction",

whether or not privity of contract exists between that person and the consumer, and includes the successor to, and assignee of, any rights or obligations of that person and, except in Parts 3 to 5 [*Rights of Assignees and Guarantors Respecting Consumer Credit; Consumer Contracts; Disclosure of the Cost of Consumer Credit*], includes a person who solicits a consumer for a contribution of money or other property by the consumer;

142 The Court of Appeal unanimously held that neither definition could apply to Canada because its alleged actions were not undertaken "in the course of business". The court held that the pleadings allege that Canada promoted the use of mild or light cigarettes, but only in order to reduce the health risks of smoking, not in the course of a business carried on for the purpose of earning a profit (para. 35).

143 Imperial submits that it is not necessary for Canada to have been motivated by profit to qualify as a "supplier" under the Acts, provided it researched, designed and manufactured a defective product. Canada responds that its alleged purpose of improving the health of Canadians shows that it was not acting in the course of business. This was not a case where a public authority was itself operating in the private market as a business, but rather a case where a public authority sought to regulate the industry by promoting a type of cigarette.

144 I accept that Canada's purpose for developing and promoting tobacco as described in the third-party notice suggests that it was not acting "in the course of business" or "in the course of the person's business" as those phrases are used in the *TPA* or the *BPCPA*, and therefore that Canada could not be a "supplier" under either of those statutes. The phrases "in the course of business" and "in the course of the person's business" may have different meanings, depending of the context. On the one hand, they can be read as including all activities that an individual undertakes in his or her professional life: e.g., see discussion of the indicia of reasonable reliance above. On the other, they can be understood as limited to activities undertaken for a commercial purpose. In my view, the contexts in which the phrases are used in the *TPA* and the *BPCPA* support the latter interpretation. The definitions of "supplier" in both Acts refer to "consumer transaction[s]", and contrast suppliers, who must have a commercial purpose, with consumers. It is plain and obvious from the facts pleaded that Canada did not promote the use of low-tar cigarettes for a commercial purpose, but for a health purpose. Canada is therefore not a supplier under the *TPA* or the *BPCPA*, and the contribution claim based on this ground and the *Negligence Act* should be struck.

145 Having concluded that Canada is not liable under the *TPA* and the *BPCPA*, it is unnecessary to consider whether, if it were, Canada would be protected by Crown immunity.

H. The Claim for Equitable Indemnity

146 RBH and Philip Morris submit that if the tobacco companies are found liable in the *Costs Recovery* case, Canada is liable for "equitable indemnity" on the facts pleaded. They submit that whenever a person requests or directs another person to do something that causes the other to incur liability, the requesting or directing person is liable to indemnify the other for its liability. Imperial adopts this argument in the *Knight* case.

147 Equitable indemnity is a narrow doctrine, confined to situations of an express or implied understanding that a principal will indemnify its agent for acting on the directions given. As stated in *Parmley v. Parmley*, [1945] S.C.R. 635 (S.C.C.), claims of equitable indemnity "proceed upon the notion of a request which one person makes under circumstances from which the law implies that both parties understand that the person who acts upon the request is to be indemnified if he does so" (p. 648, quoting Bowen L.J. in *Birmingham & District Land Co. v. London & North Western Railway* (1886), 34 Ch. D. 261 (Eng. C.A.), at p. 275).

148 In my view, the Court of Appeal, *per* Hall J.A., correctly held that the tobacco companies could not establish this requirement of the claim:

[I]f the notional reasonable observer were asked whether or not Canada, in the interaction it had over many decades with the appellants, was undertaking to indemnify them from some future liability that might be incurred relating to their business, the observer would reply that this could not be a rational expectation, having regard to the relationship between the parties. Likewise, if Canada through its agents had been specifically asked or a suggestion had been made to its agents by representatives of the appellants that Canada might in future be liable for any such responsibility or incur such a liability, the answer would have been firmly in the negative. [*Costs Recovery* case, para. 57]

When Canada directed the tobacco industry about how it should conduct itself, it was doing so in its capacity as a government regulator that was concerned about the health of Canadians. Under such circumstances, it is unreasonable to infer that Canada was implicitly promising to indemnify the industry for acting on its request.

I. Procedural Considerations

149 In the courts below, the tobacco companies argued that even if the claims for compensation against Canada are struck, Canada should remain a third party in the litigation for procedural reasons. The tobacco companies argued that their ability to mount defences against British Columbia in the *Costs Recovery* case and the class members in the *Knight* case would be severely prejudiced if Canada was no longer a third party. This argument was rejected in chambers by both Wedge J. and Satanove J. The majority of the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to consider the question, while Hall J.A. would have affirmed the holdings of the chambers judges.

150 The tobacco companies did not pursue this issue on appeal. I would affirm the findings of Wedge J., Satanove J. and Hall J.A. and strike the claims for declaratory relief.

V. Conclusion

151 I conclude that it is plain and obvious that the tobacco companies' claims against Canada have no reasonable chance of success, and should be struck out. Canada's appeals in the *Costs Recovery* case and the *Knight* case are allowed, and the cross-appeals are dismissed. Costs are awarded throughout against Imperial in the *Knight* case, and against the tobacco companies in the *Costs Recovery* case. No costs are awarded against or in favour of British Columbia in the *Costs Recovery* case.

Crown's appeals allowed; defendants' cross-appeals dismissed.

Pourvois de l'État accueillis; pourvois incidents des défenderesses rejetés.

Footnotes

* A corrigendum issued by the Court on September 29, 2011 has been incorporated herein.

DBDC SPADINA LTD., et al
Applicants

NORMA WALTON, et al
Respondents

Court File No. CV-13-10280-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(Commercial List)

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

Book of Authorities of Schonfeld Inc.
*(“Counter-Application” of the Respondents
returnable March 15, 2016 re: various
procedural relief and Manager’s Motion
returnable March 15, 2016 for an Order Striking
Certain Portions of the Respondents’ “Notice of
Counter-Application”)*

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